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*to explore the implications
of Christianity for our times*

TILlich	•	GOUHIER	•	FRIEDMANN
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COMPOSITION. 1933. Joan Miro

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
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


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ART AND ULTIMATE REALITY

PAUL TILLICH

IT IS A GREAT and unexpected honor that I have been asked to give an address in a place which for years has been for me a favored oasis within this beloved city of New York. It is an unexpected honor; for I am far from being considered an expert in the visual arts—or in any other art. I could accept the invitation to speak here only because the Museum planned a series of "Art and" lectures, the first of which was to be "Art and Religion." It is the religious angle from which I am asked to look at the visual arts. This means that I must do it as a theologian and a philosopher.

A disadvantage of such an approach is obvious. One must conceptualize and generalize, where intuitive penetration into the particular creation is the first

and all-determining task. It is well known that many artists feel uneasy if their works are subsumed to categories; nevertheless, art criticism is as necessary as literary criticism. It serves to guide one to the point where the immediate intuitive approach to the particular work can occur. Attempts at conceptualization like the following should be judged in the light of the demand to make such criticism finally superfluous.

The series of the "Art and" lectures was supposed to begin with the lecture on art and religion, but it does not. Instead, I intend to speak about art and ultimate reality, a subject which, although including religion, transcends by far what is usually called religious. Ultimate reality underlies every reality, and it characterizes the whole appearing world as non-ultimate, preliminary, transitory and finite.

These are philosophical terms, but the attitude in which they originally have been conceived is universally known. It is the awareness of the deceptive character of the surface of everything we encounter which drives one to discover what is below the surface. But soon we realize that even if we break through the surface of a thing or person or an event, new deceptions arise. So we try to dig further through what lies deepest below the surface—to the truly real which cannot deceive us. We search for an ultimate reality, for something lasting in the flux of transitoriness and finitude. All philosophers searched for it, even if they called change itself the unchanging in all being. They gave different names to ultimate reality expressing in such names their own anxieties, their longing, their

Dr. Paul Tillich, professor of Theology at Harvard University, needs no introduction. Oxford University Press recently brought out a collection of his writings, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE, and the Yale paperback series has made available his COURAGE TO BE.

The present essay was originally given as a lecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York City (Feb. 17, 1959), sponsored by its Junior Council as part of a series of talks, "Dimensions 1959." Dr. Tillich was able to punctuate his talk with many slides which represented examples of the various stylistic elements he was discussing. The spontaneous form of Dr. Tillich's lecture has been retained, together with the transcription of the question-and-answer period that followed. We have also provided black-and-white reproductions of some of the paintings mentioned by the author.

courage, but also their cognitive problems and discoveries about the nature of reality. The concepts in which ultimate reality is expressed, the way philosophy reached them and applied them to the whole of reality fills the pages of the history of philosophy. It is a fascinating story just as is the history of the arts in which ultimate reality is expressed in artistic forms. And actually, they are not two histories. Philosophical and artistic expressions of the experience of ultimate reality correspond to each other. But dealing with such parallels would trespass the limits of my subject.

The term "ultimate reality" is *not* another name for God in the religious sense of the word. But the God of religion would not be God if he were not first of all ultimate reality. On the one hand, the God of religion is more than ultimate reality. Yet religion can speak of the divinity of the divine only if God is ultimate reality. If he were anything less, namely, a being—even the highest—he would be on the level of all other beings. He would be conditioned by the structure of being like everything that is. He would cease to be God.

From this follows a decisive consequence. If the idea of God includes ultimate reality, everything that expresses ultimate reality expresses God whether it intends to do so or not. And there is nothing that could be excluded from this possibility because everything that has being is an expression, however preliminary and transitory it may be, of being-itself, of ultimate reality.

The word "expression" requires some consideration. First, it is obvious that if something expresses something else—as, for instance, language expresses thought—they are not the same. There is a gap between that which expresses and that which is expressed. But there is also a

point of identity between them. It is the riddle and the depth of all expression that it both reveals and hides at the same time. And if we say that the universe is an expression of ultimate reality, we say that the universe and everything in it both reveals and hides ultimate reality. This should prevent us from a religious glorification of the world as well as from an anti-religious profanization of the world. There is ultimate reality in this stone and this tree and this man. They are translucent toward ultimate reality, but they are also opaque. They prevent it from shining through them. They try to exclude it.

Expression is always expression for someone who can receive it as such, for whom it is a manifestation of something hidden, and who is able to distinguish expression and that which is expressed. Only man within the world we know can distinguish between ultimate reality and that in which it appears. Only man is conscious of the difference of surface and depth.

There are three ways in which man is able to experience and express ultimate reality in, through and above the reality he encounters. Two of these ways are indirect; one of them is direct. The two indirect ways of expressing ultimate reality are philosophy—more specifically, metaphysics—and art. They are indirect because it is their immediate intention to express the encountered reality in cognitive concepts or in esthetic images.

Philosophy in the classical sense of the word seeks for truth about the universe as such. But in doing so, philosophy is driven towards explicit or implicit assertions about ultimate reality.

We have already pointed to the manifoldness of such concepts, and "ultimate reality" is itself one of them. In the same way, while trying to express reality in

esthetic images, art makes ultimate reality manifest through these images—the word image, taken in its largest sense, which includes lingual and musical figures.

To be able to show this concretely is the main purpose of my lecture, and here I feel supported by the self-interpretation of many artists who tell us that their aim is the expression of reality.

But there is the third and direct way in which man discerns and receives ultimate reality. We call it religion—in the traditional sense of the word. Here ultimate reality becomes manifest through ecstatic experiences of a concrete-revelatory character and is expressed in symbols and myths.

Myths are sets of symbols. They are the oldest and most fundamental expression of the experience of ultimate reality. Philosophy and art take from their depth and their abundance. Their validity is the power with which they express their relation of man and his world to the ultimately real. Out of a particular relation of this kind are they born. With the end of this relation they die. A myth is neither primitive science nor primitive poetry, although both are present in them, as in a mother's womb, up to the moment in which they become independent and start their autonomous road. On this road both undergo an inner conflict, similar to that in all of us, between the bondage to the creative ground from which we come and our free self-actualization in our mature life. It is the conflict between the secular and the sacred.

Usually secular philosophy is called simply philosophy, and art simply art; while in connection with the sacred, namely, the direct symbols of ultimate reality, philosophy is called theology, and art is called religious art. The creative as well as destructive consequences

of this conflict dominate many periods of man's history, the most significant for us being the five hundred years of modern history. The reduction of these tensions and the removal of some of their destructive consequences would certainly come about if the decisive point in the following considerations were established.

That decisive point is this: the problem of religion and philosophy, as well as that of religion and art is, by no means confined to theology and religious art; it appears wherever ultimate reality is expressed through philosophical concepts and artistic images, and the medium through which this happens is the stylistic form of a thought or an image.

Styles must be deciphered. And for this one needs keys with which the deciphering can be done, keys which are taken from the very nature of the artistic encounter with reality. It is not my task to point to such keys for the deciphering of styles in general, or of the innumerable collective and personal styles which have appeared in history. Rather, I shall indicate those stylistic elements which are expressive for ultimate reality. The best way to do this is to look at the main type in which ultimate reality is shown in the great manifestations of man's religious experience. They express in a direct way the fundamental relation of man to ultimate reality, and these expressions shine through the artistic images and can be seen in them.

On this basis, I suggest distinguishing five stylistic elements which appear, in innumerable mixtures, in the great historic styles in East and West, and through which ultimate reality becomes manifest in works of art. After the description of each of these elements, I want to show pictures as examples, without discussing them concretely, and

with the awareness of the contingent, almost casual, character in which they were chosen, for many technical reasons.

THE FIRST TYPE of religious experience, and also the most universal and fundamental one, is the sacramental. Here ultimate reality appears as the holy which is present in all kinds of objects, in things, persons, events. In the history of religion, almost everything in the encountered world has become a bearer of the holy, a sacramental reality. Not even the lowest and ugliest is excluded from the quality of holiness, from the power of expressing ultimate reality in the form of here and now. For this is what holiness means, not moral goodness—as moralistically distorted religions assume. There is actually no genuine religion in which the sacramental experience of the divine as being present does not underlie every other religious utterance.

This enables us to discover the first stylistic element which is effective in the experience of ultimate reality. It appears predominantly in what often has been called magic realism. But because of the non-religious meaning of the term, magic, I prefer to call it *numinous realism*. The word *numinous* is derived from the Latin *numen* (appearing divinity with a divine-demonic quality). It is *realism* that depicts ordinary things, ordinary persons, ordinary events, but it is *numinous realism*. It depicts them in a way which makes them strange, mysterious, laden with an ambiguous power. It uses space-relations, body stylization, uncanny expressions for this purpose. We are fascinated and repelled by it. We are grasped by it as something through which ultimate reality mysteriously shines.

Much primitive art has this character. It does not exclude other elements, and this is most conspicuous, for its

greatness has been rediscovered by our contemporary artists who have been driven to similar forms by the inner development of their artistic visions. These visions have received different names. In the development of cubism from Cezanne to Braque, at least one element of numinous realism is present. It is present in the stylo-metaphysics of De Chirico and in the surrealism of Chagall. It appears in those contemporary painters and sculptors who unite the appreciation of the particular thing with cosmic significance they ascribe to it.

All this is the correlate to religious sacramentalism. It shows ultimate reality as present here and now in particular objects. Certainly, it is created by artistic demands, but intended or not, it does more than fulfill these demands. It expresses ultimate reality in the particular thing. Religiously and artistically, however, it is not without dangers.

The religious danger of all sacramental religion is idolatry, the attempt to make a sacramentally consecrated reality into the divine itself. This is the demonic possibility which is connected with all sacramental religion. The artistic danger appears when things are used as mere symbols, losing their independent power of expression.

It is difficult to draw the line between an artificial symbolism and the symbolic power of things as bearers of ultimate reality. Perhaps one could say that wrong symbolism makes us look away from one thing to another one for which it is a symbol; while genuine symbolic power in a work of art opens up its own depths, and the depths of reality as such.

Now I should like to mention a group of pictures which, without special interpretation, shall give you a concrete idea of what I mean about the predominance of this first stylistic element.

Since it was difficult to find among the innumerable examples of primitive

art one that was especially more significant than another, I have chosen the "Figure," as it is called, by the sculptor, Lipchitz. Please do not forget, however, that it is a stylistic element which is predominant, not a special type.

Next we have Klee's "Masque of Fear" where we find a very similar expression, the stylized presence of ultimate reality in terms of awe, which belongs to all human relations to ultimate reality.

Again, another Klee—"Child Consecrated to Suffering."

Then a Cezanne—"Still Life." About this I must say something which goes back to my earliest encounter with the visual arts immediately after I came out of the ugliness of the First World War and was introduced to modern art by a friend, Dr. Eckhard V. Sydow, who wrote the first book on German expressionism. At that time I came to the conclusion that an apple of Cezanne has more presence of ultimate reality than a picture of Jesus by Hoffman (which can now be found in the Riverside Church of this city).

Next we have Braque—"Man with Guitar," which also shows elements of reality which otherwise are not seen, and in which elements of ultimate reality show through as foundations of the surface which never appear in reality on the surface.

Then we have Chagall—"I and the Village," and again it is the individual things to which I want to draw your attention as in the stylization, the color, the lines, the relationship, and something I would like to be able to mention at greater length—the two-dimensionality which is not superficial but one of depth. All these express what I called presence of ultimate reality.

Then De Chirico—"Melancholy and Mystery of the Street." This and similar pictures are especially near to my heart,

not only because I am interested in depth psychology, in which things like this appear as dreams or as nightmares, but because at times I think all of us become estranged from ordinary reality; and this estrangement produces a new encounter with dimensions of reality otherwise unseen.

Miro—"Composition." Now here you have nothing left but the surface: nevertheless, these elements embody a power of being which you never would find in surface reality in the same way.

Next is a picture with a funny name, which no one whom I asked, including myself, understood. It is by Tanguy, and the puzzling title is "Mama, Papa is Wounded." But I think these forms express something of the potentialities which are in reality but which never come to the surface without the realizing mind of the artist.

Now I come to a Gabo entitled "Spiral Theme." This and a few others express something very important to me, namely, the possibility that man's power of technical transformation of nature and of scientific penetration into the ultimate elements of nature is thus able to produce still another way of manifesting the creative ground of reality.

And the same in this. This is by Lip-pold and is called "Full Moon, Variation 7." The variation expressed in these lines is a new understanding of something which has appeared in man's mythological thinking for ten thousand years. The symbol of the moon is a goddess, and here the mathematical structure brings the same fundamental motif into another kind of expression.

RELATED to the sacramental type of religion and at the same time radically going beyond it is the mystical type. Religious experience tries to reach ultimate reality without the mediation

of particular things in this religious type. We find this type actualized in Hinduism and Buddhism, in Taoism and Neo-Platonism. And, with some strong qualifications, in some places in later Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. It can undergo a transformation into a monistic mysticism of nature under the famous formula of the God of Nature. In it God is equated with nature—with the creative ground of nature which transcends every particular object.

We find this in ancient Asia as well as in modern Europe and America. Correlate to this religious type is that stylistic element in which the particularity of things is dissolved into a visual continuum. This continuum is not a grey in grey; it has all the potentialities of particular beings within itself, like the Brahman in Hinduism and the One in Neo-Platonism or the creating God in Christianity as they include within themselves the possibility of the whole world. The continuum contains tensions, conflicts, movements. But it has not yet come to particular things. They are hidden in a mere potential state. They are not yet actual as distinguishable objects; or if so, they shine through from afar as before creation.

We find this in Chinese landscapes in which air and water symbolize the cosmic unity, and individual rocks or branches hardly dare emerge to an independent existence. We find it in the background of Asiatic and Western paintings, even if the foreground is filled with figures. It is a decisive element in the impressionist dissolution of particulars into a continuum of light and colors. Most radically it has been carried through in what is called today, non-objective painting. For instance, the latest decade of American painting is dominated by it. Of course, one cannot show ultimate reality directly, but one can use basic structural elements of real-

ity like line, cubes, planes, colors, as symbols for that which transcends all reality—and this is what the non-objective artists have done.

In the same period in which Eastern mysticism powerfully enters the American scene, American artists have deprived reality of its manifoldness, of the concreteness of things and persons, and have expressed ultimate reality through the medium of elements which ordinarily appear only in unity with concrete objects on the surface of reality.

Here also the dangers must be seen. The sacred emptiness can become mere emptiness, and the spatial emptiness of some pictures indicates merely artistic emptiness. The attempt to express ultimate reality by annihilating reality can lead to works in which nothing at all is expressed. It is understandable that as such a state in religion has led to strong reactions against the mystical type of religion, it has led in art to strong reactions against the non-objective stylistic elements.

And now I should like to give you examples of pictures of this second stylistic element.

First is the Japanese artist, Ashikaga—"The Landscape." This shows a pantheistic nature—trees and rocks barely emerging out of the whole.

Tai Chin, where it is even more powerfully expressed.

Klee—"Equals Infinity." The word infinity here expresses this going beyond of concrete reality.

Seurat—"Fishing Fleet," where the individual things are there, but they hardly dare to become fully individual.

Kandinsky's "Improvisation." I remember when I was once sitting in a house in Berlin in the 20's, there was a Kandinsky similar to this. It was really a liberation for me to be freed from the individual things and to be in a realm

which at that time was very near to my own religious thinking.

Then, finally, Jackson Pollock's "No. 1," and I must say I found it difficult to evaluate him, but since seeing some of his very best pictures at the Brussels Exhibition, I have become very much reconciled with this fullness of reality without a concrete subject matter.

LIKE MYSTICISM, the prophetic-protesting type of religion goes beyond the sacramental basis of all religious life. Its pattern is the criticism of a demonically distorted sacramental system in the name of personal righteousness and social justice. Holiness without justice is rejected. Not nature, but history becomes the place of the manifestation of ultimate reality. It is manifest as personal will, demanding, judging, punishing, promising. Nature loses its demonic as well as its divine power. It becomes subject to man's purposes as a thing and a tool. Only on this religious basis could there arise an industrial society like that in which we are living.

If we now ask what stylistic element in the visual arts corresponds to such an experience of ultimate reality, we must answer that it is "realism" both in its scientific-descriptive and in its ethical-critical form. After nature has been deprived of its numinous power, it is possible for it to become a matter of scientific analysis and technical management. The artistic approach to this nature is not itself scientific but it deals with objects, prepared as mere things by science. Insofar as it is artistic creation, it is certainly not imitation of nature, but it brings out possibilities of seeing reality which enlarge our daily-life encounter with it, and sometimes antecedes scientific discoveries.

The realistic element in the artistic styles seems far removed from expressing ultimate reality. It seems to hide it

more than express it. But there is a way in which descriptive realism can mediate the experience of ultimate reality. It opens the eyes to a truth which is lost in the daily-life encounter with reality. We see as something unfamiliar what we believed we knew by meeting it day by day. The inexhaustible richness in the sober, objective, quasi-scientifically observed reality is a manifestation of ultimate reality, although it is lacking in directly numinous character. It is the humility of accepting the given which provides it with religious power.

Critical realism is predominantly directed to man—personally, socially, and historically, although the suffering in nature is often taken into the artistic expression of the ugliness of encountered reality. Critical realism, as, for instance, given by Bosch and Brueghel, Callot and Goya, Daumier and Ensor, by Grosz and Beckmann, shows ultimate reality by judging existing reality. In the works of all those enumerated, it is the injustice of the world which is subject to criticism. But it is done in works of art, and this very fact elevates critical realism above mere negativity.

The artistic form separates critical realism from simple fascination with the ugly. But of course if the artistic form is lacking, it is distorted reality and not ultimate reality that appears. This is the danger of this stylistic element as it also is of some kinds of merely intellectual pseudo-criticism, to succumb to a negativity without hope.

Now it would be good to look at pictures with this third element.

I never really saw the ocean, which I know and love very much, until I saw Courbet's "Wave."

Next there is the very radical "Self-Portrait With Death" by Corinth.

Then two Americans. Hopper—"Early Sunday Morning." Very fascinating for

me, because it is based on experiences of the emptiness of reality and the sharp contours coming out of it.

And then the Sheeler "Classic Landscape," which shows things which are in themselves of no significance but which show reality in a way which was hidden to us before.

Now I come to the critical group. First we have Goya—"What Courage"; standing on a heap of corpses.

Then social caricature, and there is a title by Goya also—"Till Death She Will Beautify Herself."

Then something about nature. Dauter's "A Butcher." The life of man dependent on this distortion of the natural realities.

Dix—"War," which made him famous. The trenches of the First World War, of which I unfortunately have a good knowledge—and he was right.

And finally George Grosz—"Metropolis." Here you have the most radical form which also shows the dangers of it; the perhaps solely negative form of criticism.

THE PROPHETIC-CRITICAL type of religion has in itself the element of hope. This is the basis of its power. If the element of hope is separated from the realistic view of reality, a religious type appears which sees in the present the anticipation of future perfection. What prophetic hope expects is affirmed as given in forms of perfection which the artist can produce in the world of images. The self-interpretation of the Renaissance as society reborn was particularly conducive to this attitude. But it had predecessors, for instance, in the classical period of Greece, and has been followed in our modern period by attempts to renew this stylistic element.

As a religious attitude it can be called religious humanism which sees God in man and man in God here and now, in

spite of all human weakness. It expects the full realization of this unity in history and anticipates it in artistic creativity.

The artistic style expressing it is usually called idealism, a word which is in such disrepute today that it is almost impossible to use. It is worse than criminal if you are called an idealist. But not only the word, the concept itself was under harsh criticism. In the period in which the numinous, the descriptive and the critical-realistic element dominated the whole development, the idealistic tradition was despised and rejected. In spite of the innumerable religious pictures that it produced, it was seen as unable to mediate ultimate reality. I myself shared this mood. The change occurred when I realized that idealism means anticipation of the highest possibilities of being; that it means remembrance of the lost, and anticipation of the regained, paradise. Seen in this light, it certainly is a medium for the experience of ultimate reality. It expresses the divine character of man and his world in his essential, undistorted, created perfection.

But more than in the other stylistic elements, the danger which threatens artistic idealism must be emphasized: confusing idealism with a superficially and sentimentally beautifying realism. This has happened on a large scale, especially in the realm of religious art, and is the reason for the disrepute into which idealism, both word and concept, has fallen. Genuine idealism shows the potentialities in the depths of a being or event, and brings them into existence as artistic images. Beautifying realism shows the actual existence of its object, but with dishonest, idealizing additions. This danger must be avoided as we now come to attempts to create a new classicism. I am afraid that this warning is very much apropos.

Now for this stylistic element, let us look at some of these pictures, old and new.

There is Francesca—"Queen of Sheba" and "Solomon."

And there is Perugino—"Courage and Temperance." Here you see the anticipation of human fulfillment even in the title of these pictures.

Next is the idealization of paradise in a Poussin "Landscape."

In Ingres—"Study for the Golden Tiger"—we have again memory and anticipation just as I said about this kind of style; it is the style of the paradise. But we have it also in more recent painters. We have it in the blue period of Picasso under the title "Life." Tragedy is present, but in the background, and the fulfillment is shown in the form.

And finally, we have it in the form of "Dream," which is most adequate perhaps in Rousseau. It is all-idealizing anticipation of essential fulfillment, but not beautifying.

NOW I COME to my fifth and last stylistic element. The great reaction against both realism and idealism (except numinous realism) was the expressionistic movement. To which religious type is it correlated? Let me call it the ecstatic-spiritual type. It is anticipated in the Old Testament, it is the religion of the New Testament and of many movements in later Church history; it appeared in sectarian groups again and again in early Protestantism, in religious Romanticism. It appears in unity and conflict with the other religious types. It is marked by its dynamic character both in disruption and creation. It accepts the individual thing and person but goes beyond it. It is realistic and at the same time mystical. It criticizes and at the same time anticipates. It is restless, yet points to eternal rest.

It is my conviction as a Protestant

theologian that this religious element, appearing everywhere as a ferment—and in many places highly developed—comes into its own within Christianity.

But our problem is, how does this type express itself in the visual arts? Which stylistic element corresponds to it? I believe the expressionist element is the artistic correlative to the ecstatic-spiritual type of religious experience. Ultimate reality appears "breaking the prison of our form," as a hymn about the Divine Spirit says. It breaks to pieces the surface of our own being and that of our world. This is the spiritual character of expressionism—using the word in a much larger sense than the German school of this name.

The Church was never happy with ecstatic movements. They seemed to destroy its sacramental foundation. Society today has not been happy with the great expressionist styles in past and present because they have broken and are still breaking through the realistic and idealistic foundations of modern industrial society. But it is just this that belongs to the manifestation of ultimate reality. Expressionist elements are effective and even dominating in many styles of past and present. In our Western history they determine the art of the catacombs, the Byzantine, the Romanesque, most of the Gothic and the Baroque style, and the recent development since Cezanne.

There are always other elements cooperating, but the expressionistic element is decisive in them. Ultimate reality is powerfully manifest in these styles, even if they disregard symbols of the religious tradition. But history shows that styles which are determined by the expressionist element are especially adequate for works of art which deal with the traditional religious symbols.

But we must also mention the dan-

gers of the expressionist elements in our artistic styles. Expression can be understood as the expression of the subjectivity of the artist, just as in the religious field, the spirit can be understood as an ecstatic-chaotic expression of religious subjectivity. If this happens in religion, ecstasy is confused with over-excitement; and over-excitement does not break through any form and does not create anything new. If a work of art expresses only the subjectivity of the artist, it remains arbitrary and does not penetrate into reality itself.

And now let us recall some examples in a final group of pictures.

Van Gogh—"Hills at St. Remy."

Munch—"The Scream."

Derain—"The London Bridge."

Marc—"Yellow Horses." I must tell you something about this painting. I was Professor at the University of Berlin in the years 1919 to 1924 and opposite the University was a modern museum in an old Imperial palace, and while I was lecturing on ancient Greek philosophy and comparing Parmenides and Heraclitus and others with the pictures of the modern artist, there were fist fights going on on the opposite side of the street. The fighting was between the lower petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, and these fist fights at that time were a preview of what would happen later on under Hitler when the petty bourgeoisie became the dictatorial power in Germany. And for this reason, these horses of Marc have a tremendous symbolic meaning for me for this was one of the paintings I had been discussing at that time.

This is Schmidt-Rottluff—"Peter and Fishermen." I am not sure of exactly how it is translated. You see much of the typical, very rough kind of German expressionism.

Now in the next one you also see

the religious aspects in it—Heckel's "Prayer."

Nolde—"Pentecost." And I must confess that some of my writings are derived from just this picture, as I always learned more from pictures than from theological books.

And, finally, Nolde—"Prophet."

THE MAIN POINT in the discussion of the five stylistic elements which can become mediators of ultimate reality has been to show that the manifestation of the ultimate in the visual arts is not dependent on the use of works which traditionally are called religious art. I want to conclude with a few remarks about the nature of such works and their relation to the five stylistic elements discussed.

If art expresses reality in images and religion expresses ultimate reality in symbols then religious art expresses religious symbols in artistic images (as philosophical concepts). The religious content, namely a particular and direct relation of man to ultimate reality, is first expressed in a religious symbol, and secondly, in the expression of this symbol in artistic images. The Holy Virgin or the Cross of the Christ are examples. In this relation it can happen that in the work of art as well as in the encounter with it, the one of two expressions may prevail over the other one: The artistic form may swallow the religious substance, objectively or in personal encounter. This possibility is one of the reasons for the resistance of many religious groups against religious art, especially in a devotional context. Or the religious substance may evoke pictorial products which hardly can be called works of art, but which exercise a tremendous religious influence. This possibility is one of the reasons for the easy deterioration of religious art in its use by the churches.

The avoidance of both shortcomings is a most demanding task for religious artists. Our analysis of the five stylistic elements may be useful in this respect.

Obviously, the stylistic element which we have called numinous realism is an adequate basis for religious art. Wherever it is predominant in the primitive world, the difference between the religious and the secular is often unrecognizable. In the recent forms of numinous realism the cosmic significance of works under the control of this element is obvious, but it is hard to use them for the highly personalistic stories and myths of the religions of the prophetic type.

The mystical-pantheistic element of artistic styles resists radically the attempt to use it for the representation of concrete religious symbols. Non-objective art like its mystical background is the elevation above the world of concrete symbols, and only symbols of this elevation above symbols can be expressed in artistic images.

Descriptive and critical realism, if predominant in a style, have the opposite difficulty. They can show everything concretely religious in its concreteness, but only if united with other elements can they show it as religious. Otherwise, they secularize it and, for example, make out of Jesus a village teacher or a revolutionary fanatic or a political victim, often borrowing sentimental traits and beautifying dishonesty from the distortions of the idealistic style. This is the seat of most religious *Kitsch*.

Another problem is religious art under the predominance of the fourth stylistic element, the anticipating one. Anticipation of fulfillment can, of course, most easily be expressed through figures of the religious legend and myth. But one thing is lacking. The estrangement of the actual human situation from the essential unity of the human with the

divine, the reality of the Cross which critical realism shows in its whole empirical brutality, and which expressionism shows in its paradoxical significance. Because this is lacking even in the greatest works under the predominance of the idealistic style, it can become the other source of *Kitsch* in religious art.

The expressionistic element has, as already indicated, the strongest affinity to religious art. It breaks through both the realistic acceptance of the given and the idealistic anticipation of the fulfilled. And beyond both of them it reaches into the depth of ultimate reality. In this sense it is an ecstatic style-element, expressing the ecstatic character of encountered reality. Nobody can overlook this ecstatic element in the great religious art, however different the combination of this element with the other stylistic elements may be. To show the ecstatic-spiritual character in the expression of ultimate reality in the many great periods of religious art in East and West is a task to which the ideas of this lecture could only lay the foundation. It is enough if they have done this and made somehow visible the manifestation of ultimate reality through the different stylistic elements which appear in different relation to each other in all works of the visual arts.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

QUESTION: Is it essential to art to express or seek to express ultimate reality, or is this only one thing that art does?

DR. TILLICH: Well, this question was anticipated and, as far as I could do it, answered in my distinction between direct and indirect expression of ultimate reality. In this section I said that both philosophy and the arts do express something else intentionally—

the philosophical concepts about the universe, the art images about encountered reality. But in doing so, they indirectly do something else; namely, they make ultimate reality shine through in both their concepts and their images. So from the point of view of intention, I would say that art does not have this intention, cannot have any other intention than being good art. But in being good art, it expresses—and this is the answer I would give to your question.

QUESTION: What is the relationship that exists in the experience of ultimate reality between secular painting and painting that has a religious subject?

DR. TILLICH: This of course was the main point of the whole lecture. Ultimate reality appears in what is usually called secular paintings, and the difference from what is usually called religious paintings is real only insofar as so-called religious painting deals with the traditional subject-matters which have appeared in the different religious traditions. Now I would say that the great problem is which stylistic element is most adequate to express special religious subjects, as for instance, the Christ or the Holy Virgin, or whatever it may be. I would say all styles can do it in some way or the other, but as I feel and would derive from the whole history of religious art, only if there is a strong element of expressionist character is art really able to express the religious symbols adequately. I see this in the images of Buddha; I see it in the images of the Byzantine art—which I think is the highest religious art in the Western world—I see it again in the possibilities which have appeared in the present-day expressionist painting—taken in the larger sense of the word expressionist, to mean everything since about the time of Cezanne.

Since I had no time to deal with this,

let me say one word about it. I believe that of the two elements which I described in the spiritual-ecstatic type, namely, the disruptive and the creative, today the disruptive is still predominant. This expresses itself in the fact that with respect to the Christian legend, we have more pictures of the Crucifixion which are satisfactory than of Resurrection and related symbols. I would say this is an expression of the honesty of our artists that they don't feel adequate yet to depicting symbols of glory, and they should not attempt to do so prematurely.

QUESTION: How can bad art be good for religious experience?

DR. TILLICH: How can every Indian believer feel that going into an extremely dirty river will give him purification? It is the same question, and you certainly can ask it very seriously. I would say this is the power of the development of a symbol. Symbols in their developments take on many elements which are not originally implied. For instance, the Black Madonna which I have seen somewhere, although not a work of art, is venerated by millions of Catholics, and not as a work of art but as an expression of the presence of the Holy. This expression can be found in fetishes of primitive men—which also should not be considered as works of art.

And here I come back to one section which I would have liked to discuss more fully, namely, the question of the relationship of the putting of religious symbols into artistic images. I had a very heated discussion about it at the University of Chicago a few weeks ago in the Department of Religion and Art (which is highly developed there in the theological faculty). I said that it is possible that when someone goes only once a year to church in order to listen to the "Passion of Saint Matthew" by Bach, he may have two attitudes. One is di-

rected to the artistic images in it, and the other possibility is that he is related to the religious drama as such. I was very much criticized for this statement because someone said you cannot really have an esthetic experience without the experiences of religious drama which are artistically expressed in the Saint Matthew Passion. This attack pleased me because it expresses what I see as the real fulfillment of the relationship between religion and art. But I asked the realistic, or pessimistic question, is that an actual possibility? Can you challenge the ability of those who visit galleries to experience the esthetic side of art without experiencing the full impact of the religious side? Of course, if the religious side is completely out of this world, then they would not look at it probably. But in any case, the full experience of the religious side of such a picture cannot be asked of those who go into a gallery. But I would perhaps agree, and I put this before you simply as a question, because I have no answer. Probably the essential relationship which is always at the same time the ideal, the demanded, the desired relationship, would be to have within the artistic images the full meaning of the religious reality behind it. But isn't this perhaps a problem of anticipating the re-established paradise?

QUESTION: Do you think there is an emptiness in present forms of contemporary religion which neither encourages nor forms art?

DR. TILlich: You put me on the spot because in the religious movement of today I am myself very much on the critical side, so I have a deep understanding of your searching question. I would say that we should not look for too much if we equate religion with the churches. I would agree with you that we are in a period in which the actuality of the religious life is in a great

crisis, in spite of the so-called religious resurgence. (Crisis, meaning a separating of elements; that is the meaning of this much abused word.) There are today processes in which elements—that perhaps should be thrown out of the churches—are separated from those which are trans-historical and are valid. And of theology, you can ask exactly the same question which you asked about religious art, and which I asked of myself a hundred times, is theology possible today? If it is aware of this situation, I would say it is. So I would say the creative artist who has grasped this ultimate concern, whether or not he is a member of a church, and perhaps is against the churches more than with them, may be able even today to produce religious pictures which are expressing the foundation of the Christian message as much as a theology today must do which is equally, perhaps more critical against tradition than for it. In this sense, I would like to see many young artists who are grasped by ultimate reality, or whatever they choose to call it, deal somehow with the foundations on which the Church lived and which became distorted by the Church. They are responsible for reestablishing and making visible again these foundations.

QUESTION: Dr. Tillich, can expressionism ignore classical items of beauty such as the five orders, et cetera, that have been traditionally expressed?

DR. TILlich: What are they?

QUESTION: Ionic order, Tuscan, Corinthian, et cetera.

DR. TILlich: I don't know how any form, which as a form still stands, can be ignored by any style. I can better answer your question by referring first to philosophy. Can any philosophy ignore some of the fundamental insights of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle? I would say no, and if they do, then they

ignore elements which belong to the very nature of the task of philosophy, that of discovering *sophia*. That means wisdom (*sapientia*) about reality. And as you know, *sapientia* means the knowledge of the principles. And if this is what has been brought into reality in Greek thinking, then I would say ignoring it, as some people do who think philosophy starts about 1890, is very wrong. And there I am quite clear about it because human thought has the love of structure, the structure of meaning, and this has elements which are changing and personal. If you neglect the personal elements, for instance, in mathematical structure, then you are irrational and confused. I would say the same thing about the arts. There are fundamental elements in artistic conception of reality which cannot be ignored. Even in the expressionist style for which I have a special sympathy because of my personal destiny, my warning is that it might neglect these elements and become the emotional outcry of an artist who did not learn his job. I think a great danger for modern art is that it is carried through by people who seem to think this is an easy job; you do not need to learn very much, you simply express your emotional substance and everything is all right. Such outcries in art are as bad as they are in philosophy. Therefore, do not let us forget to sit down first and to learn, both in philosophy and in art.

QUESTION: I would like to ask, Dr. Tillich, about what you said in relation to another idea you have discussed about the "courage to be"—which I understand to be the affirmation of life even with its limitations and separations. Can we say that an artist who has validly conveyed ultimate reality through the ways you have mentioned, can we say that he has discovered this courage and that he can convey it through, say, Cezanne

in his "Apple," or Miro in an abstraction, or Munch in "The Girl Screaming?"

DR. TILlich: This question I like very much. First of all, one thing must always be said. In expressionism, there is this element of disruption of the surface. I think I described that sufficiently and gave sufficient examples. Now if somebody does not go beyond this—let's imagine Munch's outcry was not the picture, anxiety, but something like this, and there is no positive content in the picture as such, where is the courage to be? The courage to be is found in the courage to paint it as a picture and as a real picture, as a great picture. I would say this is the first fundamental courage which we must attribute to our great artists of today.

I consider all modern art, even before the period of critical realism which I described, as an element in the movement of Existentialism. This starts with Pascal and takes in the great men of the 19th century and everybody in the 20th who has anything significant to say. And even in Nietzsche the representative of this movement who was most radical in his criticism, there is not only the courage to be radical—which is courage to be—but also an affirmation of life which he expresses in the symbolically taken concept of the eternal, which is nothing more than the affirmation of the present moment as eternally meaningful.

So I could go to all these men and to all these artists and show the point which may be rather hidden, but which is not missing. But this I say with caution. I do not want to be dogmatic about it, but I am very much convinced about their courage to show us the negative elements. It is an expression of cowardice of many, many people in our society that they are not able to see this.

THE TRAGIC: TRANSCENDENCE, FREEDOM AND POETRY

HENRI GOUHIER

Tragedy and Transcendence

WHAT IS TRAGEDY? Let us propose a hypothesis: tragedy exists through the presence of a transcendence in the dramatic action. The word transcendence will be taken here in a very simple sense to express a very simple thing. An event is not tragic in itself but through what it signifies, and this significance is tragic when it introduces the sign of a transcendence.

Oedipus argues with an old man who jostles him: the old man is his father. Oedipus arrives in a city where he knows no one and where no one knows him; he marries a widow: the widow is his mother. Neither the parricide nor the incest is tragic by itself, nor are they tragic in being taken together. Tragedy arises from the destiny

in which parricide and incest are the signs of a divine conspiracy.

It was Apollo, friends, Apollo, that brought this bitter bitterness, my sorrows to completion. (ll. 1329-30)*

This dark fate of Oedipus arranged by the gods, this *Moirai* (l. 1302) which baffles human precautions, is the transcendence. It introduces into the action a new term situated at a distance from the sensible world in which it unfolds and from the kind of volition shown by the "rational animal." The word transcendence designates this distance.

Through the presence of transcendence there is tragedy, no matter what the transcendence may be.

Providence in *Athalie* is transcendence, like destiny in *Oedipus Rex*. The subject is not an accursed family but a chosen people. In both, history is written in heaven before being enacted on earth; in both the man of God reads the future in the eternal present.

But why does my heart shudder with holy fear?

Is it the holy Spirit seizing me?

It is. It inflames me, speaks: my eyes are opened,

And the dark centuries are revealed about all. (V. vi)

They reveal, too, the tragic significance of what was nothing more than "a palace revolution in a temple."¹ The prophecy of Joad situates events in a kind of history which bursts the bounds of time because it transcends time. Up

* All translations from Greek plays are taken from *The Complete Greek Tragedies*, edited by Richard Lattimore and David Grene, University of Chicago Press, 1959.

¹ The phrase is that of Émile Faguet; *Dix-septième siècle*, p. 315.

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Gouhier's trilogy on drama, *L'ESSENCE DU THÉÂTRE* (Plon), *LE THÉÂTRE ET L'EXISTENCE* (Aubier), and *L'OEUVRE THÉÂTRALE* (Flammarion) represents a major contribution to modern aesthetics. The essay printed here is taken from the second of his three volumes on the philosophy of the theater.

to then we had been moved by the fate of a child. Thenceforward the salvation of Joas prefigures universal salvation. This young Eliacin, this future assassin of Zacharie, the son of his benefactor, is first and foremost the Christian people.

The leading role of the play is not indicated in the cast of characters. The old queen speaks truly,

Pitiless God, you alone have brought about all. (V. 6)

Gordon Craig reminds us that "the appearances of all these spirits in the plays (of Shakespeare) are not the inventions of a pantomime manager":

They are integral, not extraneous parts of the drama; they are the visualized symbols of the supernatural world which enfolds the natural, exerting in the action something of that influence which in "the science of sound" is exerted by those "partial tones, which are unheard, but which blend with the tones which are heard and make all the difference between the poorest instrument and the supreme note of a violin."...²

Hamlet's case is indeed that of a very nervous man whose too lucid intelligence imposes an excessive tension. But if his self-consciousness victimizes him, it in turn is exasperated by an apparition shattering to both his body and his soul. Taine showed the prince of Denmark as a poet "who forgets himself in contemplating phantoms he himself invents, who sees the imaginary world too well to play a role in the real world."³ But three soldiers saw the ghost of the old king and they inform Hamlet. The ghost expresses a reality equal to that of the living men, though it is of another kind. Shakespeare reads the great book of the world in another

edition than Taine's; this is why a transcendent being plays in his tragedy the role of prime mover.

The ghost reveals the secret of its death to the young prince; without this revelation there is no drama. By no means a simple device to start the action, the ghost never ceases motivating the drama.

Hamlet does not doubt the ghost's reality, but its moral value, so to speak, is suspect to him. His first response was one of confidence: "It is an honest ghost." (I. v. 138) Then he hesitates:

The spirit that I have seen
May be a devil...
And perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy—
As he is very potent with such spirits—
Abuses me to damn me. I'll have
grounds
More relative than this... (II. ii.
606-612)

This is why he has the players enact a murder like the one which was told to him; the accused king will be present: if he remains unmoved, the apparition has been a ruse of the devil (III. ii. 82-84); if not, the experiment will have proved the ghost's veracity.

Why does madness seem to have been spontaneously a tragic thing? Because it has long been assumed to be sacred.

Quos vult perdere Jupiter, dementat prius.

The Erinyes who pursue Orestes are by no means "vain phantoms." "Living shades, heads with serpents densely interlaced, they are goddesses who chastise the parricide even though his arm was strengthened by Apollo. The madness of Orestes is a drama played among the gods."⁴

"Those whom the gods would destroy..." As soon as he begins to see

² Edward Gordon Craig, *On The Art of the Theater*, pp. 266, 264.

³ Taine, *Histoire de la littérature anglaise*, t. II, Hachette, p. 245.

⁴ Paul Mazon, *Eschyle*, t. II, Les Belles-Lettres, 1925, p. 125.

the true face of his daughters, King Lear tries to avert this terrible, divine gift. Laurence Olivier's performance was unforgettable as, on his knees, he begged in a little voice which became more and more babyish, "Oh, let me not be mad, not mad, sweet heaven! / Keep me in temper: I would not be mad." (I. v. 50-51)

It was too late. The scenes on the heath unite a "tempest under the skull" with a tempest in the heavens; the second is not the setting for the first; it is, rather, its music. A cosmic fury shatters simultaneously the soul of the old king and the objective world. The problem is not to lead a madman through a countryside turned upside down by a storm, but, quite beyond realism, to create a kind of nature which has ceased to be natural, which has become tragically supernatural. We are dealing with

the great Gods
That keep this dreadful pothier o'er
our heads. (III. ii. 50-51)⁵

Passion becomes tragic by the measure in which it is a madness like this one, signifying a transcendence. Such is the passion of Medea, Phèdre, Othello, all "possessed."

"Possessed" by whom or by what?

Oh, I wish
That lightning from heaven would
split my head open. (Euripides,
Medea, I. 145)

The lightning cleaves, but it is not the mortal burning which the unhappy Medea implores in vain; when it strikes,

⁵ Commenting on this scene Jacques Copeau writes, "Shakespeare seems here, with the intuition of genius, to go back to the first source of the chronicle, to the most remote cosmic myths in which, in the name *Lir*, some Celtic folklorists discover the god Neptune, in the cruel daughters rough winds, and in Cordelia a soft breeze." *Critiques d'un autre temps*, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Française, 1923, p. 169.

it only leaves behind "This heavy anger on your heart." (I. 1266). The women of Corinth rightly say that now old crimes have unleashed the wrath of the gods:

O Earth, and the far shining
Ray of the Sun, look down, look
down upon
This poor lost woman, look, before
she raises
The hand of murder against her flesh
and blood...
O heavenly light, hold back her hand,
Check her, and drive from out the
house
The bloody Fury raised by fiends of
Hell. (II. 1251-60)

Even before confessing her passion to Oenone, "the daughter of Minos and Pasiphaë" acknowledges its demonic madness,

Insensate, where am I? What have I
said?
Where have I allowed my vows and
my mind to wander?
I have lost it. The gods have snatched
away my use of it. (Racine, *Phèdre*,
I. iii)

How can the "perfect soul" (I. ii. 31) of Othello let itself be taken in by Iago's lies? In Act III, the admirable third scene is a kind of conversion to evil:

Look here, Iago;
All my fond love thus do I blow to
heaven:
'Tis gone.
Arise, black vengeance, from the hol-
low hell!
Yield up, O love! thy crown and
hearted throne
To tyrannous hate. Swell, bosom,
with thy fraught,
For 'tis of aspics' tongues! (III. iii.
443-450)

Othello yields to jealousy as one responds to an appeal, and this surrender of his whole being immediately takes the religious form of a vow. The spirit which possesses him throws him to his knees while he inscribes himself,

Now, by yond marble heaven,
In the due reverence of a sacred vow
I here engage my words. (460-462)

Gabriel Marcel once wrote, "I can if necessary imagine a tragedy about a trade union, but only on condition that the union have a reality: the explicit or contractual act of will by which the members establish it." The context makes clear that this reality is to be established "in some irreducible or transcendent fashion in the understanding taken by the person or persons forming it."⁶ In effect, the group—family, nation, clan, or whatever—is a tragic principle, provided that through a system of collective images, the transcendence of a compelling ideal is introduced into individual consciences. Such was the Greece of *The Persians* or the Rome in the heart of the aged Horace; such are the Montagues and Capulets, whose past, rigidified in hate, crushes the love of Romeo and Juliet. From our contemporary theater we may add *Cromedeyre-le-Vieil* of Jules Romains. Just as this old village will have for its church no other stones than those from its own mountain, so it will know no other god than its own soul, created out of a life of *unanimism*.

Cromedeyre is busy remaking a god.
(V. 1)

This is a pagan mystery, a sacred tragedy, which concludes in a temple whose austere architecture and savage ornaments proclaim "the strength, the pride, the ardor of Cromedeyre," the single-hearted and poetic transcendence of the inspired town.

In defining the tragic by virtue of the presence of a transcendence, an essential bond unites transcendence with presence. In the world and in souls, transcendence would be only a word

were it not for a presence whose signs are cosmic or psychic. What these signs are does not matter. One willingly includes in the definition of the tragic a sense of checkmate and contradiction.⁷ These words certainly restrict the tragic to the most frequent forms under which transcendence manifests its presence, but the experience of "the tragic sweetness" and the problem of "the tragedy with a happy ending" invite us to seek the permanence of the tragic in what is permanent in all tragedies—the simple presence of a transcendence, of whatever sort and whatever the manifestations of its presence.

Absence may also be such a manifestation, as it is in Claudel's *Le Pain Dur* (*Bitter Crusts*).⁸

IF THE TRANSCENDENCE is remote, even if its presence appears most feeble, its power of transcending is not diminished. Nor does such a tendency end in its disappearing.

There is no continuity between an awareness of presence even in absence and an absence without presence.

If transcendence disappears without leaving even the palest reflection in a sense of foreboding, what remains? Only absurd misunderstandings.

Oedipus quarrels with a passing stranger and kills him: he learns that it was his father. Oedipus marries a

⁷ See, for example, G. Marcel, *op. cit.*: V. Jan-kélévitch proposes these striking formulas: "Whenever the impossible and the necessary meet, there is tragedy" (*L'Alternative*, Alcan, 1938, p. 150); "Tragedy is made primarily out of a necessary contradiction" (*Bergson*, Alcan, 1931, p. 160); cf. *Traité des Vertus*, Bordas, 1949, p. 560. Also consult the remarkable study by P. Ricoeur, "Sur le tragique," *Esprit*, March 1953.

⁸ Here the transcendences of his earlier *L'Otage* (*The Hostage*) are no longer even remembered. There is neither God nor the Church, Honor nor Chivalry, Revolution nor epic stature.

⁶ Gabriel Marcel, "Note sur l'évaluation tragique," in *Journal de Psychologie*, January 1926.

somewhat mature but still appetizing widow: he learns that she is his mother. Forget about destiny; chance is the only cause, if one may so speak of a case in which truly there is no cause.

In Camus' *Le Malentendu* (*Cross-Purposes*) an innkeeper and her daughter have been doing away with travelers wealthy enough to be worth robbing. Murder is as easily done by them as their cooking—it is a kind of second métier. A handsome man asks for a room: like all the rest, he will go to sleep at the bottom of the river. But this time there is a misunderstanding: this stranger is the son and brother of those who assassinate him; absent for twenty years, his face recalled nothing to them...

Throughout, the absurd is triumphant. Is it necessary to add that this is a tragedy of the absurd?

No. The absurd has no tragic significance, for the excellent reason that the absurd, by definition, has no significance.

Let us leave the case in which the absurd aspires to thought and proclaims, for example, a contradiction; logical absurdity is especially rich in comic effects—"This sabre is the most beautiful day of my life," "Only God has the right to kill his like."⁹ When we qualify an event as absurd, when absurdity aspires to existence, the word does not introduce the idea of the irrational but rather that of the unreasonable.¹⁰ And the irrational corresponds to an absence of explanation; the unreasonable to an absence of signification.

Taken in themselves the facts which constitute Oedipus' misfortunes are per-

fectedly explainable: there are reasons for his quarrel with the stranger whom he strikes down, as well as for his marriage with Jocasta. In the play of Albert Camus the lines of the two women, from the first scene on, make their behavior comprehensible to us. What is absurd is precisely that the explanation does not explain: explanation of the quarrel of Oedipus leaves out of account the fact that the stranger was his father; similarly, a violent desire or over-powering rage might explain the crimes at the inn, but not the fact that the new victim was the son of the house. In the Greek legend we go beyond absurdity when we see that chance is not single and that the deplorable coincidences refer us to another scheme of existence in which they signify a punishment; in Camus' perspective, however, we have a pure misunderstanding, quite free of any signification.

Camus' is an essentially dramatic vision of the world, but it is so through the absence of tragic signification: the true drama of man is that he cannot be tragic.

Now, that this absence of signification nevertheless signifies something raises another question, touching on what the sense of absurd existence is able to express explicitly about its unconscious implications. Thus, when Camus writes, "The absurd is sin without God,"¹¹ we may wonder whether the word "sin" does not shift the absurd out of the unreasonable and into the mysterious, so that total absence of signification becomes rather a signification that is totally hidden. A tragedy of the absurd then becomes possible, but only by means of an anonymous and mute transcendence: it arises out of what menaces absurdity and what is beyond the absurd.

⁹ Cf. Bergson, *Le Rire*, p. 113-116 and 186 sq.

¹⁰ Cf. Albert Camus, *Le Mythe de Sisyphe*, Gallimard, 1942, p. 70. On Camus' philosophy of the drama, another point of view appears in Haskell M. Block, "Albert Camus, towards a definition of tragedy," in *University of Toronto Quarterly*, July 1950.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

IS THIS TO SAY that all tragedy must be religious?

Two questions are involved here, one concerning the origin and one concerning the essence of tragedy. They are difficult questions, because neither can be resolved on the same plane upon which it is asked.

The first concerns the history of the theater. If, as appears very probable, the latter was "born for the glory of the gods" before it "matured for the joy of mankind,"¹² tragedy will have the same origin in the degree to which it demonstrably represents one of the theater's primitive forms. But to recognize tragedy in the most ancient civilizations, the historian has to know what tragedy is, and it is not history which furnishes him with his definition: the question of origin is referred to the question of essence, posed on another plane and depending upon the philosophy of the theater.

Is the religious origin of tragedy a purely historical episode, or is it the sign of tragedy's religious essence? It has been urged that science is the daughter of religion; it is certain that science has become scientific as it has become profane. Must we suppose, on the contrary, that tragedy would cease to be tragic if it ceased to be religious? To answer, the philosopher of the theater would have to know what "to be religious" means, and no philosophy of the theater can tell him. The question of essence refers to research carried on on another plane and depends upon a study of mankind which goes beyond his dramatic activities.

The example of Nietzsche illustrates this double movement: the history of Greek tragedy is extended into a philosophy of tragedy when the discovery of the Apollonian and Dionysian prin-

ciples unites the issues of tragedy's origin and essence. This philosophy of tragedy, however, only transposes themes from Schopenhauer's metaphysics, themes which constitute a philosophy of religion.

Our task is not at all to multiply distinctions so as to reduce our problems; it is, rather, to dissipate the false clarity of our familiar ideas.

Our first step will have been taken if it is true that tragedy is defined by the presence of a transcendence. Is all tragedy religious? This is the same as asking whether all transcendence is religious.

Does the latter question simply substitute a philosophic term for a common word? Perhaps, but the substitution is advantageous if with the philosophic term we can avoid a philosophic dispute. It seems easy to agree that the ghost in *Hamlet*, the madness of Orestes, the possession of Phèdre, the Greece of *The Persians*, the fate of Oedipus, the goil of *Athalie* are transcendences. Would it be as easy to agree that these transcendences are, equally, religious facts?

Reasons for an affirmative answer are very strong, but they involve much more than a philosophy of the theater, as would be clear if they had to be defended against arguments for the negative. The debate would soon oppose one vision of the world to another, and there is no point in it here.

Tragedy and Liberty

AESCHYLUS AND SOPHOCLES are so great that fatality seems to be the soul of tragedy.

To resist this tempting explanation, it is enough to abandon it to its own logic. Thus, in the first act of Anouilh's *Antigone*, the chorus declares,

Now the spring is wound up. It has only to unwind of itself. That is what is so convenient about tragedy; give

¹² Gaston Baty and René Chavance, *Vie de l'art théâtral*, Plon, 1932, p. 17.

it just a little push with the thumb and it starts off... Nothing more. Afterward, you only let it go. You're calm. It goes by itself. It is punctilious; it has been well oiled forever. Death, treason, despair are there, all ready, along with explosions, storms, and silences...

Drama consists of contingency, worry over what may be and regret for what might have been; in tragedy everything is decided in advance.¹³

The text contains the very words which condemn the spirit of the play. "In tragedy, you're calm... Above all, tragedy is restful..." No, tragedy is not restful and we are not calm.

Certainly, if necessity were the essence of tragedy, to feel "that one is caught like a rat" could even be a kind of relief. "There is nothing more to be done." There is, in fact, a kind of peace in certitude of the inevitable. This peace, however, suppresses the tragedy. Imagine Oedipus saying to the people of Thebes, "I killed my father, I married my mother; it's too bad, but whose fault is it? Not mine." Then we would be calm, and the innocent one would know "rest"; certitude of the inevitable would open his eyes; that he tear them out would be impossible.

Would not one rightly judge and say that on me

These things were sent by some malignant God? (ll. 828-9)

But if this judgment proclaimed only the innocence of the plaything of destiny, the "things that were sent" would cease to be tragic; it remains so because of the intervention of "some malignant God."

¹³ *Nouvelles pièces noires*, Paris, 1946, pp. 165-166. Of course, the chorus need not be expressing Jean Anouilh's views on tragedy. On fate as the soul of tragedy, see J. Segond, *La Signification de la tragédie*, Bibliothèque de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille, Paris, Les Belles-Lettres, 1943, notably chapters VII and VIII.

There are two elements in fatality, necessity and transcendence. What is tragic in fatality is not necessity; fatality is tragic in spite of necessity. When Jean Cocteau sees an "infernal machine" beneath the throne of Oedipus, it is the adjective and not the noun which gives the phrase its tragic resonance. If the machine were not infernal, the tragedy would disappear.

For this machine constructed by the gods, let us substitute a machination of Creon in league with Tiresias: this is precisely Oedipus' first thought after the blind seer's terrible and improbable revelation (cf. ll. 380 ff). One can see how a contemporary author would push the action in this direction. The two accomplices pay a shepherd to fulfill the oracle which predicted death for Laius "at the hand of his son." A palace revolution replaces the divine malediction. The dénouement would still be dramatic, but in the course of the play the credulity of the duped king would have created a situation saved from the comic only by its poor taste. And what would become of the tragedy?

Far from being the soul of tragedy, fatality is anti-tragic by the degree to which it involves necessity. It keeps its tragic value only through its basis in transcendence.

WHAT DO WE MEAN by saying that the fatality of tragedies is a transcendent necessity? Clearly, a transcendent necessity transcends an existence which by nature excludes necessity. Determinisms which produce a tidal wave do not transcend the waves which they raise up; if, as an old hypothesis holds, the phenomenon originates in an underground volcano, we may call the cause exterior to the effect but not transcendent to it. Here cause and effect belong to the same material system which constitutes our universe. A transcendent relationship, on

the other hand, implies a difference of order: if necessity is one of the terms, the other must be something different from necessity.

Therefore transcendent necessity exists only for a free being.

Therefore there is no fatality without freedom.

Therefore, there is no tragedy without freedom, since the tragic radiance of fatality depends upon its transcendence and since this transcendence transcends freedom.

Oedipus did not want to kill his father or marry his mother; his destiny is tragic because it crushes a will which sought another destiny.

What is the distinction between the ancient tragedy of destiny and the Christian tragedy of freedom?¹⁴

First, something should be said about ancient tragedy so defined. Oedipus could not escape the role imposed upon him by divine malediction, but Prometheus, Antigone, and Alcestis could.

I knew when I transgressed nor will I deny it.

In helping man I brought my troubles on me. (ll. 268-9)

The whole Prometheus story is a hymn to freedom. A free being is bound on the rock to pay for the crime of having been a liberator. A free being prefers being a prisoner to being a slave. To Hermes, the gods' valet, Prometheus asserts the certitude which sustains his freedom:

Be sure of this: when I set my misfortune against your slavery, I would not change. (ll. 966-7)

As Antigone goes to her punishment, the leader of the Chorus tells her that she is to descend to Hades "of your own

motion," *autonomos* (l. 821). And Alcestis has the right to say to her husband,

I die, who did not have to die, because of you. (l. 284)

Of course, these heroes of freedom choose their lives and deaths in a world transcended by fate, and the morality which the poets draw from their sufferings is impregnated by fatalistic piety:

So must I bear, as lightly as I can, the destiny that fate has given me; for I know well against necessity, against its strength, no one can fight and win. (*Prometheus Bound*, ll. 103-5)

Sophocles' counsel answers that of Aeschylus,

No mortal can escape the doom prepared for him. (*Antigone*, ll. 1337-8)

And Euripides avows,

I myself, in the transports of mystic verses, as in study of history and science, have found nothing so strong as Compulsion... (Euripides, *Alcestis*, 962-5)

We do not deny that, in the large, classical tragedy is that of fate; but Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides did not misconstrue the tragic value of free choice operating within the tragedy of fate.

Still less do we deny that, generally speaking, Christian tragedy is tragedy of freedom. But it must be seen that theology elaborated with the intellectual equipment of the Greek philosophers has favored a conception of Providence which strongly resembles a Christianized fate. A beneficent fatality is still a fatality. Like Oedipus, Athalia is caught up in a history written in heaven,

Pitiless God, you alone have brought about all.

It is you, flattering me with an easy vengeance,

¹⁴ Nicolas Berdyaev, cited and commented upon by P.-A. Touchard, *Dionysos, Apologie pour le théâtre*, Aubier, 1938, p. 97, no. 1.

Who have twenty times in one day
opposed me to myself,
Now for a child exciting my remorse,
Now dazzling me with your rich treasures

Which I have feared to give up to
the flames, to pillage. (V. vi)

Classical tragedy of fate and Christian tragedy of freedom are directions rather than definitions. There are, in fact, classical tragedies in which fate does not exclude freedom of choice from the tragic action, and there are Christian tragedies in which the action owes its tragic significance less to freedom than to predestination. The real distinction is elsewhere. There are works in which the tragedy expresses the victory of fate over freedom, others in which the reverse is true.

Greek and classical tragedy show above all man's impotence before what was written in heaven. The Atrides are a tragic family because they cannot escape the gods' curse. If Phèdre's passion seems tragic, it is because her passion leaves her will powerless. But neither the quantity nor the kind of examples is forceful enough to constitute a rule. On the evidence of *Life is a Dream*, we must admit that tragedy can be born also from a victory which makes destiny recoil.¹⁵

Here, King Basile in Scene vi of the First Day recalls the birth of his son. "Then I consulted the planets and they told me that Sigismond would be the cruellest man, the most impious prince; they showed me my son, after a thousand crimes, trampling under foot my grey hairs. Who would not have believed in the evil, especially in the evil which his own wisdom predicted? I re-

solved to imprison the wild beast who had just seen daylight; I published that the child had been born dead; I had a tower built on the mountain and I prohibited its approach."

Nevertheless, the astrologer king has a scruple, "Did I give too easy credence to my science?" He wonders whether he had rightly deciphered Sigismond's future; further, he recognizes that the future is not definitively determined. "His nature," he says, speaking of his son, "leads him to precipices, but perhaps he may avoid them. The strongest fate, the most violent influence, the most impious planet only incline the free agent; they cannot force him."

This is why we have a play. To give Sigismond his chance as a free agent, the king removes him from the tower; put to sleep by a powerful soporific he awakes on the throne. "If he shows himself prudent, circumspect, and just, if he gives the lie to the presages of the stars, he will keep the throne... If, wild, uncontrolled, ferocious, he gives free rein to his vices and bears out his horoscope, then at least I shall have done my duty and I shall send him back to his prison as punishment..." Thus a dramatic action is joined, because the astrologer himself believes in a freedom which "the presages of the stars" do not bind.

On the throne Sigismond shows himself as the stars had predicted; another soporific returns him to his prison; his reign has been only a dream. If the dénouement were here, the play would be tragic as an illustration of the implacable determinism of the laws which fix our characters. Its tragic character would have been marked by the disabused words of the old king, "I imagined you would be triumphant over fate and the stars."

But there is a Third Day. A military revolution frees Sigismond and puts him

¹⁵ The present work had been completed before the appearance of the important study of L. Palacios, "La vie est un songe." *Essai sur le sens philosophique du drame de Calderon*, *Laval philosophique et théologique*, vol. VII (1951), no. 1.

back on the throne. Is it still a dream? How may one know? Here the theme of *Life is a Dream* converts the young man, acts upon his soul like grace, and frees him from his fate. When the temptation of brutality arises, before an enemy or a woman, he recovers himself, "Let me master myself. Do I know whether I am awake? What is my greatness or my satisfied desire if I am pursuing shadows!"¹⁶ The dénouement takes place, of course, between the conquered king and his son. The stars had said, "He will trample under foot my gray hairs..." The astrologer waits, "I am at your feet . . . after being so long averted, let destiny finally receive my homage of submission and let heaven accomplish its word." Sigismond then explains to him the dangerously vicious circle of too much assured prevision—"warned that I would be a brute you brought me up like a brute; having been brought up like a brute I could only become a brute. Today you see a father at the feet of his son, a monarch despoiled; this is the sentence of heaven which he tried in vain to conjure away and which is now realized. Could I—inferior in age, valor, and wisdom—succeed where the king my father failed? Could I redress destiny?"

It is a tragic moment, which does not cease to be so when Sigismond adds, "Rise, my father." The action indeed implies a relationship between man and a certain transcendence; whether in the end man is overwhelmed or destiny "redressed," nothing is changed in the tragic nature of the relationship.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 93, "Fortune, guide me on the throne, do not waken me if I sleep; if I am awake, do not let me sleep. Whether this is truth or dream, it is important to act well; if it is truth, to conform to truth; if it is a dream, to win friends to assist me when the hour will sound for waking."

Thus, all tragedy, ancient or modern, pagan or Christian, is enacted among free men, or men who believe themselves to be free, even in a world governed by fate.

There is no fatality without freedom. But there can be freedom without fatality—is this tragedy?

If the tragic is the sign of a transcendence, what remains when the transcendence of fate disappears, is freedom not practiced then in a world devoid of tragic illumination?

Here, and here only, it seems, does Christian tragedy reveal to us what peculiarly belongs to it: the freedom of man before the freedom of God.

Transcendence is freedom; that is what is meant by the idea of creation. What is essential lies not in whether the world is eternal or whether it had a beginning in time, but rather in the conviction that it could not have been; a created world depends, in its existence, upon a principle which is obedient to no necessity in creating it or in preserving it. Thus, the Creation is a free act. Now, creating man in his image, God creates him free, so that the relations between man and God are those of two freedoms. God treats Adam as a free man, the Incarnation is freely willed, adoration in spirit and in truth is addressed to God freely, beyond any idolatry.

Tragedy begins when man becomes conscious of his freedom. For then he receives not only the power to misuse his freedom but also the temptation to play god. The serpent cares not at all to awaken gourmandise in Adam and Eve; he tells them, showing them the forbidden fruit, "On the day when you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like God." The Creator and then "the most wily of the animals" appealed to what was greatest in them:

the first asked them freely to respect his law without depriving them of the means of violating it, the second advised them to free their liberty from a law which limited it.

The tragic sense of the first fall is still not completely unveiled.

Nothing is lacking to God: therefore, he did not create the world because he needed it. He created like an artist, for love. Freedom and love are intimately united in the creative intention; they remain so in the mysteries of vocation and inspiration. This is the principle of the human adventure. God, for love, created a free being and he asked its freedom, for love, to impose a limit upon itself. Adam did not simply violate a police regulation; he refused to give his love freely, as if he had to choose between his freedom and the love for which God asked.

Adam's was a tragedy of freedom in love, which henceforth coincides with the Christian history of humanity. Man freely created by the love of God, sin freely committed against the love of God, the Cross freely planted by the love of God, salvation freely sought for the love of God . . . God's love for man and man's love for God answer each other in an essentially tragic dialogue, because the free act designs the image upon which God will judge us.

With what insistence, in the second act of *The Hostage*, the Curé Badilon recalls to Sygne de Coüfontaine that she is absolutely free! The sacrifice asked of her is not even a duty.

SYGNE.—And I must now call this beast my husband, and accept him and hold out my cheek to him! That, ha, I refuse! I say no! If God in the flesh should exact it of me.
MONSIEUR BADILON.—That is why He by no means exacts.

SYGNE.—Then God does not want from me such a consent?

MONSIEUR BADILON.—He does not exact it, I tell you firmly.

But he immediately adds, invoking the exemplary deed of the highest freedom, flowering from the most generous love,

And by the same token, when the Son for the salvation of men
Has been torn from the breast of his father and suffered humiliation and death

And that second, daily death which is the mortal sin of those whom he loves,
Neither did Justice constrain him.

Further on,

MONSIEUR BADILON.—I declare to you that neither I, nor men, nor even God, asks of you such a sacrifice.

SYGNE.—Who, then, does oblige me?
MONSIEUR BADILON.—Christian soul! Child of God! It is for you alone to do your own will!

A vertiginous freedom, against which Doña Prouhèze takes her precautions,

Virgin mother, I give you my slipper.
Virgin mother, keep in your hands my unhappy little foot!

I warn you that soon I'll not see you any longer and will work in everything against you!

But when I try to hurl myself toward evil, let it be with a limping foot! When I want to get over

The barrier you have put up, let it be with a clipped wing!

I have finished what I could do . . .
The Satin Slipper, I. v.¹⁷

¹⁷ There is naturally no question of claiming for the Christian vision of the world the monopoly of tragic freedom. "I wanted to deal with tragedy of freedom in opposition to the tragedy of fatality" (Yvon Novy, "Ce que nous dis Jean-Paul Sartre de sa première pièce," in *Comoedia*, 24 April, 1943). Sartre's idea of tragedy is so bound up with his philosophy of freedom that it would demand a long study. Such a study would immediately turn on the following problem: since death transforms life into destiny, according to a formula of Malraux which Sartre takes up (*L'Être et le Néant*, N.R.F., 1943, p. 156), to what degree is Sartre's

Tragedy and Poetry

BY DEFINITION the transcendent is not accessible to the senses. Eyes do not see the fate of Oedipus, ears do not hear the God of *Athalie*. Of course what is accessible to the senses can signify the transcendent, but the signification will always be beyond the sign. The theater attempts to give materiality to the transcendent—thus Apollo's exposition in *Alceste*, the witches' in *Macbeth*, Mephistopheles' in *Faust*. But the transcendent escapes the forms, even though they "seldom shape themselves more definitely than a cloud's shadow";¹⁸ the ghost which walks at night on the battlements at Elsinore is much more than its appearance; however mysterious the messenger, the message infinitely-exceeds it.

Tragedy has to make convincing the presence of realities which cannot be directly presented or even represented. This same is true of our ideas and feelings, which are not accessible either to our senses or to our imaginations and are known only by signs, words or silences, gestures and mime. But the transcendent is beyond modes of consciousness, which have a body at their disposition to make manifest their presence;

tragedy not of a kind enacted at "the twenty-fifth hour," when "the dice are thrown"—a tragedy of fatality in which life become destiny is, in relation to death, tragic transcendence, as in *Huis-clos*? The main texts authorizing a study of the question will be found in Francis Jeanson, *Le Problème moral et la pensée de Jean-Paul Sartre*, Paris, Éditions du Myrte, 1947, p. 236 sq.

¹⁸ Craig, *op. cit.*, p. 268: For example, "In *Macbeth* the air is thick with mystery, the whole action is ruled by an invisible power; and it is just those words which are never heard, just those figures which seldom shape themselves more definitely than a cloud's shadow, that give the play its mysterious beauty, its splendor, its depth and immensity, and in which lies its primary tragic element." Read his whole essay, "On the Ghosts in the Tragedies of Shakespeare."

the transcendent requires a kind of signification at the second power.

Tragedy must evoke what cannot be simply signified. There is no tragedy without evocation.

Litré defines *evocation* as "a term from magic. Action of causing demons, ghosts, or the souls of the dead to appear." The tragic work takes from a superior magic what is not content with gross apparitions in the world of appearances. But the signs which give it a body have still a further function, one of apparition and not only of expression and communication.

When Hamlet says "To be or not to be . . .," does he speak for himself or for us? Is it a monologue, in which the effort for expression coincides with the effort of thought? Is it a dialogue with one voice, in which the audience plays the role of silent interlocutor? It is certain that the words have a mission beyond expressing the hesitations of the young prince or his bitterness over the miseries of man; they evoke dreams of the last sleep and the nameless mystery of "something after death (III. i. 78)."

If the tragic moment is the point at which the presence of a transcendence is "realized," the words and images of the scene have more to do than to give birth in us to an idea or a feeling; they must cause to appear before us and in us the being which causes the idea or feeling. Oedipus' sufferings must awaken pity and terror in our souls while at the same time endowing with some kind of existence the superior power which makes Oedipus and his story pitiful and terrible.

What better name than poetry can we give to the art of opening the soul to invisible transcendence? Possibly all poetry is not evocation, but it is certain that all evocation is poetry. In what respect is the word closer to its original

and fundamental sense? Here we are involved with more than a process of harmonizing two thoughts by awakening in one the secrets of the other, of producing the sympathy by which communication becomes communion, of effecting a kind of creative cognition (*cette connaissance qui est co-naissance*). We are on a scene where everything is presence: the signs are charged with the power to create presences, they participate in the creation of the world which drama essentially is, they are creators of what they signify as they signify it.

Thus, with transcendence, an exigency of poetry is inscribed in the very essence of tragedy, as passages of intermingled verse and prose in Shakespeare strikingly show. The transcendence spontaneously takes the form of poetry. Hamlet receives Rosencrantz and Guildenstern in a prose dialogue in which humor clothes appearances in burlesque madness. Immediately afterward, when he is alone with his mission, Hamlet speaks poetry to evoke invisible powers,

'Tis now the very witching time of night,
When churchyards yawn, and hell itself
breathes out
Contagion to this world... (III. ii.
385-7)

Similarly, at the end of the famous scene in which Lady Macbeth sleepwalks, a candle in her hand: everything is prose, the breathless prose of the visionary taking its rhythm from anguish, alternating with the simply prosaic prose of the witnesses, the lady in waiting and the doctor. The latter observes the phenomenon scientifically and says, "This disease is beyond my practice (V. i. 66)." Then, brusquely, the mystery dictates poetry to him,

Foul whispering are abroad: unnatural
deeds
Do breed unnatural troubles: infected
minds

To their deaf pillows will discharge
their secrets:

More needs she the divine than the
physician.

God, God, forgive us all! (78-82)

This scene might furnish us a disturbing example. Does not the queen's hallucination represent a moment of supremely tragic action? Does it not signify the transcendence of remorse? And yet her nightmare is not exteriorized in verse.

Poetry is not synonymous with versification. Here the suggestive power of images and the rhythm of their movement, which commands that of the words, preserve poetically the discontinuity of thoughts welling up out of obsession. The effect would be more difficult to attain within the regularity of verse. Above all, a theatrical work is not only a text; it enjoys complete existence only on the stage. The tragic climate is created by words, of course, but also by composition, sight, attitude, the queen's gait, by light and darkness, by the setting which disputes the supernatural value of forms.

We may call tragic poetry, then, everything which in the text or presentation evokes transcendent presences. It illuminates equally the free verse of T. S. Eliot and the line of Claudel. It will be the aureole of a performance like Mounet-Sully's *Oedipus*, photographs of which give us a remote but precious memory. It will be the soul of the *mise en scène*, as we see it in Gordon Craig's sketches for *Electra*, *Macbeth*, and *Hamlet*, along with his commentaries which are his art's "discours de la méthode." Tragic poetry liberates the transcendent from words and gestures, from forms and colors, lights and shadows. When the holy spirit takes possession of the high priest, "the symphony" sustains his voice,

Levites, of your sounds give me
chords,
And with their movements second my
transports. (*Athalie*, III. vii)¹⁹

In Claudel's *Tidings Brought to Mary*, when a miracle revives Mara's daughter, angelic voices from heaven accompany the sacrificed and sacrificial love of the young girl Violaine.

There is a very substantial unity between tragedy and poetry. Slightly modified, a remark of Eliot's on Shakespeare's theater expresses it accurately and well, "The same plays are the most poetic and the most tragic, and this not by a concurrence of two activities, but by the full expansion of one and the same activity. I agree that the tragic dramatist who is not a poet is so much the less a tragic dramatist."²⁰

We cannot consider form and substance separately. Poetic form cannot be lifted off like a piece of clothing, leaving the tragic substance intact. Without poetry, the current of tragedy does not flow.

Platitude, by definition, excludes the third dimension. Any platitude in expression deprives a work of the profoundness of transcendence. Whatever an author's intentions may be, they do not suffice to produce a tragedy. Whatever the intelligence of aesthetics and

technique shown in a masterpiece, there are no principles or recipes for making a well-made play poetic. Whatever the historic and social conditions for a renaissance of tragedy, even the most favorable supply no more than an abstract scheme until a poet is born.

A history of tragedy *manqué* could offer a collection of very interesting negatives to show, by contrast, what is positive in the essence of tragedy. We might learn that there is no such thing as bad tragedy, only works which through faults in form do not succeed in being tragedies.

Since the beginning of the century there have been many authors in France who have felt the temptation of tragedy. There have been very many attempts to revive ancient or invent modern tragedy, to restore classical tragedy or create prose tragedy, to return to traditional tragedy or discover a formula for tragedy in modern dress. Of course it has not been enough to use a chorus, to respect the three unities, or to give a mythological disguise to our own problems. More serious still, it is not enough that sincere and profound conviction give a role to Destiny or to God, or that an intelligence enamored of truth recognize new transcendences in our world. We must have the real presence, and this presence can only be poetic.

Translated by ELIZABETH STAMBLER

¹⁹ The whole scene suggests relations between drama, music, and the supernatural.

²⁰ "A Dialogue on Dramatic Poetry," in *Selected Essays*, 1934, p. 52.

TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND HUMAN RELATIONS

GEORGES FRIEDMANN

IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES of Europe and in the U.S.A., the study of technological change in its connections with social evolution, human relations and human values attracts more and more attention.

This interest is justified: the studies involve a complex embracing many others of our time, social, ethical, and—at least, so I believe—philosophical. It often slips out of your grasp when you try to seize it. Roughly speaking, it could be defined as the relations between technical and moral progress.

For my part, I firmly believe that before we rise to general ideas, before we judge, we must be prepared to go through a long period of inquiry, of methodical observation in various types of factories, in dock-yards, in offices. We must spend a long time observing and collecting data concerning the behaviour of modern men at work and at play, and the evolution of machines and techniques of all types which permeate and transform man's environment in an industrial civilization.

I

I USED THE WORDS "industrial civilization." What do they mean? What historical and technological justification is there for this expression?

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My first point is that there are different phases or stages in the so-called "Industrial Revolution," which have their own particular features, each of them showing technical, social, economic and cultural aspects which are closely inter-related.

(a) The first industrial revolution is characterized by the supremacy of the steam-engine and consequently, of coal, which has rightly been called the "first bread of industry." It marks the transition from cottage industry to the factory. Following the rather primitive inventions of Newcomen, the appearance of James Watt's steam-pumps in the English collieries, the introduction of the first steam-looms in the weaving industry mark the beginning of this phase in the last two decades of the eighteenth century. As shown in Charles Ballot's classic, *L'introduction du machinisme dans l'industrie française* (Paris, 1923), this movement reached France after a delay of about twenty years, and, spreading through Western Europe, reached Belgium and, later, the countries of Central Europe. In the United States its beginnings were rather slow. They can be traced to the last years of Jefferson's presidency, after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.

(b) Gradually, however, discoveries in physics and chemistry and their application to industrial processes put an end to the supremacy of the alternating steam-engine, whose essential characteristic was the role of the piston.

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century striking technological changes occurred. A new and original set of techniques changed the face

of West European and North American communities.

To the steam-engine, hardly modified since the days of Watt, was now added, or rather substituted, a whole complex set of techniques, accompanied by economic transformations of which I can only mention here a few of the most striking features:

The appearance in industry of new combustibles and fuels, liquid and gaseous: the use of lighting gas in the machines of the Belgian, Jean Lenoir, from the 1860's, being an important stage of a movement leading to the progressive use of all kinds of petroleum oil in motor engines and, later, Diesel engines.

The revolution, more and more complete, in communications, by rail, road, and sea.

The readaptation of the steam-engine owing to the technical discoveries of Parsons, in the 1880's, and his steam-turbine.

New types of metal-cutting machines made of toughened steel, adding speed to greater precision and, moreover, involving several different tools, co-ordinated in their action: this being a stage on the road towards progressive automatization.

The invasion of industry and agriculture by chemistry.

And, last but by no means least, overshadowing and dominating all these changes, penetrating them, and setting its seal on the second industrial revolution: the universal use of electricity. Although the theoretical findings of the physicists date back a long way, only at the end of the nineteenth century do the practical applications of this new form of energy begin to transform the workshop and the use of man-power. Electricity deserves to be called the new "bread" of industry.

Closely linked with these technologi-

cal changes, with the tremendous increase of total production and the necessity, henceforth, of a more rational use of man-power, are the first attempts at scientific management which can be observed during this period. The active years of the life of F. W. Taylor are between 1880 and 1914: and this is not a mere coincidence. It is permissible to say that the second industrial revolution is also distinguished by the appearance of mass production and industrial rationalization—in the U.S.A. at first, in Western Europe a little later.

(c) The second industrial revolution continued and developed at the opening of the twentieth century and during the period between the two World Wars.

Today, we are on the eve of a third industrial revolution, whose characteristic will be the liberation of atomic energy and, as it appears from already advanced research, its application to industry in the fairly near future.

Such, if we had the space to describe it in more detail, would be the historical background of the industrial revolutions.

Under their influence, various machines have appeared and constantly increased in number. They play different and sometimes very numerous roles, and have different effects on man's activity and sensibility.

II

I. INTO THE FIRST category fall *production* machines used in industry, agriculture and offices. As for the latter, I am thinking in particular of accounting machines and of those connected with the preparation of work in the workshop. The huge international growth of a concern like the International Business Machines shows how important this field of technological development has already become.

(2) Into the second category fall the various machines *for transport* on land, sea, and in the air.

The social effects of these techniques are most important, as it appears from recent studies. The pioneering contribution of American sociology is, on this subject, remarkable, and particularly the work of Professor W. F. Ogburn and his assistants at the University of Chicago.

But I must emphasize that this part of the field is only just beginning to be explored and that very much has still to be investigated and to be said, especially concerning the motor car. I remember my joy when, a few years before the war, I read, in a list of American Ph.D. theses, the following title: "The automobile, a sociological study." I regret to say that the contents of the work did not come up to my expectations. Yet, this field—the effects of the motor car on society, psychology, family and even current ethics—is immense and practically untouched.

The U.S.A. has been defined as "a nation on wheels" and in Europe we observe the same trend rapidly developing. There is another definition which was given to me three years ago, in Detroit, by an executive in a big motor car factory: "The family is the place where the son waits for the return of the automobile." I pointed out to this gentleman that another important firm of motor car manufacturers had just put into mass production a car furnished with twin-beds, so that the interconnections between car and family were even more tight than he seemed to believe.

(3) Into a third category fall machines of *communication*: telegraphs, telephones, radio, television.¹

¹ Cf. *La Radio et Les Hommes*, by Roger Veillé.

(4) In our fourth category we will place the *techniques of leisure*. In an industrial civilization, mechanization of leisure accompanies mechanization of work and is closely mingled with it.

Here we find once more, though in quite different patterns, some of the transport and communication techniques previously mentioned.

For instance, the motor car is, at different times, an instrument of work or an instrument of leisure for the doctor or the business man. For the society woman whose car wanders between the beauty parlor, the dress-maker's shop and the fashionable seaside resorts, this double function does not occur.

Here we find also the gramophone techniques and what can be called "*the Big Two*" of mechanized leisure: the cinema and the radio, coupled with television.

III

THIS SHORT CLASSIFICATION leads us to a third point: the more and more pronounced appearance, due to the effect of these technological changes, of a new environment of man: "the technical environment."

These numerous techniques have transformed and daily continue to transform the living conditions of modern societies, and, consequently, the relations between individuals. Every moment of life, every aspect is more and more affected. We are confronted here by a phenomenon of vast proportions, invading working hours, life in the street, in the home, leisure both by day and by night.

Let us compare our life with the life of men and women in pre-industrial societies.

Let us take, for example, a man living at the "eleventh hour" of these communities and himself an industrialist. Buf-

fon, the great French scientist, forerunner of Darwin, born in 1707, died in 1778. He was iron-master at Montbard, a town in Burgundy on the main road to Dijon. The machines he used were worked by wind and water, energy coming directly from Nature. When travelling, he could not exceed the speed of a galloping horse. For Buffon and his contemporaries, most of the stimuli to which they were submitted came from beings and things which were not artificial but natural.

For this natural environment the industrial revolutions have substituted an environment which is more and more technical: the "technical environment." This environment daily thickens, becomes more dense, more permeated, so to speak, with all the techniques we have mentioned, and envelops, on all sides, the men and women of our time. Each day we are submitted to thousands of stimuli which, until quite recently, were unknown.

A few comments are necessary concerning this technical environment.

(1) The difference between the "technical environment" and the "natural environment":

It is absolutely essential to avoid any misunderstanding as to what we mean by "natural environment." It is not our intention at all to give it the meaning of a *purely* natural environment. Such a conception would be abstract and unrealistic.

(a) There were techniques in all pre-industrial societies where agriculture was far more developed than industry. Concerning these techniques we must emphasize that, in these societies or communities, work included many repetitive and highly monotonous tasks, such as the millstone, the mortar, the spinning wheel and so forth.

There is no question of an idealized

view of the past which would coincide with a metaphysics of the "good old days."

(b) Therefore, we must bear in mind that, ever since the origins of pre-history, the "natural environment" is a relatively "technical" environment. Modern ethnologists are giving more and more attention to studying the efforts by which man seeks to defend, feed, shelter and clothe himself, and the gradual development of the related techniques. Among the recent French contributions in this field, I refer here to the interesting works of M. André Leroi-Gourhan, one of the best disciples of Professor Paul Rivet, and Deputy Director of the Musée de l'Homme and Reader in the University of Lyons. And also, on the anthropo-geographical side, to the very important works published since 1945 by Professor Max Sorre under the title: *Les fondements biologiques et techniques de la Géographie humaine* (4th volume is in the press); the works of M. Sorre are in the intellectual tradition of Vidal de la Blache, the founder of the French School of human geography which is so closely connected with our sociological preoccupations.

(c) Does all this mean that the opposition between "technical environment" and "natural environment" is only superficial, and that it disappears on more careful examination?

We do not think so.

The term "natural environment" seems justified when applied to societies of the past or the present which use machines propelled exclusively by natural energy (animal force, wind, water). In these societies, technical change is not due to the industrial revolutions.

On the other hand, in the phase of the industrial revolutions entered upon by the Western World since the end of the eighteenth century, there is an enor-

mous multiplication of techniques, a huge increase in the technical power of man. Motors propelled by natural energy are quickly replaced by motors and engines propelled by thermic, electric, and, in the near future, atomic energy.

For the past hundred and fifty years, technical change has shown an *acceleration* hitherto unknown. This acceleration can be measured and attempts have been made in that direction, from a sociological point of view, by Ogburn in the U.S.A., and, from an economic point of view, by Colin Clark, and in France, by my colleague Jean Fourastié in his recent works.²

The impact of this accelerated technological change on the environment of man is one of the main themes of social psychology and sociology. Here we can use the famous Hegelian concept: the transformation of *quantity* into *quality*. The *quantity* of these new techniques gives birth to new forms, to a new *quality*, of civilization. In this sense, and whatever may have been the technical achievements of mankind, before the industrial revolution, the end of the eighteenth century, shall we say, constitutes a break or even a jump: it marks the beginning of a new era in the psycho-sociological conditioning of man by his environment, and the beginning of what we call the *technical environment*.

(2) My second comment on this point would be this:

Is the "technical environment" a universal phenomenon? Marcel Mauss, whose works are read and appreciated in England by social anthropologists and sociologists, studied the spread of techniques in various societies. In 1929, at the first "Semaine internationale de synthèse" held in Paris, which offered an interesting symposium on civilization,

he read a very thoughtful paper, in which he emphasized the importance of what he called "les faits de civilisation" ("constitutive facts of civilization").³

The techniques, their changes by development and borrowing from one society to another, are amongst the "constitutive facts of civilization." Marcel Mauss, with his extremely wide ethnogeographical knowledge, gave numerous and very convincing examples. He himself suggested the application of these ideas to the most advanced communities and especially to contemporary industrialized societies.

According to these views, we lay down that a sufficient number of these "facts of civilization" create a common pattern of civilization. They define and constitute a certain type of civilization. This happens today with the development of the second industrial revolution.

In this evolution the U.S.A. is the leading country. But, on the whole, the same technological changes have occurred or are occurring in Britain, France, Germany, in small but highly industrialized countries like Belgium, and recently, in Soviet Russia.

I do not underestimate (a) the differences in the speed and progress of this common evolution, (b) the role of ethical and cultural differences and, consequently, the variety of reactions to technological change, due to what Ralph Linton and other authors call the "basic structure of personality," (c) the role, and impact on these reactions, of economic, social, and political structures (for example, between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.).

In spite of these differences, everywhere, the same technological changes that we have outlined above control the same double process of mechanization in leisure and in work, and provide the

² *Le Grand Espoir du XX Siècle*, Paris, 1949; *Machinisme et Bien-Etre*, Paris, 1951.

³ *Civilisation, le mot et l'idée*, Paris, 1930.

same "constitutive facts" of civilization.

This would suggest that there is a common "technical civilization" developing in all countries subjected to the second revolution.

(3) As a third comment, and in further support of these views, I would like to emphasize that valuable observations suggest the existence of common factors in industrialized areas of different countries, and refer, here, to a few points:

(a) The common trends in mechanization of leisure which strike the impartial observer in such industrialized cities as New York, Paris, London, Chicago and even Moscow.

Concerning Soviet Russia, these trends were already noticeable on the eve of the 2nd World War and I have noted them down, after three trips devoted to the study of the impacts of technological change in the U.S.S.R., in a book published in 1938 under the title *De la Sainte Russie à l'U.R.S.S.* ("From Holy Russia to the U.S.S.R.").

Incidentally, and in the same line of thought, an interesting problem is suggested by the reactions of newly industrialized communities to the forms of leisure of a mass society, and to the new types of values and habits which these create.

This is the case of the industrial Negro communities which have considerably increased in the U.S.A., and particularly in Chicago, Detroit and St. Louis, since the beginning of the 2nd World War. The process of their adaptation to their new environment is being studied in the field by research teams under the direction of Everett Cherrington Hughes and W. Lloyd Warner, both of the University of Chicago.

As far as France is concerned, studies in progress, undertaken by teams from the "Centre d'Études Sociologiques" and

led by P. Chombart de Lauwe, in Paris, reveal interesting facts about these trends. These studies are devoted to the social ethnography of the Paris area, mainly in six districts of the city or the immediate suburbs; the first volume, which forms an ecological introduction, is now being prepared for the press.

(b) In the light of the development of the social psychology of personality as shown, for instance, by such works as those of Kardiner, Linton, Erich Fromm and Karen Horney, I am personally interested in the observation and definition of certain human types common to these different societies and characteristic of the technical environment. A brief mention, a rapid outline is all I can give them here.

Kayserling (whom, of course, I do not quote as a scientific authority but, in this case, he did hit the nail on the head), in one of his best books, *Die entstehende Welt* ("The Rising World"), gives the symbolic name of "chauffeur," "the driver," to the men, who, in modern societies, use the techniques, and sometimes very powerful ones, without having any technical knowledge or any strong cultural background.

May I state that this is no special attack on motor car drivers: it would be an attack against most of us—and against myself.

A number of observations suggest, and this is the point, that technical power, when not balanced by culture, tends to shape the whole personality: this is the case of the type called here the "chauffeur."

(c) There is another type, perhaps even more interesting: that is the man who considers all problems of his daily activity, of his profession (including the human problems) only from the point of view of technique and its requirements. We call this type "the technician."

Here again I do not want to indulge in hasty generalizations and impeach a whole profession. But, being an industrial sociologist who, for years, has had the opportunity to observe many engineers inside factories and out of them in several different countries, I consider that it is a fact that a great number of production engineers, production experts and also advisers in scientific management have something of this type of personality.

Incidentally, the second Industrial Revolution has bred the most interesting type of technician, F. W. Taylor, who can be regarded as a kind of technical genius. But his system of "scientific management" is characterized by the omission of the non-technical factors in the study of industry and of its human problems.

As I just defined him, a man who considers all the problems of his daily activity (including the human ones) from an exclusively technical point of view is a technician. One of the usual characteristics of the technician in offices and factories is that, when faced with a problem, he begins by making a draft, writing down figures and, if possible, formulating an equation.

But misunderstandings must be carefully avoided: the traits characteristic of the personality of the technician are not peculiar to any particular occupation and can be found outside the professions which are considered to be specifically technical: they can be found not only in business, among managers and executives, but in military careers, and also among University professors and scholars of all descriptions, including sociologists.

Coming back to the engineer and managers, those who know France are aware that our famous "École Polytechnique," whose merits are, in many respects, con-

siderable, has bred and is still breeding a great number of these men, who occupy important posts in public as well as private administration.

The spread of the "technician" type and the recognition of its weaknesses are now more and more freely acknowledged. New trends in scientific management tend more and more to give importance to human relations, and influence the programs of Engineering Colleges and High Schools. It is worthwhile to point out here as very significant, the creation and development in the U.S.A., at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, of a section called "Economics and Engineering," which should enable a certain number of engineers to acquire broader ideas about the human factor in industry.

In France, as in other countries, there is a struggle in this matter, but I regret to say that the greater strength rests still on the side of the "technician" managers and engineers. It so happens that, thanks to research which will be published at the end of 1953, we have had the experience of that struggle in a big French motor car concern. A new department, supported by some of the highest executives in the firm, is trying to impose itself. It is headed by men who, in every respect, both from the point of view of vocational selection, training of supervisors, mental and physical comfort of the workers, are experienced and well-intentioned. The reaction of the technician engineers, in the workshops as well as in the technical departments, is often negative and takes the form of scepticism and passive (or even active) resistance. In other cases, the technician manager, who has had trouble with his employees (decrease of output and quality, turnover, absenteeism, or even strikes) suddenly discovers the magic formula: "human relations"

and accepts panaceas which, he naïvely hopes, will, in a few weeks, change the whole morale of his personnel.

May I add that, in an entirely different occupation, that of medicine, we are beginning to collect data on the evolution of this profession, which show the rise and spread of a technicist type of physician (not to speak of the surgeon).

This new type seems to be closely differentiated from the former type. The abundance and perfection of technical equipment, the common use of X-rays and other kinds of laboratory analysis tend to lessen the importance of direct auscultation, to lessen also the practitioner's use of his senses of sight, hearing and touch. It changes, as far as the physician is concerned, what can be called the "feeling for the sick" (*le sens du malade*), and consequently the psychological attitude of the physician towards the patient and vice-versa. We all know (I mean all of us who have been ill)—and this has been confirmed by our interviews among various social strata—that the moral tact of the physician, his comprehension and sympathy, his psychological presence are important factors in his knowledge of the patient and, often, in the success of the treatment. Here are the words of Professor Schœmaker at the opening of the 1st International Congress of Gastro-enterology, held in Brussels in 1935: "L'idéal que chacun de nous doit avoir dans son cœur, c'est d'être pour nos malades le médecin moderne avec ses appareils compliqués, son laboratoire chimique, ses rayons X, ses instruments à endoscopie, sa technique opératoire, et aussi le médecin ancien qui prenait la main de ses malades en disant: 'Ayez confiance, je suis avec vous.'" A well-expressed thought of which, I fear, my English will not convey all the meaning and feeling: "This is the ideal which all of us should

keep in our hearts: to be, for our patients, the modern physician, with his complicated equipment, his chemical laboratories, his X-rays, his endoscopic instruments, his operative techniques, and *also*, the old-world practitioner who would take the hand of his patient and say: 'Don't lose heart, I am with you.'" By observing methodically the evolution of the medical profession, psycho-sociological research in this field will show us if this noble ideal *is* and *can* be attained by the technicist type of physician.

Before concluding this part of my subject, may I emphasize that the evolution towards the technicist attitude is bringing us face to face with an international type of individual, the product of the technical environment.

Observations made during my trips to Soviet Russia in 1932, 1933 and 1936, and in France in 1944 and 1945, when I had occasion to meet a number of Soviet citizens, plus the analysis of Soviet literature and recent Soviet films, have convinced me that the same evolution, expressed through different social institutions and national traits, is taking place in the U.S.S.R., where, for instance, heads of firms, engineers, Red Army officers, scientists, managers and so forth, show all the characteristics of technicist attitudes towards their tasks and the problems they involve.

In short, I think that in spite of ethical, economic and political differences and variety in degree and expression, we must admit the "technical environment" as a universal phenomenon of our industrialized societies.

The consequences of such a statement are that:

(i) There is no scientific reason to speak (as do many distinguished writers and essayists in Western Europe) of so-called "Americanism."

The U.S.A. is ahead of the rest in the evolution towards a "technical environment," and it is important to remember that other countries in Europe and Asia have stronger and older traditions, homogeneous social and cultural patterns which delay this evolution.

But in this path the U.S.A. has no "privilege" (if this can be called a privilege); it is only at the head of a universal trend which is leading to the construction of a "new environment."

(ii) In opposition to the scheme of orthodox Marxism there are important features which are common to capitalist and non-capitalist societies. In other words, there are important human problems, and especially problems concerning human relations, which *cannot* be solved automatically by the overthrow of the capitalist system, as is dogmatically asserted by Marxist theorists. To put it in Marxist terms, the dialectic of technological change is not identical with the dialectic of the class struggle.

IV. TECHNICAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SENSIBILITY

If the views which we express above are correct, if, corresponding to the technological change which has been developing rapidly since the end of the eighteenth century, there is a deep transformation of the environment of a great part of mankind, if there is such a change in the stimuli to which the individual is submitted, then there must also be a transformation of

emotional mental	} attitudes of ways of	feeling thinking acting

(1) This transformation has been very strongly emphasized by Lucien Febvre,

the eminent French historian and co-founder, with Marc Bloch, professor at the Sorbonne and heroic Resistance leader, shot by the Germans in June 1944, of the journal, *Annales d'Histoire Economique et Sociale*, which has developed, in close connection with sociological research, into a broad movement, highly significant of contemporary French social science, and known as the "Annales movement."

Shortly after the collapse of France, M. Febvre published in the *Annales* of January-June 1941, an article on "La sensibilité et l'histoire" (Sensitivity and History), a manifesto as well as a program of work, which, because of the date of publication, has remained unknown to many whose attention it would certainly have attracted under normal circumstances.

This theme, concerning the evolution of emotional and mental attitudes in their relation to changes in the social and technical environment, is also the basic thesis running through his admirable book: *La Religion de Rabelais et le problème de l'incroyance au XVI^e Siècle* ("The religion of Rabelais and the problem of unbelief in the sixteenth century").⁴ I would like to draw attention to a chapter of this work which contains an interesting and, I believe, quite original line of research into the history of literature in its connections with the sociology of knowledge. In it M. Febvre gives the conclusion to a careful analysis of the works of a number of poets and writers of the French Renaissance. He points out that the poetic images and comparisons which they use are, more often than not, related to the senses of smell, taste or hearing. Visual images are, in comparison, very rare. Particularly striking is the fact that, to the men of this type of civilization, living in its

⁴ Paris, Albin Michel, 1942.

particular environment, hearing seems at every instant to precede and, if I may say so, supersede sight. Among the great writers of this period, Rabelais is the only one who can make a character-study, paint a portrait. In connection with this point it is to be noticed that sight is the most abstract of the senses, the geometrical sense, *par excellence*. Life in the natural environment, the permanent contact with natural elements, natural beings and rhythms tends to develop a more concrete form of sensibility than in our "technical environment."

(2) This same theme runs also very deeply through the works of Huizinga, the Dutch historian, professor at Leyden university, who died during the German occupation, and in my opinion one of the greatest humanist scholars of our time.

I refer here especially to his famous book, *The Decline of the Middle Ages*, and will allow myself to stress one observation which is supported by several facts mentioned at different places by Huizinga and corroborated by the works of M. Febvre and his disciples. It is the violent contrast of day and night imposed on all inhabitants of the countryside and of many of the towns. The techniques of housing and of lighting, which were still very primitive, the conditions of urban life explain this sudden transition from the labor and noise of the day to the total silence of the night. Is it, therefore, exaggerated to believe that these conditions, mainly due to the level of technological development, influenced the sensibility of men living in this environment, a sensibility which the most authoritative historians describe as full of contrasts and sharp oppositions? It is precisely what Huizinga points to, namely, that, in these men, there are violent contrasts in

feelings, emotions, in the whole sensibility, and that they are accompanied by a sort of oscillation between extremes. The religious emotions especially were more violent and correspond to forms of the imagination different to the average of our time; representations of Sin, Hell, the Devil, Paradise, as observed in the plastic art of the period do not have an equivalent today.

The works of the above-mentioned historians suggest to the social scientist a new way of studying religion in connection with the evolution of man's environment: for instance, religious sensibility, so far as it can be reconstructed from all that we know through writings and works of art, at the time of Pope Leo X was not the same as the religious sensibility of the modern Catholic, contemporary of Pius XII. How could it be the same?

(3) The same attempt to connect the total environment and, in particular, the technical environment with the evolution of the human mind, feelings, and behaviour, appears in the more recent works of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and having had the privilege of seeing him fairly frequently and of consulting him in the last years of his life, I know how anxious he was to promote research in that direction. His scientific standpoint had considerably changed since the publication, in 1910, of the *Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures*, the first of his series on primitive mind, and he was perpetually criticizing his own findings, becoming more prudent in his interpretations, recasting his main theories, as has been quite recently revealed by the posthumous publication, in 1949, of his *Carnets* ("Notebooks"). One of his main preoccupations was to investigate the relations between primitive ways of thought and behavior and the state of techniques in the environment. His

study of the traditional French fairy tales, for example, *Puss in Boots* ("Le Chat botté"), *The Sleeping Beauty* ("La Belle au Bois dormant"), *Beauty and the Beast* ("La Belle et la Bête"), led him to regard these fairy tales as survivals of very ancient attitudes in the minds of modern men, living in a transformed cultural and technical environment.

(4) The comparative study of perception in the "natural environment" and the "technical environment" points to a new field of research. How could perception, the relations between space and time, be the same in men who knew of nothing quicker than the gallop of a horse or, more often, their own pace or the pace of an ox pulling a plough, and in men who live in our great European and American cities? It seems, as has been pointed out by the analysis of literary documents, that they did not observe their surroundings from the same mental standpoint as we do.

The senses of man, in the modern "technical environment" are, from childhood, subjected to the influence of new techniques, such as photography, which accustom him to seeing things from the most varied angles, to rapid vision from fast-moving vehicles, and more and more to aerial vision: these influences have been emphasized by one of our best experimental psychologists, Professor Henri Wallon, since his pioneering article published in 1935 in the *Journal de Psychologie* and entitled "Psychology and Techniques."

(5) I would like to say a few words here about the transformation of the feeling of *presence* in the "technical environment."

Piaget has analyzed the importance of the feeling of presence in the young child and the way in which it is constructed. According to the classical

scheme of things, the feeling of the presence of a human being is created in the child's consciousness by a process of association. The child associates, after a time, the visual image (the external features of his mother, for example) with an auditive image (her voice) and eventually, with images of touch. By this means, he feels that the same person is present; he thus constructs the feeling of a human presence.

Is this scheme still valid in the "technical environment" where, today, a great number of children, often, as soon as they can speak, are accustomed by other members of the family to hear and speak on the telephone, which can be described as a technique of hearing without vision?

As far as the radio is concerned, I have personally observed the reactions of children and noticed how deeply impressed they were the first time they heard the voice of a person well known to them, for instance their father, coming out of the wireless set whilst this same person was sitting near to them in the same room. Here, also, the classical scheme, according to which the feeling of presence is constructed, is completely upset.

Television, which is rapidly spreading, will have a similar effect by giving at the same time hearing and vision without the feeling of presence.

This evolution of the role and feeling of human presence is one of the most important and profound features of the trend which I am trying to define.

A review of the techniques of work and leisure, of the constructive techniques as well as of the destructive ones used in war, would show a weakening of the feeling of human presence as it was felt and lived in the "natural environment."

In industry, mechanization and gradual automatization have, for centuries, progressively and constantly decreased the part man plays in production. The history of technological change shows us the existence of different stages in the evolution of the machine. The Egyptian potter, as it appears from figures in documents, used his two arms and his two legs to move the different parts of his machine, to hold the tool and to work on the product. His body and his mind were, so to speak, wholly absorbed by the machine which was, on the other hand, strictly dependent on man. In further stages of this technological development, machines have become *semi-independent*, as, for example, the lathes invented at the end of the eighteenth century by the famous French engineer, Vaucanson, or the textile machines designed by Edmund Cartwright, and far more still, the turret-lathes which appeared in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Today the rapid spread of automatization has made extremely common, in modern workshops, *fully independent* machines which render unnecessary the presence of man. This trend can only be strengthened by the application to industry, in the near future, of atomic energy. In our century, a vast lay-off, a universal dismissal of man by the machine is more and more frequent. From a psycho-technical point of view, this evolution has been admirably summed up by the German industrial psychologist, Otto Lipmann, in his communication to the 4th International Congress of Psychotechnics, under the title: "Der Anteil des Menschen am Produktionseffekt" ("The part of man in production"), which was later translated and published in the *Journal de Psychologie*, in January 1928.

If we turn to the techniques of leisure, we see that a psycho-sociological study

of the cinema and the radio has much to investigate about the feeling of presence. I am not one of those who question the dignity of the cinematographic art. Nevertheless, the film, as compared to the stage-play, to dramatic art, is characterized by a certain absence of man: absence of active participation on the part of the spectator, and, on the other hand, absence of the actor, of the human being in the flesh, with his direct action on those who see and hear him, with the direct impact of complex psychological influences. Especially when considered from the point of view of human relations, the theatre involves a kind of reciprocal action, of creative complicity between the stage and the audience, which is relatively absent from the cinema and the radio.

The radio allows millions of people, sitting by their fireside with their feet in their slippers, to be "present" at a football match, a meeting, a music hall performance, a lecture, a symphony concert. But would it not be more true to say that the radio allows, in many cases, a *certain form of absence*? Television, though adding visual to auditive images, deserves the same description.

I strongly believe that the film, the radio, and television, have enormous and splendid cultural possibilities and that they are capable, under certain conditions, of creating other kinds of human participation and *presence*. But these are still unknown, uninvestigated and, I fear, are today being abused.

V

IN THE "NATURAL environment," man was obliged to participate, to be present, in all his activities; in production, in art, in leadership, in war. The "technical environment" is characterized by the decline of that kind of participation.

Furthermore, and this is my last point and an important one, it is also characterized by a decline in knowledge of the materials on the part of the men who work on them in industry and agriculture.

Formerly, and until quite recently, work was of an artisan nature and knowledge of the materials in which the worker operated played an important part in his skill. Much of the apprenticeship consisted in acquiring experience in the use of materials: leather, wood, paper, glass, metal, and so on; the properties of the materials, their reactions to tools, to shaping, etc., were of prime importance.

In the "technical environment" this knowledge becomes gradually less and less necessary as a result of the progress of mechanization.

And this phenomenon has, as will be seen, repercussions not only on the transformation of the working conditions of the individual, but also on the shaping of human relations in industry and agriculture.

I do not want to embark on a purely technical discussion. But after all, examples of this evolution are very numerous. Most of the facts given here have been observed or corroborated in the course of our research in this field.

The textile industry.—Knowledge of the textile fibre, before the introduction of semi-automatic or automatic machines in the spinning mills was an important part of the skill of the workers, and particularly of carders. They had to know the varying reactions of the fibre (cotton, wool, hemp, flax, silk, etc.) to different degrees of humidity and temperature.

This knowledge is today considerably reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by the use of the modern machines, for instance, of the carding machines called

"gills" in the textile area of Northern France (Lille-Roubaix-Tourcoing). In most cases, these machines are operated by women whose whole period of training does not exceed six months: six months which are required for them to become familiar with the machines, to acquire the psycho-motory automatisms involved by their tasks, and the last remnants of a knowledge of the fibre.

As for knowledge of the machines themselves, here, as elsewhere in most mechanized industrial processes, it is nowadays the monopoly of the *setters* who do not need any knowledge of the materials (in this case, textiles) but merely of the machine, which incidentally requires fairly high qualifications.

The skilled weavers, capable of turning out a complete article, had a very good knowledge of the materials, of the structure of the cloth and of its qualities. It so happened that, after visiting a number of weaving sheds just before the outbreak of the last war, I had, during the occupation of France by the Germans, the unexpected opportunity of making comparative observations. As a result of the abnormal economic circumstances during the years 1941 to 1945, old looms were revived and put into operation by old skilled weavers, particularly in the upper valleys of the Pyrenees. Compared with the knowledge which their work revealed, knowledge of the materials, of the role of the warp, of the structure of the cloth in its minutest details, knowledge of the materials shown by workers who are responsible for a group of fifteen to twenty-five automatic looms is practically *nil*. The devices and gadgets which automatically give a signal as soon as the least thing goes wrong, have become both numerous and common. The workers do not know the most elementary characteristics of the materials on which

they are working or of the product to which their work finally leads.

Led us now point out how the meaningless character of the work in the eyes of the worker affects the individual and relations within the working group of which he is a member.

This absence of meaning is due in particular, following the mechanization of industrial processes, to the extremely tight reduction of the total work cycle and of the unit of work cycles. Light has been thrown on the psychological aspect and on some of the social aspects of these problems by an inquiry sponsored by the Human Factors Panel of the committee on social productivity, and undertaken by the National Institute of Industrial Psychology. Two members of the staff, Mr. David Cox and Miss Dyce Sharp, have recently given a first report in the journal *Occupational Psychology*.⁵

In the metallurgical industry, knowledge of the metal, of the varieties of steel and iron, of their properties and reactions to the tool according to the different temper, knowledge of sharpening, etc., are all related to knowledge of the materials. They are now the privilege of the tool-makers, the maintenance staff and, to some extent, of the fitters and setters, who constitute a very small fraction—not more than 10 per cent as shown by our findings—of production workers in metallurgical plants with modern equipment, and form a sort of new technical aristocracy. The outstanding majority, including 90 per cent of the workers, accomplish tasks which have, in most cases, no significance for them beyond that of satisfying immediate needs.

Comparable observations have been made in the ready-made clothing industry.

It must be stressed that the manufacture of clothing has, for centuries, been a handicraft and has called for accurate and skilled knowledge of all the material used. A large proportion of clothing—and nowadays even clothing for the middle class—is turned out on highly mechanized lines and the unit of the work cycle has been most strikingly reduced.

As far as the shoe industry is concerned, a knowledge of leather was, until recent times, very important. The least mistake, the least flaw in that knowledge could spoil a whole product. In the case of the highly skilled shoemaker, who knows how to make a whole shoe to measure, and to adapt it carefully to the foot, the major qualification lies in a knowledge of the materials. In the average mechanized modern boot and shoe factory, the last remaining possessor of that knowledge is the "cutter," and even he, in the most up-to-date factories, as I have observed in the big shoe concerns of the State of Tennessee, is losing this privilege through the introduction of a new type of automatic machine.

The same observations are relevant in the glove industry, which has been deeply transformed by mechanization, as in the Grenoble area of France. In the paper industry producing writing paper, envelopes, etc., knowledge of paper is disappearing among the workers. Before leaving this topic I would like to quote a curious example taken from an industry which one could have expected to remain unaffected by this trend: the confectionery trade.

Shortly before the war, we studied a highly mechanized factory making biscuits and pastries in Paris. It was equipped with very modern and very beautiful Dutch and Swiss machines. These machines did all the work: meas-

⁵ Vol. XXV, No. 2, April 1951.

uring the flour, egg-powder, sugar, syrup, cooking the mixture and dividing and wrapping the biscuits.

On our first visit we found that out of a total of 80 workers, 20 were traditional, skilled French pastry-cooks. They had been kept on by the management only to take care of unforeseen incidents. We interviewed these men. They told us: "The machines are excellent. There are no mishaps. We are bored and are sorry we are not back at Deauville, Dinard or Nice, working for the season or creating ourselves, as skilled artisans, magnificent birthday or wedding-cakes at a pastry-cook's." The management finally realized the position, and when we returned for further study, their skilled workers had been dismissed. The management kept only three of them, not as you keep in museums survivals of an extinct species, but because they had acquired, in the meantime, a good mechanical knowledge of the manufacturing processes. May I here mention that, in the famous sweet factory which I visited in November 1948 in the suburbs of Chicago, the training of the men who were introduced to me by the Personnel Department as being "the best cooks" in the factory did not exceed six weeks! Needless to say, their knowledge of the material was rather primitive and that they were, in fact, semi-skilled or highly specialized operators.

We can say then that the decline in the knowledge of materials is a universal trend connected with technological change. Of course, there still remain branches where craftsmanship survives. But satisfaction in work when the job involves the completion of a whole product lies very largely in knowledge and mastery of the materials. By jeopardizing that kind of satisfaction in work, technological change is greatly al-

tering the human relations which were linked with it both in industry and in agriculture. We will return later to this point.

As we have mentioned agriculture, we should bear in mind that there is, in the European peasantry, an evolution similar to the one which we have outlined in industry.

In the case of France, in industrialized agricultural areas which have been greatly extended in the last three decades, traditional working processes are being rapidly transformed by mechanization. Resistance to this change must not, however, be overlooked and a recent interesting document on this question has been provided by the monograph of M. Garavel, entitled: *Les paysans de Morette, Un siècle de vie rurale dans une commune du Dauphiné*, published in 1948 in the series of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.

An important consequence of these technological changes in the French countryside is the decrease in the number of rural craftsmen: wheelrights, blacksmiths, harness-makers, etc. Some of these men, rather than leave their home, prefer to transfer themselves to new kinds of jobs or to readapt their old ones; for example, by becoming mechanics, maintenance men or agents for agricultural machines and equipment. We have collected some facts on this aspect of technological change and its consequence, in a brief field study made in 1947 in the Vexin district, north-west of Paris. One of the features of this evolution and its psychological repercussions is that the men who are transferred to modern mechanical jobs do not play, in the life of the villages, country towns and rural communities generally, the same role as did the old artisans. This is also shown by an interesting field

study undertaken with the help of country schoolmasters under the direction of M. Varagnac, the author of an interesting book: *Civilisation traditionnelle et genres de vie*.⁶ The aim of this inquiry was to investigate the relations, in the French countryside, between recent technological change and traditional creeds and ways of behavior. Examination of the documents has shown how greatly these creeds and ways of behavior are influenced by the change in what we called the "technical environment." The subject tackled here is related to an important and, I would say, practical problem of modern culture: how far is it possible to maintain, in a technologically transformed world, traditional dress, traditional expression of feelings through dance, song and other forms of popular art? Is the rural folklore which was so rich up to recent times, in many French provinces, irrevocably condemned to disappear?

If we turn now from the rural artisan to the small peasant proprietor raising a number of different types of crops, as is often the case in France, it is clear that his work calls for a substantial and varied knowledge of Nature, seasons, animals, elements, plants. This knowledge is the equivalent of knowledge of materials in the industrial worker.

The peasant is a man of several techniques, a craftsman who must be able to turn his hand to widely varying tasks, including repair work. Today, technological change has brought all sorts of machines to the farms, from the small motor tractor and the milking machine to the huge combined harvesters and threshers, and is substituting them, to a large extent, for traditional individual knowledge of Nature and the elements.

The new forms of mechanized labor in industry and in agriculture, owing

to the nature of the tasks and the conditions of work which they entail, do not provide the same kind of emotional wealth or the same sources of satisfaction as the traditional jobs consisting in the creation of a complete article. Moreover, and without embarking here on an ethical discussion, we may incidentally ask ourselves the question whether the loss of intimate contacts with Nature in the "technical environment" does not imply fundamental social consequences and especially striking changes in human relations.

VI

BY SPLITTING UP the unity of traditional occupations and by decreasing knowledge of materials and the significance of the task, technological change has upset the ancient crafts inherited from the guilds and the human relations which they invoked. But it would be a great mistake to leave things at that point. Indeed, after having, for a while, the effect of individualizing work by multiplying isolated machines, technological change tends nowadays to create "lines," groups, teams of workers depending on one another. This phenomenon is particularly noticeable in the many forms of work involving conveyor belts. Conveyor work increases the number of interdependent teams, and gives to each a number of complementary tasks. The teams are composed of workers who, in their work, must rely on each other. Further, in many American and certain European factories, substitutes, called "relief men," are added to the personnel of the groups. They specialize in a section of the conveyor work and know several operations. Their job consists in replacing fellow-workers during brief absences and so ensure continuity in the work.

Moreover, the use of new equipment

⁶ Paris, Albin Michel, 1948.

such as secondary belts or "tool conveyors," moving floors and revolving seats for the lateral displacement of workers standing or sitting, introduces into what, until quite recently, was a rigid type of rhythm, a certain degree of fluidity. The worker has, at his disposal, a certain margin of freedom which is sometimes relatively great and can be still further increased by the introduction of "buffer stocks" of semi-finished products, placed between the workers. In these circumstances, the workers can organize their own work within the limits allowed by the rhythm of the conveyor system, and thus a certain freedom is introduced into the otherwise cramped rhythm of work.

We have observed on many occasions (and have mentioned this fact in a sketch of the psycho-sociology of conveyor work)⁷ that the collective structure of the work and this margin of freedom make for the creation of social relations between individuals at the place of work. These social relations are further encouraged by the fact that semi-automatic tasks can hardly be said to absorb one's attention. Men and women meet every morning at the same group of machines, at the same assembly section or inspection point and a certain social life is engendered, lending color to the hours of work which, in the eyes of the outside observer, seem monotonous. This social life gives the operator the benefit of a conscious activity which surrounds and envelops, so to speak, the process of reflex action, of medular tasks characteristic of the repetitive, fragmentary nature of work in mass production.

It is therefore possible to speak of "social" conveyor work groups. Good understanding between members of the team, emotional and mental harmony play an important role in the creation

and maintenance of this "sociability." Thus, the selection of individuals who are destined to meet one another, to work side by side, day after day, month after month and year after year, ought not to be left to chance or to methods of a hit-and-miss nature, the results of which are often disastrous. I go so far as to say that, in a more advanced and rational stage of human relations, people will be amazed that industrial organization in the middle of the twentieth century still accepted the haphazard throwing together of individuals constitutionally unfitted to work together and, particularly, individuals whose working rhythms are very different.

The importance of *rhythm* in the working group created by technological change since the 1920's and the rise of mass production, has been emphasized by recent psycho-physiological research, particularly by the work of Professor Léon Walther of Geneva. He is pursuing certain long-term projects, strongly influencing working conditions, for example, in an important food industry (Suchard's) and in a watch and clock factory in the Bernese Jura, employing 1,200 workers and which is highly rationalized and equipped with the most modern machines. I have visited him there several times. M. Walther has set out his ideas in a book, published in 1947, entitled *Psychologie du travail*, and in various recent articles.⁸ I will only mention those points arising from M. Walther's research which concern our subject, namely the repercussions of technological change on human relations and, particularly, the rhythm of working groups.

Rhythm is profoundly and specifically characteristic of the individual. Each of us has his natural "rhythm" which he can neither ignore nor transgress.

⁷ Cf. *Industrial Society*.

⁸ *Revue Philosophique*, Paris, Oct.-Dec., 1951.

One of the main tasks of the science of human work is to detect the natural rhythm of the individual in his economic activity. From a physiological point of view, rhythm can be defined as a pause inserted between muscular contractions, a pause which allows for the recuperation of spent energy. Rhythm thus increases the amplitude of a movement without increasing the initial effort, and has the effect of delaying the appearance of fatigue. Its connections with the feeling of satisfaction in work and interest in work are narrow and permanent.

M. Walther has conceived a method for determining the rhythm which is "natural" to each operative. This method is remarkably simple and has proved effective, as I have seen for myself, but I cannot enter here into technical details.

Thanks to a knowledge of the rhythms, it becomes possible to form groups of workers which are what might be called "physiologically homogeneous," that is to say, composed of individuals who have very similar, if not identical, rhythms, and for whom there is a stable satisfaction in working together.

M. Walther remembers the famous words of Bacon: "Natura non aliter quam parendo vincitur." I have heard him say, after a demonstration of his method: "After all, rhythm is stronger than sociology!" What does he mean by that? This deserves to be clarified.

Innovations, inspired by the famous experiments made at the Western Electric (Hawthorne Works, Chicago) between 1927 and 1939, and applied in a methodical and intelligent manner by certain American and European firms, tend to create, in the production lines, working groups with good understanding between their members and good relations between these groups and the

supervisors; in short, to create a healthy "climate" of industrial relations. These steps, according to M. Walther, are quite insufficient if the individuals composing the groups do not possess common features in their "natural rhythm," by means of which the homogeneity of the whole group is ensured. Thus it must be considered as a heresy, from a scientific point of view, and a barbaric practice, from a human point of view, to throw together, higgledy-piggledy, into repetitive tasks with a collective and rigid cadence, men and women whose "natural rhythm" has not been previously investigated with a view to constituting homogeneous groups, thus depriving them of a cadence suited to their individual aptitudes.

Here we find the core of the fundamental opposition between the physiological and the psycho-sociological points of view, entailing important practical consequences. This dispute can be cleared up only by long, patient and methodical experiments. But we must recognize and measure its full significance. Scientific management, largely inspired by American theory and practice, is nowadays mostly directed towards the psychological factors influencing the working groups within the factory. In the near future it will undoubtedly have to admit the importance of the "natural rhythm" element and take it into account in formulating the strategy of industrial relations. At the same time, we must point out that the "primacy of physiological rhythm" is in contradiction to the principles of the "Industrial Relations" movement, at present predominant in the United States, as well as being in contradiction to the doctrine underlying the Stakhanovite movement and its recent developments in the U.S.S.R., namely that individual output is "plastic" and can be determined to

a considerable degree by the economic and political structure.

I would add, finally, on this point, that the constitution of physiologically homogeneous groups should be studied in relation to establishment of *emotionally* homogenous groups, as understood in the sociometric tests of Moreno and the "Nominating technique" of Jenkins.

FINAL REMARKS

I AM CONSCIOUS of having tackled, in this short outline, a large number of problems and of having, in fact, presented here the program of a course which might be spread over a whole year. If I have made a mistake I am now going to make my case worse by confessing that this was intentional. Nevertheless, I hope that, out of this synthetic approach, a few important lines can be selected for further reflection and concrete research.

Observation of technological change, from the point of view of its psychosociological consequences, presents us with facts, all of which are not likely—far from it—to strengthen our faith in the immediate future of critical thought and human dignity, those indispensable conditions of a truly democratic society.

It is a great temptation (and many have succumbed to it) for men of our time, especially intellectuals, to adopt an egocentric attitude, to indulge in a deep mistrust of the progress of technology and its social consequences, to retire into an "ivory tower" and to seek shelter in the values of art, philosophy or various kinds of mystical escape.

In my opinion this is a great mistake.

The "technical environment" is challenging us; we must accept that challenge. Techniques can work two ways; they can be used against the dignity and the life of man, but they can also be reversed and made to serve man's dignity and life. Many of the concrete problems, arising from technological change in the Machine Age, are not, whatever many people may imagine, purely individual or ethical problems. They are, in fact, also economic and social problems. For instance, it can be forcibly asserted that the cultural value of "mass media" is linked with an improved social structure, with the creation of more rational economic, social and, particularly, educational institutions.

On the other hand, these social changes, however well-conceived, would not, alone, be sufficient to carry us to the goal and to solve the dramatic problems of which only a few have been outlined. The creation of really human relations in the "technical environment" calls also on the part of the individual, for an effort towards a more acute consciousness of the situation and a greater self-control, because no good institution can remain good without being actively supported and made a living thing by upright men. This is the concrete and realistic meaning which I would, for my part, give to the famous and beautiful lines of Henri Bergson: "Le corps de l'humanité, démesurément agrandi par la technique, attend un supplément d'âme" ("The body of mankind, increased out of all proportion by technology, awaits an increase of soul").

ARE WE AT THE END OF THE WORLD OF IMAGES?

AMÉDÉE AYFRE

WOULD VALÉRY'S FORMULA for the death of civilizations apply to this image-civilization which is ours? Has it already reached such a point of decline that we must watch its soon-approaching disappearance with the resigned clarity of old men? To say yes would indicate a perverse taste for paradox, for everything seems to indicate, on the contrary, that the world of images which surrounds us is in a period of full expansion. In any case, sober minds who are attached to traditional forms of culture and believe that they can only wage rear-guard actions against an enemy whose influence grows stronger every day, will scarcely believe that it is in its death-agony. But perhaps they might be shown that, quite secretly, death has already lodged itself within this image-civilization, and is gnawing away successive victories from within, until a final one reveals the complete evidence of its presence.

Images and the Presence of Reality

TO SEE THIS, we must rapidly retrace the successive stages that techniques of diffusion and reproduction have undergone in the past century, which have

brought it about today that men, in every corner of the globe, are surrounded by an ocean of images of every kind.

(It will be convenient here to take the word "image" in its broadest sense—which is also its original Latin meaning: everything which imitates, represents a so-called reality of the original fact. This imitation, however, can be more or less total, more or less perfect. One can represent only a part, or only one of the aspects of reality: the sketch of a face, the sound of a voice, the color of a dream, the movement of a form.)

This need to double the reality with something which resembles it and which can, by this fact, take its place in case of absence, constitutes one of the fundamental characteristics of man. But the conjunction of this primitive need and of the immense resources of contemporary technique has given rise to an unprecedented development of the world of images.

First it was photography, largely known to the public from the middle of the 19th century, which, by its technical precision, made possible a fidelity in resemblance and a facility of multiplication previously unknown. Perfected in every way, the photo-mechanical processes of reproduction have opened up possibilities for newspapers, signs, magazines and illustrated books which have not yet been fully explored. The mass-circulation press, as well as what Malraux has called "the imaginary museum," owe their very existence to this technique.

Edison's invention of the phonograph in 1877, perfected and completed later

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by other techniques, especially that of electro-magnetic waves, made possible an analogous multiplication of sound-images.

A little later, converging studies were to give birth to a new category of images, which were also to see a fantastic development: images of movement. Moreover, it is with these latter that between the two world wars there was to be realized the synthesis of visual and sound images when the movies began to "talk." With the successive improvement of color and large screens, we have thus come to an almost total image of the real, its almost perfect duplication. Of course, there is still lacking the data of some complementary senses, but it does not seem that we should exaggerate their importance. Indeed, what matters is not so much the fact of superficially experiencing something in relief, or receiving its odor, as of feeling a total impression of reality. For this, we do not need the simultaneous contribution of all our senses. A man deprived of one, or several among them, by using those that he retains, can distinguish between his dream and reality quite readily because each sense contains all the others virtually in the unity of consciousness.

What is most important to underline is that the cinema, in striving for a total representation of the real, has succeeded in showing us something else besides the perceptible surface of the world. Through phenomena, it is being itself that has been made present under all its forms. The cinema has been able to reveal to us feelings, ideas, and mysteries, just as much as men, things, and events. Those invisible forces no more escape the camera by reason of their invisibility than the past or the future, by reason of their absence.

A homeopathic dose of reality, placed in front of the object, polarizes the entire world of being around it. Thus the last

obstacle that these quasi-perfect images have to surmount in order to blend completely with the original, does not lie in the reality of the sensible order, or in the depth of essences, but rather in the fact that they always remain inevitably representations—that is, between their recording and projection there is always an interval of time. The length of the interval is unimportant, but its necessary intervention is enough to draw an absolute dividing line between the image and reality.

But now with television this failure of temporal synchronism disappears. Is the image that is directly televised still a re-presentation, the double of an original, or is it not rather the original "in person," seen from far away, perhaps, but scarcely reduced, discolored, or flattened by distance? Just a little more progress and these minor defects will disappear in their turn. Then the very special pleasure of "recognizing" someone on television, and the admiration for the "beauty" of the image, understood as essentially synonymous with fidelity, will reach their culminating point. This is more than an image, but a whole presence, which the swiftness of light—whose privileged status must be admitted—will diffuse almost instantaneously to all points of the globe. If ever the circuits are multiplied so that they intersect and are as widely diffused as the telephone, we would then know a ubiquity of man and an omnipresence of the world which would ultimately make all means of reproduction useless, for what further need will we have to represent what is rendered effectively present? Will this not be the situation of the present, which itself will have disappeared? In fact, the present, definitively caught by implacable magnetic or electronic memories, will be able to be totally reconstituted at any moment; we would then be dealing less with an

image of the past than with a sort of reserve presence, always capable of being reactivated, and hence constantly available. To spatial ubiquity, man will in this way add temporal ubiquity, at least in the direction of time that has already passed.

Are we flirting dangerously with science-fiction in all this? Or isn't this simply a matter of bringing to a conclusion—according to reasonable predictions, in a short period—a stage that has already begun? Man seems to be directing himself, not, surely, towards an eternal present which would make of him a god without limits, but towards a universal presence, towards a suppression of all distance between himself and things, without any mediation except that of a technique that has become absolutely transparent. Once arrived at this extreme point of perfection, the image would thus be effaced before that of which it is the image.

Images and the Arts

AT LEAST, that is the conclusion which a rapid review of a certain aspect of our civilization leads to, after an intervening dialectic carried out to its logical extreme, but without paradox. There is another approach, by an apparently inverse path, which is certainly much simpler but which leads to the same result. On the borderline of modern techniques of diffusion and reproduction, there is a whole area of expression which remains faithful to certain traditional artistic processes: painting, design, engraving, ceramics, sculpture, stained glass work, etc. In our time these arts have remained as alive as they were in past centuries, when they alone took upon themselves all the power of images.

But since a period which coincides—by chance or by necessity—with the appearance of photography, and through the successive revolutions of the Im-

pressionists, Fauves, Cubists, and finally the Abstractionists, we have seen these "images" detach themselves more and more from a faithful representation of the world of appearances in order to evoke in another way all that the latter are unable to offer. Figuration is abandoned to those techniques with which it would be vain to compete; what is retained is that which it is often believed will always escape them, the invisible beneath all its forms. This is so true that Etienne Gilson, in his excellent book, *Painting and Reality*, has been able to develop a perfectly adequate distinction between painting and imagery.¹ While the latter aims at an integral fidelity, the former is founded on what Delacroix called "the necessity of sacrifices." It is a question, Gilson says, of "eliminating from the painting everything which, though it makes up a part of reality, does not bring the painting nearer the purpose which the painter proposes to himself. What would be indispensable to the exactitude of an image would be detrimental to the picture."² We know what freedom the application of this principle has given to modern painting, from Gauguin to Mondrian.

But the plastic arts—for we are obviously dealing with the same situation in sculpture—have no monopoly on this doctrine of "sacrifice," and on this deliberate flight from all imagery which is its consequence.

Contemporary literature has also made this the charter of its modernity. What poet of today would dare, except under the cover of parody, equivocation or conscious naïveté, to base his poetry on the good old images of yesterday, even if they were "renewed" and "made original"? If anyone dared to do this seriously, he would at least have to make these

¹ Etienne Gilson, *Painting and Reality*, ch. 5.

² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

images of double or triple depth, and force the reader to perform some subtle gymnastics if he wanted to capture their point of departure.

These remarks would be wrongly interpreted if they were understood as criticisms, and to me they seem equally relevant for what we call the "new theater" or the "new novel." They too may be essentially characterized by the deliberate elimination of all the elements which made the older theater and the traditional novel "mirrors" of reality: intrigue, drama, psychology, characters. Nor can the greater importance sometimes given to visual elements of the scenic setting, or lengthy descriptions of specific "objects," make us think we are dealing with imagery. The "zero point of writing"³ that is attained here is much too radical to evoke anything but itself. There is only itself and the metaphysical reality on which it seems, this side of all phenomena, to be suspended. The man of common sense is not deceiving himself when he refuses to go along with this, since it proceeds on a terrain which does not *resemble* in any way what he sees around him with his inevitably somewhat myopic eyes. On the other hand, he is immediately at his ease with those mirrors which send his own image back to him.

But here again, at this extreme limit of art, just as we saw before at the extreme limit of technique, there are no longer any images. In one case, it is the invading presence of reality which eliminates them; in the other it is its "sacrifice." In every way, the images seem to disappear from the human horizon without recourse; and such a thing can hardly occur without serious consequences, which will moreover be different in each case.

³ Referring to a work of criticism of R. Barthes, *Le degré zéro de l'écriture* (Seuil). (Tr.)

The Death of Images Does not Give Life to Reality

THE OMNIPRESENCE of all the phenomena of the universe for the man of tomorrow, without the intermediary of a specifically *imaginary* double, can obviously be considered as an advance. Already the cultural contribution of documentary television in social milieux which, previously, had been almost completely cut off from the rest of the world, could scarcely be contested. The new vision of men and things which were unknown before can only enrich man's experience and open his mind. From a long-range viewpoint, a truly human community might emerge from this. Nevertheless, does not this sudden proximity of millions of human beings to each other, this reciprocal interpenetration of crowds in all lands, run the risk of multiplying dangerously all the phenomena of hyper-socialization, gregarious responses, mental uniformity, and the fear of solitude, about which clear-sighted humanists already complain? Similarly, an uncontrolled avalanche of things, a too immediate contact with them, without the least psychological interval which would make it possible to establish limits for them even while giving them expression, may mean the hopeless drowning of consciousness by paralyzing every vestige of reflection.

Furthermore—since the disappearance of images does not necessarily involve the disappearance of the imaginary in man—in the absence of an autonomous domain reserved to it, it is on the real itself that the imaginary will be grafted and come to flower, so that in the end the imaginary will proceed to digest the real. Formerly, myths began to be born generally only after the death or at least the absence of their heroes. It was only after St. Helena that popular imagery developed the Napoleonic legend. To-

day Brigitte, or Grace, to take only feminine examples, can scarcely be distinguished from the dreams that they evoke. There is practically no frontier between what they are and what they appear, between reality and its image. The constant proximity with the public which the fact of mass communications imposes on them today, requires that they be for themselves what their myth wishes that they be for all. This phenomenon can only become more accented; to the degree that the image is made more realistic, reality becomes more and more imaginary.⁴

But when the disappearance of imagery is due to the "sacrifice" of the figuration of things, there is no longer that risk of suffocating consciousness under the weight of a reality that is too dense, even when it is fallaciously lightened by a mythic inflation. On the contrary, we are dealing with the subtlety of extremely keen spiritual faculties, attempting to compensate by their activity for the disappearance of things.

In the absence of re-producing or recognizing the accustomed face of the exterior world, it is necessary, while establishing or penetrating new beings and original forms, to overcome the defeat of imagination in a somewhat subtle manner. Because of this, there is always a distance—following Brecht, we today like to call it a "distancing"—with regard to the work, which the autonomy of consciousness maintains and exercises. Nevertheless, it is vain to believe that this attitude, which in itself is positive, is without risks. Distance can become rupture, autonomy can become mere sufficiency, and exercise only a play of mirrors. We escape the sordid pressure of people and things, only to replace gregarious solitude with the isolation of high altitudes. In this way aristocratic

and undernourished worlds are established, from which the only messages which clearly reach the external world are condemnations. For the crowd is impure and number is sacrilege. *Ubi multitudo, ibi peccata*. The unique work, the limited edition, in order to retain its value, must preserve its uniqueness and its limits. To multiply is to betray. The image is not only a scandal when it pretends to double nature, but still more when it wishes to imitate art. Its sin is more essential to it than is believed. It does not consist in the object represented, but in the fact of re-presenting—which is the very image.

Whether the elimination of images is accomplished through the invasion or through the reabsorption of reality, whether in terms of a popular or aristocratic orientation, it does not appear less inevitable or heavy with consequences. Whether consciousness is ensnared or is carried off by the wind, is diluted or isolated, it is certain that it is lost. And if catastrophes (unfortunately not impossible) should occur which destroyed the marvelous techniques of the next stage of our civilization, it would perhaps be the only one to leave, if not any trace, at least no image of itself. Faces of stone will doubtless defy time more successfully and will be more universally readable than those that we naively record on electronic memories.

If it is ultimately true that a civilization without images is being prepared for tomorrow, it will appear infinitely more terrible for man and culture than all the imageries of yesterday and today. For the humanity of a culture is a function of the authenticity of the mediations which bear it. If the latter no longer play their role—whether they form a screen, or are reduced to the point of disappearing—we are led into angelism or animality. The idea of a "civilization without images" is certainly

⁴ Cf. on this theme, E. Morin, *Le cinéma ou l'homme imaginaire* (Ed. du Minuit).

contradictory. To accept it for the future would be to accept as final our modern dualism between a high culture and a mass culture, both of which can only be pseudo-cultures.

But there is no necessity for this passivity. Even those who hold most strictly to the idea of a "meaning in history," would not admit it.

For New Images

SURELY IT WOULD BE MAD to try to halt the progress of the techniques of presence to the world, and of the exploration which all the arts are making of the purity of their essence. But it may be that the problem occurs only because of this very divergence. Perhaps we will end in a world without images only if these two currents refuse to encounter each other. On the other hand, wouldn't their convergence be able to give the coming age, which is already at hand, some authentic images, which would result, not from a compromise between abstraction and realism, but rather through reciprocal aid and revitalization. The omnipresence to reality which techniques are going to make more and more possible, is equally well able to favor an omnipresence to the art which today conceives of its work precisely as human objects among others. The principle of the work's uniqueness will not suffer at all if it is true that it will then only be a question of an indefinite extension of its singular presence.

Moreover, this last phase, in which every original creation could be immediately and totally present to all men who would feel the desire for it, would justify by its result the preparatory and imperfect stages that we know: the movie and television presentations, the photographs and records, the innumerable processes of reproduction, the series made from a prototype which is

made by an authentic creator of forms. The only criterion by virtue of which these techniques ought to be judged is that of fidelity, not of number. For in this perspective we must indeed admit that multiplication, in whatever domain, is not the irredeemable sin that all the esthetes and merchants wish to make it. On the contrary, it is the only means which could allow great works to reach the universal audience which they merit. This is all the more true as the realism of the techniques of diffusion offers everyone the possibility of personally recognizing the artist himself. His face, his gestures, his words, are no longer reserved to a few privileged souls, but can aid anyone who wishes to enter indirectly within the universe of his creation. In this way the image is both the reflection of men and the source of culture. The imaginary, polarized by art, no longer menaces reality.

In addition, art itself, by enlarging its audience, without at the same time prostituting itself, is humanized. And doesn't all this presuppose techniques of a perfect transparency? Even if they become such one day, they are still not yet pure instruments, perfectly neutral. They will offer passage to diverse works only while conferring on them a new face for each occasion. Technically, this is a weakness; esthetically, it can be the opportunity for a new art to appear—at least, an art of execution, analogous to that of the pianist, the actor, or the director, who interpret a work which is not their own. In the best of hypotheses, there is no longer a meeting but rather an interpenetration of two worlds. From this a dialectic of fidelity and of creation should take place, which can confer on the image which will result from it an extraordinary richness of meaning. Moreover, that same technical displacement between reality and its presentation, which can thus give birth to new

interpretations of esthetic value, could make equally possible a new art. This is obvious in the movies. Without necessarily going against the direction of its natural orientation, and without adopting an attitude of irrealism or abstraction in regard to appearances, the cinema has been able to enrich the imaginary museum with a certain number of realizations whose quality in no way yields to that of works already found there. Will later technical advances, or those of television, entirely eliminate it as an autonomous form of artistic expression, or will the relatively balanced status it has achieved today between the real and the imaginary allow it rather to survive as an independent art, in the same way that the theater has survived along with the cinema itself? Formulas like that of the televised film allow us to believe so. To the same degree as the other arts, but in terms of the realistic line which is proper to it, it could then continue to supply true images (indissolubly both real and imaginary) to a world which too perfect techniques or overly abstract arts would risk making inhuman.

If this should be so, neither the end of the world of images, nor consequently the end of civilization, need be upon us quite so soon.

Translated by JOSEPH E. GUNNEEN



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ECUMENICAL CATHOLICITY

OTTO KARRER

IN HIS BOOK, *Insights*, Martin Buber writes: What weight do all misguided discussions on God's essence and operations have when contrasted with the one truth that all men, who have addressed God, have the same God in mind? Let us carry this thought over to historic Christianity: How significant are the plurality and division when contrasted with the one truth that all who have been called by Christ in faith have Him in mind? The ecumenical meetings and endeavors made by Protestants and Catholics have reminded us that in spite of the deep differences that exist among Christians, they all want to be loyal to the same truth (L. Newbigin).¹

Divisive differences no longer arise from the old controversial questions concerning the justification of man (the grace of God before and in all human endeavors), nor from questions concerning the relation between Scripture and Tradition (the apostolic revelation stated in Holy Scripture as the fundamental norm of all later revelations, and of all legitimate expressions of ecclesiastical

life). Neither do they lie in the inner relation between faith and sacrament, in regard to the Eucharist as participating in the One Sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and bearing the imprint of the transfigured Lord (as "substance" under the sacramental veils), nor in the ordering of the spirit to a proper authority, of the community to its pastor. Within recent decades, by means of research in biblical theology, and as a result of ecumenical declarations, all these questions have led, on the Protestant side, to a re-examination of old positions, and to a positive evaluation of Catholic doctrine—and simultaneously, to a rectification of our corresponding counter-Reformation attitudes. The divisive factor in ecclesiastical life today is rooted in the question: what is the Church?

IN THE FIRST PLACE we should mention the idea of the Church prevalent in Eastern Orthodoxy. The "sobornost," the fraternal solidarity of the independent episcopal churches, regards unity as a mystical ideal without a divinely placed center in the Papacy. In itself, this mystical magnetism would appear as a type of bridge between the Roman Catholic and the Protestant ideas of the Church; it falls short, however, of biblical unity. "Each of these churches is a replica of the others, and in regard to its divine prerogatives, each is as much 'the complete Church' as all taken together; each is equal to the other, each independent and fully endowed with powers of the Spirit. All of this, however, rests upon a denial of a Church divinely founded and commissioned, a divinely organized totality. And this is a position unknown to Holy Scripture" (Newman).

Fr. Otto Karrer is an eminent German theologian, best known in this country for his THE RELIGIONS OF MANKIND (Sheed & Ward). This article, from the April 1959 HOCHLAND—one of the most distinguished Catholic intellectual reviews in the world—Kaiser Ludwigplatz 6, Munich 15, Germany, \$4.50 a year—reflects the spirit of ecumenical discussion going on in Germany between a limited number of Catholics and a small but significant group of Protestants. Fr. Karrer's reflections, particularly his emphasis on what he considers the "pre-theological" problem, should be of value to a wider audience.

A second explanation of ecclesiastical unity starts with historical separations and seeks to reconcile itself with given conditions. It makes a virtue out of necessity, a type of ideal position wherein one either escapes from historical forms to "an invisible church of love" or into the dilemma of a church composed of many similar branches. The "invisible Church" is no longer maintained by theologians who believe in the authenticity of the Bible. The "branch theory," developed by Anglican theologians in the last century, was rejected by Leo XIII and again by Pius XI. The Anglicans themselves now take a somewhat more sober view of it. Newbigin says: "The unity of the Church is not a union with friends chosen by us; it is, rather, the Unity specified by Christ Himself. For this reason I can view the image of unity in the sense of a confederation only as an error . . . for it offers unity without repentance."

The idea which the Anglo-Saxon wing of world ecumenism has in mind today represents an essential step ahead when contrasted with this happily optimistic dream of a federal Church: "Catholicity from the (historically formed) fragments of the apostolic tradition" is what W. Nichols calls it. According to this view, the Church of the apostles has suffered severe historical disturbances. Instead of a *Catholica* we have a battlefield made up of a huge Christian arena, in which differing and mutually-estranged groups of men build their divided chapels or pavilions out of the relics of a Holy Cathedral. "Christ in His totality is hidden (latent) in each church fragment and only in a united church will he be revealed (patent)," says O. Tomkins.

WHETHER INFLUENCED by these writings or not, the fact remains that Protestant theologians in Germany are very close to this basic position in their most recent writings. We are concerned

with several important movements inspired by a desire for unity among the churches, which, in contrast with world ecumenism, views discussions with Roman Catholics as the most pressing task of Christian consciousness in our country. They have banded into the "Michaelsbruderschaft" and in the "Samm-lung," and have produced a whole series of works with the object of community: *Credo ecclesiam* (1955), *Die Katholizität der Kirche* (1957) and *Katholische Reformation* (1958). The two groups led by K. B. Ritter, W. Stählin and H. Asmussen with their lay and theologian friends, though numerically small, represent a leaven within German Protestantism. They do not consider the conditions of union with Rome as given; rather they hold that since the convulsion of the Reformation, and by means of the consciousness initiated at the Council of Trent, the Catholic Church has risen above the negative polemic in which the Reformation was enmeshed. These serious attitudes towards the present appearance of the papal Church have not been unmeaning for theologians of Ecumenical Catholicity—rather they voice a Protestant self-probing and an invitation for a corresponding penitential preparation in the Catholic Church. Surely, it is our responsibility to listen to this invitation.

The editors of the writings I have mentioned did not expect complete agreement from the Catholic side. But the statement from an influential place that it was the old "branch-theory" came as a surprise to them. The preface of Asmussen and Stählin to the book *The Catholicity of the Church* was used as evidence for this interpretation. "We believe that the divided members of the One Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church are being moved towards each other not only through their *diaspora* existence in a non-Christian

world, but also through their own inner history. The future of the whole Christian church cannot be thought of without a renewed and deepened relationship between the divided church bodies." Then there is Stählin's statement at the beginning of his article: "The proper relationship of the divided churches, especially of the two great branches of western Christendom, is a vital question not only for the Christian church itself . . . but also for the preservation and care of the total inheritance which we in Europe and the entire West have to administer." Does the idea of a federated church lie in these words? The authors speak of "Christian churches" as is the custom in modern phraseology; the interpretation of this phrase depends upon the total context wherein it is found. A very well-known Catholic theologian speaks of "the mysterious rent which has separated the Church for centuries," but it would be hard for anyone reading it in context to interpret this as "the branch-theory." These writers are not speaking, in an abstract world of ideas, of the various parts whose sum would for the first time constitute the whole Church. They do not speak of a tree with many branches, whose very plurality belongs to the life and fruitfulness of the Church. They are, rather, talking about something entirely different—of the notorious fact that Christianity is split in its historical development. Subscribers to the "branch-theory" are reassured by this fact. The prophets of Ecumenical Catholicity are deeply disturbed by it, because this historical reality contradicts the idea and mission of the Church, and they are, consequently, calling loudly for a consideration of Unity. I felt obliged to ask the writers themselves—one orally, the other in writing, about their attitudes. Asmussen said: "a gross misunderstanding!" Stählin wrote me: "If you

understand by the 'branch-theory' that the differing church bodies are related to each other as are the branches of a tree, I do not share this concept at all and I cannot understand how anyone could come to the conclusion that I do. At the same time I would not contest the fact that this theory has a kernel of truth in it; however, it cannot express the awareness of culpable division and of passionate responsibility for the unity of the Church." Thus the discussion is about the empirically culpable origin and presence of a divided church and not of the proper variety of development within the One Church. Furthermore we are not speaking of the Church as an abstract concept; we speak of it rather in its historical existence. Christ lives in the history of His body; the Church is made up of men in space and time—of men who are sinners, but who through the Spirit of Christ and the gifts of grace are made holy. For centuries now the crime of division lies over all Christianity. It is this that the authors of Ecumenical Catholicity are talking about. They have gained from us the impression that we, forced by historical awareness, are ready to acknowledge a co-culpability for the emergence of the split, but that we have not drawn the *de facto* conclusions from it. Instead, in our self-assurance of being the true children of Abraham, we have expected reflection and repentance only from others, without reviewing our part in the affair. In a discussion in Richard Bauman's *Rock of the World*, K. B. Ritter (certainly no enemy of the Catholic Church) says that the situation is apparently not hopeless, because the Catholic Church explains itself as essentially an apostolic authority. The only question is: "How does this apostolic authority understand itself? Does it regard its spiritual authority as given once and for all (unconditionally) and total-

ly at its disposition, or as bound to the resurrected Lord and His Spirit? Does it realize that an authority is recognized in the measure to which it exercises itself in sacrificial service to the gospel and in the spirit of love, and is it thus prepared at any time to be called back to obedience to Christ? The dogmatic difference between Protestant and Roman theology is, according to Protestants, that what constitutes Divine Law in the Church is not free from biblical criticism and thus from self-examination and penitence."

Here we are actually at the core of the church question. But before we go into the question of the promise, and the problem of authority and its spiritual application, a reflection on the historical reasons for the split is necessary. ("Knowledge of the different confessions must always be historically oriented," says H. Jedin.) An obscuration of the biblical idea of the Church arose through lack of clarity concerning the extent and limits of the Reformation, as well as through the overall disruption of spiritual authority and the worldliness of the Renaissance papacy. The call for a council should have been made; that it was not made in the ensuing years was largely due to the hesitation of the Roman curia. Had it not hesitated so long through fear of unwanted reforms enforced by a council, everything would have taken a different turn (at least as far as human reckoning goes) and there would have been no split. The later refusal of the Protestants to respond to the bull calling them to the council of Trent in 1537 was, in view of the divided purposes of the Protestant theologians, "a political decision carried out by princes and magistrates" (Jedin). The division thus set a precedent which speaks harshly for the members of the Kingdom of God. Quite simply there was a growth away

from each other, and all who followed inherited this tradition. On one side was the Catholic tradition and on the other the Protestant, and people were members of one or the other because they were so born and raised. In other words, the historical separation and division of Christianity by political powers into two different life-streams did not result in the same Christian content remaining untarnished in both of them. Objectively speaking the fullness of Christian being is present only in the Church which preserves the authority of the bishops and of the papacy. It is, however, also true that Protestant Christianity carries with it from its origins the well-springs of life, whose spirit is that of the One Church.

We must work for only one thing: that is, to heal the broken unity through mutual reflection on the apostolic inheritance, and to draw nearer to "perfect unity." If each confession wanted to glorify its inheritance at the expense of the others, it would amount to a deepening of unrest and would mean not listening to Christ. It is both truthful and in conformity with the command of the Lord to recognize the historically continuing division as involving mutual guilt, and in the spirit of Christian repentance "to avoid everything which can reasonably offend the other," (P. Ch. Boyer, Rome) and, for the sake of Christ, to do all that can be done for unity. The representatives of Ecumenical Catholicity have given me personally a deep impression of their moral and theological work for unity—and indeed precisely in relation to the crucial position of the Church, the apostolic succession of the See of Peter. But they do not expect us to act like the "holy possessors," as if we had nothing to contribute, as if we were a pure likeness of the apostolic church.

IN REGARD to the succession to authority, the New Testament uses its familiar words for office (*arché* and *exousia*), evidently because of their conceptual proximity to "lordship" or "power of disposal" when it is speaking of the political realm and the realm of the synagogue. They are never used in an ecclesiastical sense. In this context the word *diakonia* is used, i.e. service to the people of God in responsibility to the Lord and in the spirit of brotherhood. On this point both Catholic and Protestant exegetes are unanimous. With this purpose in mind the apostles appointed "shepherds" to the communities who, in their turn, could pass on their particular responsibilities to worthy men of good reputation, or even to worthy men proposed by the community. Those men who had been installed by others, through the holy signs of the laying on of hands and the call of the spirit, were then called "those established by the Holy Spirit," and so form "from the very beginning, for all time, the connecting links which come from eternity into time" (K. H. Schelkle). The liturgical prayers of consecration in both the West and the East show that the post-apostolic church was well aware of this idea of "holy authority." It was not buried in the following centuries, but rather was hampered by severe mystifications and disfigurements, since both Constantine and Charlemagne took over the office of "protector." As a result of the symbiosis with the secular power, the consciousness of "lordship" came more and more to the fore. In the ninth and tenth centuries the apostolic office became a football of feudalism; in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries it became an almost totalitarian power, and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it became a chaos through the Western Schism. It was shaken by the Reformation in the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries and then caught up in renewals and litigations until the Vatican and post-Vatican discussions over the relationship of the primate to the episcopate under the aegis of curial centralism. So far as the valuation of the papacy was concerned, the Reformation was a revolution which sought refuge from a desperate situation in German corporate law. According to the characterization made by a Lutheran ecclesiastical jurist, what remained were "functional sees without orders (*ordo*)."

Instead of the intended union with the ancient church, there was a union with the authority of the provincial princes, and instead of the spiritual fatherhood and sonship between Paul and Timothy, between the consecrator and the consecrated, the creed took on an entirely new educative meaning, detached from the personal tradition. The biblical way is the personal transmission of the responsible service of the shepherd. God has taken men into His service. The Lord says to his apostles: "He who hears you, hears Me." Paul writes to Timothy: "Protect the good entrusted to you by the Holy Spirit and give it to the keeping of men you can trust who are assigned the task of teaching it to others." The Lutheran theologian H. Asmussen says, "Under this aspect the position of the reformers does not attain the truth of the ancient biblical church because it dissolves the position of bearer of ecclesiastical authority." They believed that there was a succession of credos and that this alone sufficed for succession.

LET US TURN to what is truly worth considering in the recent history of Protestant theology; something visible in the few passages quoted above. Thanks to intensified biblical studies (Kittel-Friedrich's theological dictionary forms a testimony which has no counterpart on the Catholic side); thanks to

the fraternal meetings of Protestant theologians with Anglican and Eastern Orthodox colleagues in the World Council of Churches and with their Catholic colleagues in *Una Sancta*, a mellowing of the old lines of opposition concerning apostolic succession has begun which promises to be of the greatest significance for further developments. A few examples: L. Newbigin, bishop of the Church of South-India, writes in *The Household of God* that as far as the "Catholic" wing of the *Oekumene* is concerned, the bishop's authority belongs to the very essence of the church and as far as the Protestant wing is concerned, it is of "high worth." This concession rests on Protestant premisses. Nevertheless, it is recognized that reunification is a command of the Lord, and that the apostolic tradition of the East-West Church has more weight than the separation in the sixteenth century, understandable in the situation, but unendurable permanently. A Lutheran like Edmund Schlink finds apostolic succession desirable, Ethelbert Stauffer sees that the succession to the office of bishop is within the framework of the Gospel, and Werner Elert asserts that the liturgical and sacramental celebrations presuppose the supervision of the episcopate. Even the reform theologian, J. J. von Allmen, professes that apostolic succession is the very essence of the ordering principle proper to the Church. In his introduction to the French edition of Gregory Dix's significant work, *Le ministère dans l'Église*, (1955), he writes: "The full valuation of the office of pastor is the first ecumenical problem. To evade it is to evade union itself. Corresponding to the threefold office of Christ as Preacher, Priest and Pastor, the life of the Church is based on faith, the administration of the sacraments and the direction of the flock. To deny this would be to deprive the Lord of

part of His Body." The validity of the consecration to authority is put in question if the apostolic succession is denied. With the same intention, the representatives of Ecumenical Catholicity have set for themselves the goal of becoming theologically acclimatized to thoughts of a return to an apostolic order native both to the Bible and the ancient church. They have "a new consciousness of the powers which have been given to the spiritual authority," says H. D. Wendland. "It has cost the Protestant church unspeakable effort to this very day to free itself from perverting contradictions, and to recognize the mixture of spiritual inequality with spiritual equality to which the Church of the apostles testifies in the writings of the New Testament." According to H. Asmussen, "It remains a serious question whether the orders given from dire necessity in the Reformation have ever emerged from the stage of provisionality... One cannot raise 'dire need' to the level of a principle. Once more it must be asked how succession in the Church is to be viewed in its earthly definition... The authority of directing the Church cannot be self-established; neither can it be established by official actions. Ordination is a pneumatic power, the point at which the *pneuma* affects the succession. Consequently the power of ordination can be imparted only in a sacred service."

NATURALLY a few questions still require clarification. An ever-recurring concern of our Protestant brothers is the apparent formalism of the line of succession, the automatic mechanism of succession to office. What Karl Barth writes in his *Church Dogmatics* is highly interesting: "The idea of succession in the ancient church could be justified (as the knowledge of the co-dwelling of Christ and the Church), and in respect to the 'thatness' of it, no objections can

be made; objections can be made only to the 'how' of it—and even in this respect no fundamental objection on our side can be raised against the conception of the 'apostolate in Peter,' nor against the possibility of a primate in the Church. Protest is raised only against the contention that the highest power (from the apostles and from the first Peter) proceeded automatically to each succeeding Roman bishop, as if the succession could be viewed as other than pneumatic or, to put it more precisely, as though the pneumatic could be reduced to the secular actuality of a list of bishops."

The objection to the mechanism of succession, it appears to us, deals basically with the administration of the sacraments, and is based on the misunderstanding that according to Catholic doctrine, the *opus operatum*, the outer thing or act, is efficacious in itself alone. In truth, considered in themselves, the consecration to office, baptism, the consecration of the bread and wine and the forgiveness of sins, are not efficacious without faith on the human side as a disposition for the consecration by the Holy Ghost. Thus men are simply, as St. Augustine explains, instruments for the invisible gift. Consequently, although the higher powers are in a spatio-temporal dimension, since it is a man who is doing the ordaining (baptizing, consecrating, forgiving, etc.), nevertheless their basis is not so much the holiness of the human framework, or the historically-determined line of succession of the act of consecration back to the time of the apostles, as it is the operation of the Holy Ghost Who transcends both time and space. Even though severe spiritual abuses occurred in the feudal society of former centuries, even though illicitly-consecrated individuals were forced into the Church by the secular power, even though Popes (justly

or unjustly) were deposed—no theologian maintains that the original link has been cut off by men, and that the continuity of the grace-giving Spirit has been broken. Although Donatists and others made the "holiness" of the person concerned the condition for valid consecration, it is interesting to notice that the Augsburg Confession kept aloof from this view, since "the sacraments and the Word are made efficacious through the appointment of Christ even when they are handled by evil persons." As far as lists of bishops are concerned, they are no more to ecclesiastical life than a family history is for the life of a family.

THE POSITION of the Protestants, however, goes deeper and should be taken seriously by us. Stählin says: "Certainly the unity of the Church is enclosed in its historical continuity, and this continuity on the horizontal level is subordinated on the vertical level to the operations of the supernatural First Cause. What is questionable is the self-assurance in the administration of the deposit of grace, the impression of having Christ's presence at one's disposal. Is any promise given unconditionally, is it not always bound to obedience to the word and spirit of Christ?" This is the serious worry that moves sincere friends of ecumenism like Peter Brunner or Ernst Kinder. "The traditions in the Church," says Kinder, "have a tendency to absolutize themselves and to emancipate themselves from their functional relationship to the Bible . . . as though they had an exclusive lease on God's saving powers." Our response is: Never will there be a perfect guarantee against the abuse of what is holy. The teachings of Holy Scripture and the history of the Church are very clear on what attitudes can be taken to avoid severe failures and scandals: there is always the free word of the prophets and

obligatory fraternal admonishments (involving at times the admonishment of a superior in rank by an inferior) and in extreme cases the holy right and duty of opposition to the scandals of a superior. Thomas Aquinas praises Paul for his opposition to the dangerous position of the first apostle concerning the sharing of meals between Jewish and gentile converts. Can a consecrated person then be spoken of as having the deposit of grace at his disposal? Foolish and misleading words can provide the occasion for such an interpretation—I myself have heard some. The doctrines of faith, however, should not be measured by the inaccuracies of a preacher or the lightly-considered formulations of a journalist. I think that Protestant theologians do not doubt the objectively given power of a spiritual authority. The power "to bind and to loose," is promised and given by God; otherwise all talk about responsible services by the Church would be senseless. This is not to say, however, that man can dispose of this divine gift according to caprice. This authority must be understood in the spirit of Christ, in the spirit of love. It would be sinful for man to act high-handedly and the saying that "all sin avenges itself on earth" holds equally for the Church.

It is well said by Karl Rahner: "The promise that the gates of hell will never prevail against the Church does not mean the promise of a strength and safety that is always tangible for us; it is, rather, the promise of the power, which is God's alone, on behalf of the weak and constantly threatened men who form the Church. The men in the Church may well feel assured that 'nothing can really happen to the Church' because time and again nothing has happened to the Church which is in God's hands despite the men who lazily or

fearfully (we add—arrogantly) have abandoned Her."²

Now it appears that Rahner himself raises a question in another article³ when he places the spiritual power in an easily misleading proximity with an unconditional "disposability," and just at the point where the powers of the Church are concentrated in the Papacy. He first says what is evident: "Only a totalitarian, not a Pope, could regard the free charisma in the church through the action of the Holy Spirit as a diminution, or a danger to perennial authority; and this is valid especially when a charismatic bishop, in the name of Christ, leads to pasture the flock which Christ has entrusted to him." Later on, in respect to the full powers of the Pope, he says: "To a certain extent, the proper limitation—that is, a limitation factually proportioned (i.e. through positive human ecclesiastical law)—to the events and to the time of the spiritual situation, is something that cannot be constitutionally regulated by strict material norms. There is no tangible evidence to show that the factual relation between the episcopate and the primate in the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of competency is correct and suitable. Only the governance of the Holy Spirit can see to it that this competition in practice . . . takes place in such a way that it works for what is best for the Church. When the relationship between the two powers is properly considered, there is no norm which precludes a Pope in practice from taking all power to himself in such a way that actually only the name of divine power remains for a bishop . . . for no earthly tests of an authoritative kind overrule the judgments of the Holy See; the highest competency belongs to the Pope and it does not give and cannot give a particular and ultimate right of opposition that the Church can concretely main-

tain. (Furthermore it is a right that the Church should not give because of the presence of the Holy Spirit promised to it.)" In a theological discussion Rahner clarified his view in the following way: "From the promise of the Spirit, we can infer that if a future Peter XX *de facto* wanted to transgress his spiritual authority in a serious matter, at that very moment he would suddenly die."

ONE CAN ONLY be grateful that the question has been made so clear in respect to this crucial point. As our basic thought let us keep in mind the principle expressed in the following words of M. Pribilla: "The Spirit allows a good deal of room to human freedom. Christ, the wellspring, is never dry, but we men participate in His blessings only insofar as we make ourselves receptive to them. In this connection between divine and human factors it is basic that both the growth and decline of Christendom depend on human factors." Dietrich Bonhoeffer expresses it this way: "I do not believe that God is a timeless Fate; rather I believe that he awaits and answers sincere prayers and responsible actions." And H. Dombois: "Indeed all earthly tendencies have not killed the Church. What the Holy Spirit does through the epochs in the history of the Church, and what human effort achieves in obedience to faith are evidently incomparable; on the other hand it is equally clear that the protection and reawakening of the Church is not accomplished without our human effort. No guarantee can chain up the Holy Spirit, but we are asked to take in all seriousness the divine service, teaching and order. The question is: Does the Spirit act, in the case of transgressions of spiritual authority (as with Boniface VIII), as a sort of *Deus ex Machina*, or does God wish to utilize the pneumatic powers within the Church as a corrective against a threatening abso-

lutism? Since the authority of the bishop is based on no less a divine apostolic basis than the authority of Peter, does it not require some type of ecclesiastical judicial prerogative in order that it may fulfill its mission with full decisiveness? Is there not in the inspired New Testament a *de facto* approval of the opposition of the last apostle to a dangerous measure by the first apostle? Do the bishops only represent the Pope, and not rather the "college of apostles"? Has this (the college of bishops) its power from the Pope, or rather from Christ? And does not the Church stand by the power of divine law which, antecedent to Church law, is based solely on the "apostles" and on "the prophets"? Jesus prayed for Peter that he should strengthen the brethren, and when he refused in Antioch, Brother Paul knew himself called by the Spirit to give his admonition with full apostolic power. If, in the hypothetical case presented by Rahner, the bishops feel themselves bound in duty to act, would a Pope then be valid as the bearer of the Holy Spirit who wished to oppose both the episcopate and the people of the Church, and thus place the Church in a position where there was nothing left but to await a miracle?

I confess myself deeply impressed by the confident assurance of Rahner's statement that the direction of the Church by the Holy Ghost is ultimately not an affair of human guarantees and the assurances of ecclesiastical law, but that it derives from a divine promise. We are in accord on this. What it seems important to me to emphasize is the means, closely associated to faith, in which the divine Spirit actualizes His promise in history through human instruments, and how a refusal of co-responsibility towards God's counsel brings about sickness for the members of the historical Church.

On the historical plane the Spirit's promise of God's fidelity is actually not effectual independent of devotion to the faith by those elected to it and responsible for it; it is, rather, conditioned by their faithfulness to the Spirit of Christ. We are fundamentally in accord with the representatives of Ecumenical Catholicity on this decisive question which they have placed before us. Only, perhaps, we do not consider it as seriously as it should be considered. Certainly Paul says in his Epistle to the Romans that the promises of the spirit cannot be simply annulled by human infidelity, but they can be limited by a "holy delay" for a while (for a thousand years, which are only a day in the sight of God). What a darkening of the saving mission of the Church was indicated by the pretensions of the medieval hierarchy, especially when they were cloaked with an appeal to sacred scripture! And does the neglect of the eucharistic service through the centuries mean anything other than a shocking loss of religious substance for the spiritual nourishment of the flock of Christ, a loss of substance that weighed not only on the flock but on the shepherds themselves, because people permitted themselves all too easily to be satisfied with an unconditional promise! Did not the Reformation itself occur because the co-responsibility of the episcopate for the conduct of the Roman curia in serious matters was no longer taken seriously? And in regard to the split itself, Newman wrote (to be sure as an Anglican, but later on even more professedly as a Catholic) these serious lines:

If we have anything to learn from the history of Judaism, it is not improbable that the Christian Church has forfeited a portion of the promises; but we shall find, I think, in the New Testament that the promises made to her actually did depend in

part upon a condition which now for many centuries she (as the totality of those validly baptized) has broken. This condition is Unity, which Christ and his Apostles made to some extent the sacramental channel through which all the gifts of the Spirit, and among them purity of doctrine, were secured to the Church.⁴

WE MUST REGARD these considerations, based on the historical predicament of the Church, even more closely and speak concretely in order to avoid vagueness. Let us assume that our Catholic co-responsibility for the split, brought about by mutual fault of our fathers and perpetuated by ourselves, was taken seriously not only by theologians and active lay groups, but also by the bishops, especially the bishops (not unimportant for the collective Church) of the confessionally mixed countries. And let us further assume that while looking towards a papal definition, we faced the question whether we and the pastors of the Church, in the presence of the guilt-laden predicament of Christianity, must not concern ourselves, before everything else, with the unity of the divided Christian community. The question involves the Church as a whole, especially the bishops, and not only the see of Peter, which according to the express declaration of the Vatican must be asked if it has a final decision. Now I think that the question is not once and for all a clear-cut theological question; rather I think it presupposes an ethico-religious "pre-decision," whether the people of the Church and its responsible pastors want to meditate on concrete historical actualities, on the broken existence of the Christian community in the world. For the sake of Christ, in responsibility for the Kingdom of God, and for the moral worth of the Christian faith in the West and in its missions, such considerations must lead to the recognition that

nothing more important can happen for the Church as a whole. For Roman Catholic Christianity, the Council of Trent has striven for the unity that was possible in its historical time; it limited itself theologically to the most necessary current clarification of the controversial questions and consciously abstained from a dogmatic completion by its own power. Gradually the broad groups composing the Church's people hardly thought of their responsibility to Christendom as a whole; rarely did they think of the necessity for amendment (amendment seemed necessary only for personal sins). If the Church in itself is spoken of as a kind of abstract idea, then it is the one true Church insofar as it unites in itself all the essential marks and characteristics, and insofar as it conducts itself with the fullness of all its powers. This is theologically incontestable. But can one neglect the historically empirical reality which is revealed by the separate growth of a "conservative Catholic" and a "reform Catholic" wing of Christendom, the one with a culpable retardation of readiness for reform, the other with culpable of "revolutionizing" the reform, yet neither of them finally wanting separation even though they are compelled to separate politically? Can one convinced of the correct idea of the Church's completeness and integrity in its very essence, then act as if the Church did not live at all in history, and as if "the completed Church" could forego its moral co-responsibility for the split, and its religious duty to heal this split, before it does anything else? The question is not theological; the theological truth of dogmatic propositions is not under discussion.⁸ Neither is it an opportunity to dogmatize; more widely and relevantly than the secular word "opportunity" permits us to suppose, it deals with an ethico-religious responsibility. Should

we in this culpable existence of historical division take up the spirit of Jesus Christ as a self-evident privilege for our own special ecclesiastical development? Can we do this while we evade the moral "pre-decision," or have forgotten it in becoming accustomed to the situation? It is historically understandable that at the moment this type of question lies far from the sight of such church circles as those, for instance, in South America, who, without giving serious thought to their ecclesiastical existence in Christ, and the most pressing missionary tasks within their own countries, prefer to specialize even further their Marian cult. "How very much exaggerations of a falsely understood Mariology can deteriorate genuine Catholic thought," a leading Catholic theologian wrote me in this regard.

The Papacy within the circle of the apostles and the continuity of this structure is nearly as well attested in Scripture and the ancient Church as is the Church itself. The basic proofs for Catholicism have impressed many Protestants. Also the advertence of K. Hofstetter and others to early Christian witness of the replacement of Jerusalem by Rome as the Mother-Church and the chief location of the total Church are being justly noticed. But the authority of Peter in the ancient Church cannot be easily compared with our present papal authority, and Catholic theologians such as B. Bootmann, P. Benoit, O. Rousseau and the friends of the highly respected P. Couturier cannot help but admit this. Developments understood pneumatically but not organically are grounded in the very historical existence of the Church; but so few developments in the Faith and ecclesiastical life can be fundamentally thrown into question that we shall have to measure these and any other results coming from them by the standard of Scripture.

by the prototype of the ancient Church, and by the overall spirit exhibited by them. The gradations of responsibilities, the relationship of the apostolate to the testimonial of the Spirit, of the episcopate to the primate, is essential for the Church. Autocratic tendencies are temptations and are thus not in the spirit of Christ. "No single one can want to be all; only all can be all, and the unity that of a totality," says Moehler in a classic phrase. Believing that he was making the essence and greatness of the Church more familiar to Field-marshal Montgomery, the English convert Arnold Lunn said: "You see, the Catholic Church is like the Eighth Army; it has its discipline and its leaders." He may have considered such an image modern and purposeful—but measured by the apostolic Church it gives a distorted image of the authority and mystery of the Church. If such images were to become more widespread, we should be very grateful for an inhibiting ecumenical partnership.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of ecumenical partnership for the development of modern theology and the care of souls cannot be hidden from anyone in our day. Many evangelical theologians give us an example of their love of unity by re-examining their own position. We should not expect everything from them without laying some bricks of our own on the road to reunification. I say "we," not only "the Roman Catholics" or the Pope, for on the deepest level we are united in guilt and grace. Being ready to heal the broken unity of Christians in accord with Christ's serious command is identical with reflection and atonement for all those taking part in it.

The first thing that honest ecumenical amendment involves is the acknowledgment that our separated fellow Christians are brothers in Christ, thanks to the grace of God and Holy Baptism, the

power of God's Word in them, and finally to the presence and activity of the Holy Ghost in their midst; acknowledgment of their love (given by faith) of Holy Scripture and especially acknowledgment of the truly Christian life, not of all, but of many in their love of God and neighbor with their whole hearts; acknowledgment of their efforts towards unity, not always as one might think solely with Protestants, but also in fraternal dialogue with the Catholic communities that have joined the dialogue. All this we know from experience, and we testify to it with great joy. Our best theologians and spiritual directors have Protestant friends who have no desire to lure them from their position or from their work for the Kingdom of God.

Secondly, in regard to ecumenical reflection, there is the need to become prepared to learn from each other in mutual helpfulness for the Kingdom of God. The Council of Trent adopted many of the Protestant options of its time; present-day theologians learn much from Karl Barth, O. Cullmann and other Protestant exegetes. It would certainly not be detracting from Catholic truth to point out that the realization of certain values in the life of the Church came into being only as a result of the encounter with our Protestant fellow-Christians. The justification of sinful man through God's grace is not closely connected in the Protestant realm with the sacramental life; on the other hand it might be said that the belief in justification as good Protestants experience it, cut free from the battle against "works," has nothing un-Catholic about it. Rather it discloses a personal immediacy to God which brings great simplicity and purposeful direction towards what is truly necessary—a simplicity and purposeful direction that cannot be replaced by theological knowl-

edge or through many devotions. After getting over the first surprise it was a great joy to me when Rudolph Otto answered my query as to what was essentially Protestant in this way: "Justification by faith." I then said to him: "If this is truly the decisive point, then many of us are good Protestants and many of you are good Catholics." St. Thomas Aquinas teaches: "Not on the moral (the fulfillment of the law) does the confidence in justification lie, but in faith alone. We believe that man is justified (participates as a child of God) by faith without performing works of the Law." In this regard Lyonnet observes: "With St. Paul what is contrasted is all moral activity on one side and faith (in the grace of God) on the other", and according to an explanation given by H. Küng that means: "the confident yielding of the self to God's grace as a response to God's action."

Another thing that we can learn is the Protestant valuation of Holy Scripture as the normative basis of revelation and piety. We could certainly learn this theology from the Church Fathers and from the example of many saints such as the little St. Theresa; our discourse however with our contemporaries means—thanks to the questions they put to us—a wholesome needling. Biblical studies play a somewhat modest role in the present-day education of our theologians, and this is also true—prescinding from the Bible Institute—for Roman institutions as well. In the homes of Protestant pastors I found a custom which says far more than many discussions: in the morning before breakfast the father of the house reads a short excerpt from Holy Scripture and then a daily excerpt of the Roman mass from the missal as an inspiration for the labors of the day. I could think of nothing more beautiful for Catholic homes

since only a few can initiate the day's work with Holy Mass.

The following example should show that our Protestant fellow-Christians can teach us much about the Christocentric applications of our theology and piety which is truly Catholic, but which at times is not too clearly discernable. The English Catholic journalist Michel de la Bedoyere writes from his life and observations that his religious instruction within his circle had been "heavily loaded with catechetical concepts, moral definitions, and rules for devotions and asceticism. It had also been characterized for many others by a strange hunger for prophecies, the visions of children, stigmata, etc. And so he spent decades missing the forest for the trees until he discovered how great and simple Christ's message is, since it reveals to us what God is to men and that we, in Christ, are the New Man. It is sad that Protestants have lost the meaning of the veneration of saints and above all of the Holy Mother of God; but to a large extent this is a reaction to an overemphasis in practice on the part of Catholics—an overemphasis which, in those countries barely touched by biblical instructions, has tended to a certain displacement of the Christocentric character of Catholicism.

FROM THE FOREGOING it would follow that the increasing proximity of many Protestant theologians to Catholic truths which had previously been lost should be answered on our side by "not only a sympathetic, but also by a concrete search for what is valid in the reform positions." Varying Congar's inferences, Karl Rahner writes in his essay "On Conversion"⁶ that besides tendencies towards dissolution in contemporary Protestantism, there is not only much genuine Christian substance to be observed, but also "in a long history outside the Catholic Church, genuinely

Christian possibilities were actualized in theology, piety, the liturgy, the communal life and art . . . which have not been realized by us in the Catholic Church, although in themselves they belong to the actual fullness of the historical development of that which is Christian." How much is lacking to us in Catholic Christianity because—for fear of the "Protestant spirit"—we fettered the genuine evangelical freedom of witness and self-responsibility in the realm of the spiritual life as it had not been fettered in the Patristic or the Medieval period! How Newman suffered over this! On the other hand what heavy losses and splinterings has Protestantism suffered and continues to suffer because she—to name the most decisive factor—let fall the authority of the apostolic office as the antithesis of the free testimony of the Spirit. The post-Reformation generations have been hindered in their receptivity to many Catholic truths; but they sincerely want to hold themselves to Christ's revelation, and, thus, in a formal sense, they are not heretics. Rather they are much more bound to Christ's Church by their membership in Him. This can be said in another way: "They are our fellow Christians and in all truth our comrades in faith with whom we know ourselves bound in the great decision which is posed to modern men everywhere: the choice between belief and disbelief" (W. H. van de Pol).

H. Schütter shows very penetratingly in his book *On Reunification in Faith*,⁷ what essentially Catholic doctrines are held by Protestant theologians and what decisively Protestant positions can find a just home in the Catholic Church. A spiritual testimonial of burning actuality for this consciousness is the *Catholic Mission Yearbook of Switzerland, 1958*.⁸ Protestant and Catholic Mission Societies have contributed to it with pictures and reports on lamentable disturbances

in the past brought about by mutual enmity, and on the beginnings of consciousness about these things. The ecumenical movement had its beginning in the missions. The missionaries observed: "We must tread the path of rapprochement or the missions are lost. In the situation in which Communism has placed us in the missions, necessity compelled us divided Christians to draw together. It seems that in the fire of a common threat, God wants us to sweat together into the long sought unity." To be sure, the concrete possibilities will bring severe problems with them for the missions at home, but for the sake of Christ, with good will they can and they must be solved.

Do ecumenical endeavors have any prospects of success? There cannot be a union with Protestantism for the simple reason that there is no such thing as "Protestantism." There are only Protestantisms. And at the present the members of the Protestant Church hardly permit themselves to think of a deeper movement towards Catholic unity. Temporarily there are theological and religious inner circles who are in close prayerful and dialectical community with their Catholic brothers. But then the Catholic Church itself is not presently ready for a larger ecumenical movement. Newman's words: "It must now prepare itself just for converts," apply to an even greater extent to the difficult preparation of the whole Church in regard to the responsibility for reunification through serious reflection or "repentance" (to use Bishop M. Besson's word). Nevertheless with God nothing is impossible. According to the testimony of those very close to him, Pius XI faced this problem seriously as a part of his purpose to renew all things in Christ. He was very much concerned as to how he could effect a reversal necessary for the sake of Christian unity,

from the high point of hierarchical centralism to the synthesis of love of the Church Fathers, and ultimately according to the original apostolic image. Humanly speaking, it is not probable that we shall realize such possibilities tomorrow or the day after, and thus approach Unity with the great Protestant bodies. Nevertheless this is the decision before which Christianity stands. But the majority does yet not understand how dangerous a refusal would be. The greatest dangers, says Karl Rahner, are those one does not notice and the most dangerous decision is the decision not to decide.

Is it too bold to hope and to strive for repentance in the ecumenical sphere? A counter-question: Is it not cowardly, and a sign of little faith not to hope and strive? Faith is a pledge for the human inability to see God. "Faith involves the courage to make a wager (J. H. Newman)." Faith in the meaning of Jesus is a surrender to the Kingdom of God that is always coming into time. Have not all the heroes of faith died without having experienced the fulfillment of the promise? If this is the case—and the Bible proclaims it—then slogans like "Utopia" have no justification. It would amount to saying that the apostolic Church itself is one of the never-to-be-discovered Utopias of history. We would then be refusing to adopt the apostolic ideal of the Church as the mirror by which to test our historical reality. This amounts to subjecting divine law, and the duty to be faithful to the structure of the apostolic church, to our own special claims. In this way we are telling Jesus Christ (sorrowfully to be sure, but in fact, that his Testament does not interest us and that we prefer to remain divided—since there is no way to Unity. We would rather sing our own text in the theological war than sing Christ's

praise. The first choir proclaims: "We Protestant Christians perpetuate the emergency methods of Luther and Calvin in order to keep out of the Pope's snare." The second choir: "We Catholics perpetuate the summit of the development which led us from the 'Collegial-Petrine Church' to the 'Centralized-Petrine Church.'"

BUT PERHAPS we will probe ourselves seriously to discover whether Christ's call for reflection at the beginning of His mission, and His prayer for unity as His last testimonial, can be as existential a question for us as it once was for the people of the promise.

Translated by GERARD FARLEY

FOOTNOTES

¹ *The Household of God*. It goes without saying that a positive valuation of present religious opinions has nothing to do with a comparative study of differing religious groups.

² *Gefahren im heutigen Katholizismus* (1950), p. 7.

³ *Stimmen der Zeit*, February 1958, p. 335 f.

⁴ From the *Via Media*, by Newman-Karrer, *Die Kirche*, II, p. 244 f. One should observe in this connection the "to some extent"—for naturally Newman's belief also involves unconditional reliability on God's faithfulness and promise. On the other hand he calls our attention to the fact that not only the individual Christian, but the Church as a whole in its every concrete expression of certain spiritual values, can be deficient in regard to the fullness of truth and love, which, even in the New Testament, is bound to a condition, and "that in the course of the centuries the life of the Church appears continually threatened" (Lortz).

⁵ Yet with Dom Hil. Marot one can find it deplorable that since the split between the East and the West, no one has taken the trouble to make the split more comprehensible to the thought of the divided groups. This holds equally well for the "forgetting" of the community in both guilt and grace and leaves us the task of making reparation for this deficiency in the ecumenical future. (See *Istina*, 1957/4).

⁶ *Hochland*, December 1953, p. 119 ff., also in: *Schriften zur Theologie III* (1956), p. 441 f.

⁷ Verlag Fredebeul & Koenen, Essen 1958.

⁸ Freiburg/Schweiz, Paulus-Druckerei.

THE HUMANITY OF GOD

KARL BARTH

THE HUMANITY OF GOD! Rightly understood that is bound to mean God's relation to and turning toward man. It signifies the God who speaks with man in promise and command. It represents God's existence, intercession, and activity for man, the intercourse God holds with him, and the free grace in which He wills to be and is nothing other than the God of man.

Surely I do not deceive myself when I assume that our theme today should

Karl Barth has probably been the most influential theologian of our time. The present essay is the first half of an important lecture he gave at the meeting of the Swiss Reformed Ministers' Association in Aarau, Sept. 25, 1956. It has historical importance because Barth is here calling for a new change of direction in Protestant theology, perhaps as significant as the one he himself led after the First World War.

Barth's whole lecture, together with other significant recent work, will shortly be published by the John Knox Press (Richmond, Va.) under the collective title, THE HUMANITY OF GOD. Newcomers to Barth, those that know him only on the basis of his earlier writings available in English, and those who feel the need of a toe-hold before tackling the volumes of Barth's CHURCH DOGMATICS (being brought out by Scribner's) where these themes find more thorough expression, will find this book invaluable. The original German text was published in the THEOLOGISCHE STUDIEN series by Evangelischer Verlag, A.G., Zollikon-Zurich.

CROSS CURRENTS has previously published Barth's essay, "The Church between East and West" (Winter 1951).

suggest a *change of direction*¹ in the thinking of evangelical theology. We are or ought now to be engaged in this change, not in opposition to but none the less in *distinction* from an earlier change. What began forcibly to press itself upon us about forty years ago was not so much the humanity of God as His *deity*—a God absolutely unique in His relation to man and the world, overpoweringly lofty and distant, strange—yes, even wholly other. Such was the God with whom man has to do when he takes the name of God upon his lips, when God encounters him, when he enters into relation with God. We were confronted by the mystery comparable only to the impenetrable darkness of death, in which God veils Himself precisely when He unveils, announces, and reveals himself to man, and by the judgment man must experience because God is gracious to him, because He wills to be and is his God. What we discovered in the change which occurred at that time was the majesty of the crucified, so evident in its full horror, just as Grünewald saw and depicted Him. We saw the finger of John the Baptist, by the same artist, pointing with authority to this holy One: "He must increase but I must decrease."

Unmistakably for us the *humanity* of God at that time moved from the center to the periphery, from the emphasized principal clause to the less emphasized subordinate clause. I should indeed have been somewhat embarrassed if one had invited me to speak on the humanity of God—say in the year 1920, the year in which I stood up in this hall against my great teacher, Adolph

¹ German: *Wendung*.

von Harnack. We should have suspected evil implications in this topic. In any case we were not occupied with it. That it is our subject for today and that I could not refuse to say something on it is a symptom of the fact that that earlier change of direction was not the last word. It could not be. Similarly, the change in which we are now engaged cannot be the last word. That, however, may become the concern of another generation. Our problem is this: to derive the knowledge of the humanity of God from the knowledge of His deity.

I

PERMIT ME TO GIVE my exposition of this theme first in the form of a report. In a consideration of the earlier change referred to above, a viewpoint regarding the urgent new task of the succeeding period and of today will emerge.

The change of direction then made had a pronounced *critical* and *polemic* character. It came to completion gradually when viewed in terms of time, but as a sudden conversion when viewed in terms of content. It was a precipitous break with the ruling theology of the time, a theology more or less liberal—or even orthodox—representing the climax of a development which had successfully asserted itself for two or three centuries, apparently incapable of being arrested.

We are called upon today to accord to that earlier theology, and the entire development culminating in it, greater historical justice than appeared to us possible and feasible in the violence of the first break-off and clash. This is an easier task today than it would have been earlier. However, even in the most unbiased evaluation of its legitimate purpose and its unmistakable service, even in the most peaceful review of it,

one cannot hide the fact that it could no longer continue as it was. Modification of the theological conception then normative through new and at the same time older and original Christian knowledge and ways of speaking proved unavoidable. Evangelical theology almost all along the line, certainly in all its representative forms and tendencies, had become *religionistic*, *anthropocentric*, and in this sense *humanistic*. What I mean to say is that an external and internal disposition and emotion of man, namely his piety—which might well be Christian piety—had become its object of study and its theme. Around this it revolved and seemed without release compelled to revolve. This was true of evangelical theology in its doctrine of principles, in its presentation of the Christian past and its practical understanding of the Christian present, in its ethics and in that which perhaps was to be regarded as its dogmatics, in the proclamation and instruction of the Church determined by it—above all, however, in its interpretation of the Bible. What did it know and say of the *deity* of God? For this theology, to think about God meant to think in a scarcely veiled fashion about man, more exactly about the religious, the Christian religious man. To speak about God meant to speak in an exalted tone but once again and more than ever about this man—his revelations and wonders, his faith and his works. There is no question about it: here man was made great at the cost of God—the divine God who is someone other than man, who sovereignly confronts him, who immovably and unchangeably stands over against him as the Lord, Creator, and Redeemer. This God who is also man's free partner in a history inaugurated by Him and in a dialogue ruled by Him was in danger of being reduced, along with

this history and this dialogue, to a pious notion—to a mystical expression and symbol of a current alternating between a man and his own heights or depths. But whatever truth was gained in this way could be only that of a monologue.

At this point some of us were appalled after we, along with everyone else, had drained the different chalices of this theology to the last drop. We then concluded (from approximately the middle of the second decade of our century on) that we could not side with it any longer. Why? Had the pious man and the religion of whose history and presence we had heard so many glorious things at the university and of which we ourselves thereafter had tried to speak, become a matter of question in our own person? Was it the encounter with socialism as interpreted by Kutter and Ragaz which opened our eyes to the fact that God might actually be wholly other than the God confined to the musty shell of the Christian-religious self-consciousness, and that as such He might act and speak? Was it the suddenly darkened outlook for the world, in contrast to the long period of peace in our youth, which awakened us to the fact that man's distress might be too great for a reference to his religious potentiality to prove a comforting and prophetic word? Was it—this has played a decisive role for me personally—precisely the failure of the ethics of the modern theology of the time, with the outbreak of the First World War, which caused us to grow puzzled also about its exegesis, its treatment of history, and its dogmatics? Or was it, in a positive sense, the message of Blumhardt concerning the Kingdom of God which, remarkably enough, was only then becoming timely? Was it Kierkegaard, Dostoevski, Overbeck, read as a commentary on that message, through which we

found ourselves compelled to look for and set sail to new shores? Or was it something more fundamental than all that, namely, the discovery that the theme of the Bible, contrary to the critical and to the orthodox exegesis which we inherited, certainly could not be man's religion and religious morality and certainly not his own secret divinity? The stone wall we first ran up against was that the theme of the Bible is the deity of God, more exactly God's deity—God's independence and particular character, not only in relation to the natural but also to the spiritual cosmos; God's absolutely unique existence, might, and initiative, above all in His relation to man. Only in this manner were we able to understand the voice of the Old and New Testaments. Only with this perspective did we feel we could henceforth be theologians, and in particular, preachers—ministers of the divine Word.

Were we right or wrong? We were certainly right! Let one read the doctrine of Troeltsch and Stephan! Let one read also the dogmatics of Lüdemann, in its way so solid, or even that of Seeberg! If all that wasn't a blind alley! Beyond doubt what was then in order was not some kind of further shifting around within the complex of inherited questions, as this was finally attempted by Wobbermin, Schaeder, and Otto, but rather a change of direction. The ship was threatening to run aground; the moment was at hand to turn the rudder an angle of exactly 180 degrees. And in view of what is to be said later, let it immediately be stated: "That which is gone does not return." Therefore there never could be a question of denying or reversing that change. It was, however, later on and it is today a question of "revision."² A genuine revision

² German: *Retraktation*, from the Latin, *retractatio*. Barth is thinking of Augustine's *Retractiones*.

in no way involves a subsequent retreat, but rather a new beginning and attack in which what previously has been said is to be said more than ever, but now even better. If that which we then thought we had discovered and brought forth was no last word but one requiring a revision, it was none the less a true word. As such it must remain, and still cannot be by-passed, but rather constitutes the presupposition of that which must be further considered today. He who may not have joined in that earlier change of direction, who still may not be impressed with the fact that God is God, would certainly not see what is now to be said in addition as the true word concerning His humanity.

In regard to the change which then took place one might well have sung:

"See the moon in yonder sky?

'Tis only half that meets the eye."³

It must now quite frankly be granted that we were at that time only partially in the right, even in reference to the theology which we inherited and from which we had to disengage ourselves—partially right in the same sense in which all preponderantly critical-polemic movements, attitudes, and positions, however meaningful they may be, are usually only partially in the right. What expressions we used—in part taken over and in part newly invented!—above all, the famous "wholly other" breaking in upon us "perpendicularly from above," the not less famous "infinite qualitative distinction" between God and man, the vacuum, the mathematical point, and the tangent in which alone they must meet. "And as she warbled, a thousand voices in the field sang it back."⁴ There was also the bold assurance that there is in the Bible only *one* theological in-

terest, namely, that in God; that only *one* way appears, namely, that from above downwards; that only *one* message can be heard, namely, that of an immediate forgiveness of sins both in prospect and in retrospect. The problem of ethics was identified with man's sickness unto death; redemption was viewed as consisting in the abolition of the creatureliness of the creature, the swallowing of immanence by transcendence, and in conformity with these the demand for a faith like a spring into the abyss, and more of the like! All this, however well it may have been meant and however much it may have mattered, was nevertheless said somewhat severely and brutally, and moreover—at least according to the other side—in part heretically. How we cleared things away! And we did almost nothing but clear away! Everything which even remotely smacked of mysticism and morality, of pietism and romanticism, or even of idealism, was suspected and sharply interdicted or bracketed with reservations which sounded actually prohibitive! What should really have been only a sad and friendly smile was a derisive laugh!

Did not the whole thing frequently seem more like the report of an enormous execution than the message of the Resurrection, which was its real aim? Was the impression of many contemporaries wholly unfounded, who felt that the final result might be to stand Schleiermacher on his head, that is, to make *God* great for a change at the cost of *man*? Were they wrong in thinking that actually not too much had been won and that perhaps in the final analysis it was only a new Titanism at work? Was it only obduracy when, beside the many who to some extent listened with relief and accompanied us, so many others preferred to shake their heads,

³ From the hymn, "The Moon Has Risen," by Matthias Claudius.

⁴ Emmanuel Geibel.

nonplussed or—like Harnack at that time—even angry over such an innovation? Was there not perhaps in their obduracy the dark presentiment that, in the religionism, the anthropocentrism, the ill-fated humanism of the earlier theology, there might have been something at work that could not be given up? It is possible that, granted the unmistakable contestability, even perversity of their position, the *humanity* of God did not quite come into its rights in the manner in which we, absorbed as we were in contemplation of the mighty deployment of Leviathan and Behemoth in the book of Job, lifted up His deity on the candlestick?

Where did we really go astray? Where was and is the starting point for the new change of direction? Our shrewd friend from another shore⁵ has, as is well known, laid his finger on the fact that at that time we worked almost exclusively with the concept of diastasis, only seldom and incidentally with the complementary concept of analogy. That may be the case. But was not this formal principle merely a symptom of a more deep-seated, essential infirmity in our thinking and speaking at that time? I believe it consisted in the fact that we were wrong exactly where we were right, that at first we did not know how to carry through with sufficient care and thoroughness the new knowledge of the *deity* of God which was so exciting both to us and to others. It was certainly good and proper to return to it and to make it known with great power. Moreover, Master Calvin in particular has given us more than wise guidance in this matter. The allegation that we were teaching that God is everything

and man nothing, was bad. As a matter of fact, certain hymns of praise to humanism were at that time occasionally raised—the Platonic in particular, in which Calvin was nurtured.

It is nevertheless true that it was pre-eminently the image and concept of a "wholly other" that fascinated us and which we, though not without examination, had dared to identify with the deity of Him who in the Bible is called Jahve-Kyrios. We viewed this "wholly other" in isolation, abstracted and absolutized, and set it over against man, this miserable wretch—not to say boxed his ears with it—in such fashion that it continually showed greater similarity to the deity of the God of the philosophers than to the deity of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Was there not a threat that a stereotyped image would arise again? What if the result of the new hymn to the majesty of God should be a new confirmation of the hopelessness of all human activity? What if it should issue in a new justification of the autonomy of man and thus of secularism in the sense of the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms? That was the concern and the objection of Leonhard Ragaz. God forbid! We did not believe nor intend any such thing.

But did it not appear to escape us by quite a distance that the *deity* of the *living* God—and we certainly wanted to deal with Him—found its meaning and its power only in the context of His history and of His dialogue with *man*, and thus in His *togetherness* with man? Indeed—and this is the point back of which we cannot go—it is a matter of *God's* sovereign togetherness with man, a togetherness grounded in Him and determined, delimited, and ordered through Him alone. Only in this way and in this context can it take place and be recognized. It is a matter, how-

⁵ Hans Urs von Balthasar, a Swiss Roman Catholic priest and author of *Karl Barth: A Presentation and Interpretation of His Theology*.

ever, of God's *togetherness* with man. Who God is and what He is in His deity He proves and reveals not in a vacuum as a divine being-for-Himself, but precisely and authentically in the fact that He exists, speaks, and acts as the *partner* of man, though of course as the absolutely superior partner. He who does *that* is the living God. And the freedom in which He does *that* is His deity. It is the deity which as such also has the character of humanity. In this and only in this form was—and still is—our view of the deity of God to be set in opposition to that earlier theology. There must be positive acceptance and not unconsidered rejection of the elements of truth, which one cannot possibly deny to it even if one sees all its weaknesses. It is precisely God's *deity* which, rightly understood, includes his *humanity*.

II

HOW DO WE COME to know that? What permits and requires this statement? It is a *Christological* statement, or rather one grounded in and to be unfolded from Christology. A second change on direction after that first one would have been superfluous had we from the beginning possessed the presence of mind to venture the whole inevitable counterthrow from the Christological perspective and thus from the superior and more exact standpoint of the central and entire witness of Holy Scripture. Certainly in *Jesus Christ*, as He is attested in Holy Scripture, we are not dealing with man in the abstract: not with the man who is able with his modicum of religion and religious morality to be sufficient unto himself without God and thus himself to be God. But neither are we dealing with *God* in the abstract: not with one who in His deity exists only separated

from man, distant and strange and thus a non-human if not indeed an inhuman God. In Jesus Christ there is no isolation of man from God nor of God from man. Rather, in Him we encounter the history, the dialogue, in which God and man meet together and are together, the reality of the covenant *mutually* contracted, preserved, and fulfilled by them. Jesus Christ is in His one Person, as true *God*, man's loyal partner, and as true *man*, God's. He is the Lord humbled for communion with man and likewise the Servant exalted to communion with God. He is the Word spoken from the loftiest, most luminous transcendence and likewise the Word heard in the deepest, darkest immanence. He is both, without their being confused but also without their being divided; He is wholly the one and wholly the other. Thus in this oneness Jesus Christ is the Mediator, the Reconciler, between God and man. Thus He comes forward to *man* on behalf of *God* calling for and awakening faith, love and hope, and to *God* on behalf of *man*, representing man, making satisfaction and interceding. Thus He attests and guarantees to man God's free *grace* and at the same time attests and guarantees to God man's free *gratitude*. Thus He establishes in His Person the justice of God vis-à-vis man and also the justice of man before God. Thus He is in His Person the covenant in its fullness, the Kingdom of heaven which is at hand, in which God speaks and man hears, God gives and man receives, God commands and man obeys, God's glory shines in the heights and thence into the depths, and peace on earth comes to pass among men in whom He is well pleased. Moreover, exactly in this way Jesus Christ, as this Mediator and Reconciler between God and man, is also the *Revealer* of them both. We do not need to engage in a

free-ranging investigation to seek out and construct who and what God truly is, and who and what man truly is, but only to read the truth about both where it resides, namely, in the fullness of their togetherness, their covenant which proclaims itself in Jesus Christ.

Who and what *God* is—this is what in particular we have to learn better and with more precision in the new change of direction in the thinking and speaking of evangelical theology, which has become necessary in the light of the earlier change. But the question must be, who and what is *God in Jesus Christ*, if we here today would push forward to a better answer.

Beyond doubt God's *deity* is the first and fundamental fact that strikes us when we look at the existence of Jesus Christ as attested in the Holy Scripture. And God's deity in Jesus Christ consists in the fact that God Himself in Him is the *subject* who speaks and acts with sovereignty. *He* is the free One in whom all freedom has its ground, its meaning, its prototype. *He* is the initiator, founder, preserver, and fulfiller of the covenant. *He* is the sovereign Lord of the amazing relationship in which *He* becomes and is not only different from man but also one with him. *He* is also the creator of him who is His partner. *He* it is through whose faithfulness the corresponding faithfulness of His partner is awakened and takes place. The old Reformed Christology worked that out especially clearly in its doctrine of the "hypostatic union": God is on the throne. In the existence of Jesus Christ, the fact that God speaks, gives, orders, comes absolutely first—that man hears, receives, obeys, can and must only follow this first act. In Jesus Christ man's freedom is wholly enclosed in the freedom of God. Without the condescension of God there would be no exaltation of

man. As the Son of God and not otherwise, Jesus Christ is the Son of Man. This sequence is irreversible. God's independence, omnipotence, and eternity, God's holiness and justice and thus God's deity, in its original and proper form, is the power leading to this effective and visible sequence in the existence of Jesus Christ: superiority preceding subordination. Thus we have here no universal deity capable of being reached conceptually, but this concrete deity—real and recognizable in the *descent* grounded in that sequence and peculiar to the existence of Jesus Christ.

But here there is something even more concrete to be seen. God's high freedom in Jesus Christ is His freedom for *love*. The divine capacity which operates and exhibits itself in that superiority and subordination is manifestly also God's capacity to bend downwards, to attach Himself to another and this other to Himself, to be together with him. This takes place in that irreversible sequence, but in it is completely real. In that sequence there arises and continues in Jesus Christ the highest communion of God with man. God's deity is thus no prison in which *He* can exist only in and for Himself. It is rather His freedom to be in and for Himself but also with and for us, to assert but also to sacrifice Himself, to be wholly exalted but also completely humble, not only almighty but also almighty mercy, not only Lord but also servant, not only judge but also Himself the judged, not only man's eternal king but also his brother in time. And all that without in the slightest forfeiting His deity! All that, rather, in the highest proof and proclamation of His deity! *He* who *does* and manifestly *can* do all that, *He* and no other is the living God. So constituted is His deity, the deity of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In Jesus

Christ it is in this way operative and recognizable. If He is the Word of Truth, then the truth of *God* is exactly this and nothing else.

It is when we look at Jesus Christ that we know decisively that God's deity does not exclude, but includes His *humanity*. Would that Calvin had energetically pushed ahead on this point in his Christology, his doctrine of God, his teaching about predestination, and then logically also in his ethics! His Geneva would then not have become such a gloomy affair. His letters would then not have contained so much bitterness. It would then not be so easy to play a Heinrich Pestalozzi and, among his contemporaries, a Sebastian Castellio off against him. How could God's deity exclude His humanity, since it is God's freedom for love and thus His capacity to be not only in the heights but also in the depths, not only great but also small, not only in and for Himself but also with another distinct from Him, and to offer Himself to him? In His deity there is enough room for communion with man. Moreover God has and retains in His relation to this other one the unconditioned priority. It is His act. *His* is and remains the first and decisive Word, *His* the initiative, *His* the leadership. How could we see and say it otherwise when we look at Jesus Christ in whom we find man taken up into communion with God? No, God requires no exclusion of humanity, no non-humanity, not to speak of inhumanity, in order to be truly God. But we may and must, however, look further and recognize the fact that actually His deity *encloses humanity in itself*. This is not the fatal Lutheran doctrine of the two natures and their properties. On the contrary, the essential aim of this doctrine is not to be denied at this point but to

be adopted. It would be the false deity of a false God if in His deity His humanity did not also immediately encounter us. Such false deities are by Jesus Christ once for all made a laughingstock. In Him the fact is once for all established that God does not exist without man.

It is not as though God stands in need of another as His partner, and in particular of man, in order to be truly God. "What is man, that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou dost care for him?" Why should God not also be able, as eternal Love, to be sufficient unto Himself? In His life as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit He would in truth be no lonesome, no egotistical God even without man, yes, even without the whole created universe. And He must more than ever be not *for* man; He *could*—one even thinks He *must*—rather be against him. But that is the mystery in which He meets us in the existence of Jesus Christ. He wants in His freedom actually not to be without man but *with* him and in the same freedom not against him but *for* him, and that apart from or even counter to what man deserves. He wants in fact to be man's partner, his almighty and compassionate Saviour. He chooses to give man the benefit of His power, which encompasses not only the high and the distant but also the deep and the near, in order to maintain communion with him in the realm guaranteed by His deity. He determines to love him, to be his God, his Lord, his compassionate Preserver and Saviour to eternal life, and to desire his praise and service.

In this divinely free volition and election, in this sovereign decision (the ancient said, in His decree), God is *human*. His free affirmation of man, His free concern for him, His free substitution

for him—this is God's humanity. We recognize it exactly at the point where we also first recognize His deity. Is it not true that in Jesus Christ, as He is attested in the Holy Scripture, genuine deity includes in itself genuine humanity? There is the father who cares for his lost son, the king who does the same for his insolvent debtor, the Samaritan who takes pity on the one who fell among the robbers, and cares for him in a fashion as unexpected as it is liberal. And this is the act of compassion to which all these parables as parables of the Kingdom of heaven refer. The One who speaks in these parables takes to His heart the helplessness and the misery of the human race surrounding Him. He does not despise men, but in an inconceivable manner esteems them highly just as they are, takes them into His heart and sets Himself in their place. He perceives that the superior will of God, to which He wholly subordinates Himself, requires that He sacrifice Himself for the human race, and seeks His honor in doing this. In the mirror of this humanity of Jesus Christ the humanity of God enclosed in His deity reveals itself. Thus God is as He is. Thus He affirms man. Thus He is concerned about him. Thus He stands up for Him. The God of Schleiermacher cannot show mercy. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob can and does. If Jesus Christ is the Word of Truth, the "mirror of the fatherly heart of God, (Luther)" then Nietzsche's statement that man is something that must be overcome is an impudent lie. Then the truth of God is, as Titus 3:4 says, His loving-kindness and nothing else.

III

WE SHOULD NOT YET, however, have arrived at this insight in the right way—in any case we should not yet have

been certain of it—if its content had not been evident along the lines which all Christian thinking and speaking must follow. The statement regarding God's humanity, the Immanuel, to which we have advanced as a first step from the Christological center, cannot but have the most far-reaching consequences. These result from the fact that we are asked about the *correspondence*—here the concept of analogy may come into its right—of our thinking and speaking with the humanity of God. The most fundamental and important of these consequences, though not all of them, must now be brought more significantly to light.

From the fact that God is human in the sense described, there follows first of all a quite definite *distinction of man* as such. It is a distinction of every being which bears the human countenance. This includes the whole stock of those capacities and possibilities which are in part common to man and to other creatures, and in part peculiar to him, and likewise man's work and his productions. The acknowledgment of this distinction has nothing to do with an optimistic judgment of man. It is due him because he is the being whom God willed to exalt as His covenant-partner, not otherwise. But just because God is human in this sense, it is actually *due* man and may not be denied him through any pessimistic judgment, whatever its basis. On the basis of the eternal will of God we have to think of *every human being*, even the oddest, most villainous or miserable, as one to whom Jesus Christ is Brother and God is Father; and we have to deal with him on this assumption. If the other person knows that already, then we have to strengthen him in the knowledge. If he does not know it yet or no longer knows it, our business is to transmit this knowl-

edge to him. On the basis of the knowledge of the humanity of God, no other attitude to any kind of fellow man is possible. It is identical with the practical acknowledgement of his human rights and dignity. To deny it to him would be for us to renounce having Jesus Christ as Brother and God as Father.

The distinction due to man as such through the humanity of God, however, extends also to everything with which man as man is endowed and equipped by God, his Creator. This gift, his humanity, is not blotted out through the fall of man, nor is its goodness diminished. Man is not elected to intercourse with God because, by virtue of his humanity, he deserved such preference. He is elected through God's grace alone. He is elected, however, as the being especially endowed by God. This is manifest in his special bodily nature, in which he of course has ever so much in common with plant and animal, and also in the fact that he is a rationally thinking, willing, and speaking being destined for responsible and spontaneous decision. Above all, however, it is shown in the fact that from the beginning he is constituted, bound, and obligated as a fellow man. God concerns Himself with, loves, and calls him as *this* being in his particular totality. In bringing into action his particular nature, man, as *this* being, may and should praise Him and be submissive to His grace in thankfulness. It would not do even partially to undervalue his humanity, the gift of God, which characterizes him as *this* being. We can meet God only within the limits of humanity determined by Him. But in these limits we may meet Him.

The distinction of man, however, goes still further. It even extends itself to what one is accustomed to call human culture

in its higher and lower levels. Whether as creators or as beneficiaries of culture, we all participate in it as persons responsible for it. We *can* exercise no abstinence from it, even if we want to. But we should not want to do that. Each of us has his place and his function in its history. Certainly we must here consider the fact that the use of the good gift of God, and hence human activity with its great and small results, is compromised in the extreme through man's perverted attitude toward God, his neighbor, and himself.

Certainly culture testifies clearly in history and in the present to the fact that man is *not* good but rather a downright monster. Even if one were in this respect the most melancholy skeptic, one could not—in view of the humanity of God which is bestowed upon the man who is not good or who is even monstrous—say that culture speaks only of the evil in man. What is culture in itself except the attempt of man to be man and thus to hold the good gift of his humanity in honor and to put it to work? That in this attempt he ever and again runs aground is a problem in itself, but one which in no way alters the fact that this attempt is inevitable.

Above all, the fact remains that the *man* who, either as the creator or as the beneficiary, somehow participates in this attempt is the being who interests God. Finally, it also remains true that God, as Creator and Lord of man, is always free to produce even in human activity and its results, in spite of the problems involved, *parables* of His own eternal good will and actions. With regard to these no proud abstention is appropriate, but only reverence, joy, and gratitude.

Translated by JOHN NEWTON THOMAS

Notes on other Publications

TOWARDS A CHRISTIAN CONSCIENCE IN POLITICS

1.

The varieties of tension contained in the East-West conflict have stimulated much explicitly Christian thought on politics. The books discussed below are by sincere and competent representatives of this discussion, engaged in an open-minded search for a new certitude based on the Christian conscience, and steeped in the Bible.

At the 1957 CDU party congress, the Lutheran theologian Helmut Thielicke startled the delegates with his frank politico-ethical "sermon": the Christian politician cannot avoid ethical responsibility for what appear to be autonomous laws guiding the dawning atomic age (*Christliche Verantwortung im Atomzeitalter*, Stuttgart, Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1957, 131 pp). Thielicke had already demonstrated in his two volume textbook (*Theologische Ethik*, 1951 & 1955) that evangelical ethics had progressed beyond Luther's "two realms" to stricter unitary principles. It should employ them to challenge the "political apathy of Christendom," as well as the concept of the state's peculiar amoral autonomy. Thielicke portrayed his search for answers by analyzing two concrete models, the place of the Church in the East-West conflict and the role of the Church in the totalitarian state. He concludes that the Church has "the duty to liberate the commandments and promises of Christ from restriction to the personal and private sphere. Instead, the Church has to assert her claim to public influence (pp. 77-78)." The Church will not fulfill this role by enunciating political and social programs, but by mobilizing men's consciences to proclaim and effect God's reign over all

manifestations of life. In the light of this "new Lutheran" ethics Thielicke also attempts to tame atomic armaments. He finds complete opposition to atomic war "unrealistic" at the moment. The reality of fallen nature and suspicion among men, moreover, force him to be sceptical. "The venture of love cannot be made the principle of politics" (p. 111). But Christian ethics can always sanctify the immediate concerns. Therefore, he advocates an "ethics of the first step," such as the conditional suspension of atomic testing as a beginning of disarmament.

"Realists" are deeply influenced by apparent "evil." Thielicke assumes that there must be total distrust between East and West. Others try to gain a constructive insight into the problems of social relations by fathoming the implications of Christianity concerning trust and distrust. Glock and Lutz of Nuremberg published in 1956 two such attempts: Hans Dahmen, *Das Zeitalter der Begegnung und des Gesprächs* and Friedrich Schulze, *Der Mensch in der Begegnung*. Dahmen has given personal witness to his understanding of trust, and genuine conversation. Influenced by Max Scheler's vision of an age of understanding after a period of ideological warfare (cf. *Zeitalter des Ausgleichs*, 1928), he founded in 1946 the Place of Meeting at Vlotho (Stätte der Begegnung), sponsoring conferences and meetings between victors and vanquished, Christians, Buddhists, Mohammedans, Asians, Africans, Europeans, Americans, followers of all sorts of isms; he has been publishing a monthly 'cross-currents' of his own, *Das Gespräch aus der Ferne* (Mühlheim/Ruhr, Bleischstrasse 3, West Germany). His book is an autobiographi-

cal and reflective document of good will. Experience has convinced him that very, very few of the complex issues separating persons and groups are black and white. To illustrate this for politics, Dahmen quotes Klemens Brockmöller S.J. (*Christentum am Morgen des Atomzeitalters*, 1954), "dialectical materialism cannot simply be identified with Anti-christ and evil"; for religion, Albert Hartmann, S.J. (*Toleranz und christlicher Glaube*, 1955), "both Catholics and Protestants have been led, in different ways, by a conscious and living grasp of Christian values." Personal meetings and discussion in this spirit enrich above all human capacity for good.

Schulze underwrites the existential experiences of Dahmen by a systematic analysis of a possible Science of Encounter (*Begegnungslehre*). A theoretical part analyzes the structure of encounter; a pragmatic part describes the basic modes of encounter. In an appendix the author sketches the success of his principles in his work as educator. After examining psychological, semantic, phenomenological, axiomatic, ontological, metaphysical and theological views on encounter, Schulze shows how a center of encounter actually always exists (Plato). Yet superiority or inferiority complexes, individual or collective egotism, conventionality and irrationality, power-craving and megalomania inhibit the efficacy of that center. Identity, I-Thou relationship, politics, the state, education, the idea of *logos* and *eros*, the community, the *agape*, constitute many-sided modes of encounter, from which, however, free man can escape, if so desiring. The inescapability of encounter Schulze shows in fate and the finality of encounter in death, encounter with God. For the Christian the awareness of a final encounter with God can help provide the strength to sponsor trust in

all types of encounters during earthly existence.

This entire complex of trust and distrust is subjected to a searching analysis in Rudolf Schottlaender's *Theorie des Vertrauens* (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1957, 148 pp.). The examination of types of trust and repose, and of the relationship of trust to authority, introduces a thorough analysis of causes for the widespread disappearance of trust and the universal rise of distrust in social relations. Such investigation discusses the idolatry of work, the competition of loyalties, the fanaticism for security, the sceptical fear of forming judgments, moral and psychological agnosticism, the generalized abstraction. And, like Schulze, Schottlaender points to the actual estranged individual in this world, suspended between dialog (Buber), and silence (cf. Max Picard, *The World of Silence*). The estrangement will be overcome once more, if free man becomes grounded anew in community, for which tolerance, reexamined, offers one of the keys. It means not only to endure, but to appreciate, without necessarily agreeing with that which is different. Thus, not an indifferent, but a productive neutrality can be developed, which could contribute to the bridging of differences, especially significant in international politics. Both Schulze and Schottlaender are making contributions to Human Relations and Behavioral Sciences, although they do not specifically mention them.

This recurring emphasis on man as master of his destiny, raises again the question of freedom, of which G. Kitson Clark (*The Kingdom of Free Man*, Cambridge, England, 1957, 213 pp.) attempts a revised Christian liberal definition. (See John Wild below for some of the answers to questions raised by Clark.) Christians in the West are the spoilt children of Christendom (p. 50).

The collaboration of Christianity with bourgeois society is just as perilous as with the communists (p. 60). The moral significance of liberal democracy was often brought about by non-Christians (pp. 71-72). If the harsh dilemma of the Christian conscience, objecting to the acts of any state, occurs, man can only suffer the consequences. The nostalgia for the Christian State is idolatry.

The unanswered questions raised, particularly in this connection, can, perhaps, be best reexamined in the light of the experience and history of Catholic Church-State relations. A Viennese professor of Church Law, Alexander Dordett, in his *Die Ordnung zwischen Kirche und Staat* (Innsbrück, Tyrolia, 1958, 207 pp.) offers a competent historic survey of these relations, especially in the light of classical sources, and a systematic exposition of the principles underlying any church-state relation. Clark's fearful interpretation of Cardinal Ottaviani's (*Osservatore Romano*, March 4, 1953) "exclusiveness of the Roman Catholic Church in a Roman Catholic country" (p. 134), undermining his kingdom of free men, finds some reassurance in Dordett's insistence that Catholic "faith in an uncompromising Revelation does not exclude respect for the person of differing belief" (p. 173).

"Freedom" for Clark "always stands as the link in an equation: I am free from something to do something or be something" (p. 98). "On the 'to' side there is likely to be an element of choice" (p. 99). And while Clark favors the "earthly expedients" which are designed to secure freedom and condemns totalitarianism of all kinds, he warns that through the power of Christ's Crucifixion the kingdom of free men extends into all countries (pp. 194 & 205).

The sincerity of the Christian witness of free men rings also through Charles

C. West's *Outside the Camp* (Doubleday, 1959, 168 pp., \$3.). In the revolutionary insecurity of Asia and Africa and in the mass culture of the West, what is God doing and what is the Christian's role? West answers with a plea for a new missionary effort which would include the secularized West. Like Clark, West believes that the Christian has no preconceived ideas about the common welfare but "bears witness by the quality of its service, by its indifference to the motives of ambition and security which spoil the objectivity of other men, and by its greater sensitivity to human needs and problems" (p. 155). And like Thielicke, West says, "the Church is free not to dominate the world in its own name but to point toward the rule of Christ by being a servant and a witness, over against the powers which decide our economic, our political, and our cultural fate (p. 154)." The Christian's answer is to be present. His calling is to live between this world which men have made, torn as it is among many societies at war with each other, and the world as God intends it, who reconciles it and rules it as his kingdom.

But the dialectic continues. What of those who have a genuine Christian concern for the preservation of institutionalized freedom, the survival of Christian practiced values? And what of the force they advocate, if need be? Thielicke, Clark and Dordett would be fascinated by an answer. The grand debate on this problem has been taking place under our very eyes. Paul Peeters relates it in his *Massive Retaliation: The Policy and its Critics* (Regnery, 1959, 304 pp., \$5.). This exhaustive survey, quoting from the disconcerting plethora of arguments, is indeed symbolic for the agonizing appraisal in which Christians and non-Christians in the United States find themselves. Peeters

agrees with those who from a convinced Christian position formulated the doctrine of massive retaliation, who believe that the USSR can never really live in peace alongside the free nations, that Communism is the incarnation of Evil ("The Communist challenge is so fundamental that any form of moral evil is, in fact, an accomplice of the Communist conspiracy," p. 287). "Limited" evils of atomic armament and deterrent have "become a necessary part of our destiny," to preserve Christian values. Christian courage, militancy and devotion will be rewarded with victory.

IN A SENSE a stalemate seemed to have been reached in the discussion: on the one hand Christian sacrificial witness, on the other hand Christian sacrificial militancy. The stalemate in concepts and arms, indeed, opens a renewed opportunity to pick up the fragments of the quickened discussion and attempt the offering of a first sketch of a systematic alternative. This is the perennial task of political philosophers, and there are two significant recent attempts to perform it—by William Ernest Hocking (*Strength of Men and Nations*, Harper, 1959, 248 pp., \$3.50, with essay in Appendix, "The International Role of Art in Revolutionary Times"), and John D. Wild (*Human Freedom and Social Order: An Essay in Christian Philosophy*, Duke University, 1959, 250 pp.).

Prof. Hocking holds an idealist conception of the world-process. There is a governing purpose at work in cosmos and history, and fundamental truths and certitudes for man to grasp. For, every relative is relative to something. Liberty calls for authority and vice-versa. The moral absolute concerns also statecraft. Mutual fear is a vicious cycle: capitalism *delenda est* because, for capitalism, socialism *delenda est*. The supinely accepting people of Czarist Russia have

become the expecting people in the Soviet Union. Soviet leadership must be hypersensitive to experience, alert to blind spots in the Communist doctrine. Marxism thus loses its clue to history, the most disastrous of all deviations. The relentless impact of experience on wrong systems gives a transitional role to any autocratic government. The never-resting postulate of democracy is every man a whole man, in thought, speech, and deed. The forecast for the USSR is, therefore, its inevitable self-revision.

But after all this confidence, Hocking reaches his "moral dilemma of peace." "There can be no dissent from a protest against making peace with radical evil. There is but one thing to do with radical evil—that is, to fight it, even if we and our world go out in doing so (p. 207)." But immediately afterwards he insists that the Bolshevik revolution has learned, and that Russia is changing.

Hocking points out a relationship between Russia's attempt to draw the implications of a consistently materialistic conception of man, and modern science's increasing insight into its own incompleteness. Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Schrödinger, Heisenberger have unanimously rejected science's previous claim to explore that depth of truth. Hocking looks to religion and philosophy for help in exploring the meaning of existence, in which Prof. Wild's new work is surely to be welcomed.

Duke University established in 1957 through a grant from Lilly Endowment *The Research Program in Christianity and Politics*. The fellowships, conferences, and other efforts to bring disciplined Christian concern to bear upon political and social problems, deserve every encouragement. This book of John Wild is its first publication.

Drawing heavily on Augustine, Pascal

and Kierkegaard, Wild thinks that a Christian philosophy can now be attempted. "An open Christian philosophy striving as a purely human discipline to take account of the evidence accessible to all, but ultimately inspired by the guiding image of Christian faith has now emerged as a living option for the more chastened and self-critical thought of our time (p. viii)." His book is divided into two parts: Christian Thought and Gnosticism, and Christian Ethics and Social Philosophy. Philosophy is the discipline of freedom and of human existence. Wild traces the global pattern of prehistoric, mythical society, and its breakdown in ancient Greece. This breakdown released two forces, the free individual capable of making history through choices, and the shared rational consciousness. Reason usually predominated in the precarious balance following, until in our time the essential incommensurability has come to light. The individual is no longer able to understand himself and the world in which he lives by the methods of science and objective reason. Science and reason cannot master the free human person. In fact, though the sensational advances of science and large-scale technology are most impressive, they are perhaps the final expression of that gnostic enterprise. We stand at the end of an era.

Biblical literature is written in the living language of the *Lebenswelt*. Christian faith is therefore deeply and primarily concerned with lived existence. Using concrete symbols like sin, grace, faith, which cannot be objectively defined, it calls upon the individual to make a decision. This decision involves a radical break with a self-centered and calculating mode of existence and leads to a new mode of life of faith, forgiveness and sacrifice. If lived authentically, it will not only transcend established

patterns of thought, but will establish moral patterns of action as well.

Wild envisages, for example, a growth in personal freedom, the preservation of small national groups, a world community exercising administrative powers essential for survival, education for creative use of growing free (leisure) time. What will the Christian Church do? It must maintain its liturgy and organic unity as a basis for the coming Christian world. But it will be less interested in the world and more in the lost and wandering sheep "who alone can bring this world to life by the exercise of a sacrificial freedom (p. 243)."

ERNST F. WINTER

2.

An important book by Charles C. West, assistant director of the Ecumenical Institute of the World Council of Churches in Geneva, discusses the attitude of five contemporary Protestant theologians to the challenge of Communism (*Communism and the Theologians: Study of an Encounter*, Westminster Press, 1958, pp. 399, \$6).

Dr. West first takes up the nature of the Communist challenge, the questions that Marxism has posed to the theologian. The responses of the different theologians are presented, and analyzed critically in the light of these questions. In each case, West asks if a real answer has been provided. A final chapter allows him to formulate a preliminary synthesis of what appears to him as the key to any full answer.

West reduces the questions raised by Communism to three. First, Marxism denounces every ideology, including that of religion. Question to the theologian: "How fares the Christian's conscience in this situation? Does his theology and witness express in truth only God's work in Christ, or does it reflect the interests of some social group, some other ideol-

ogy over against the Communist one? Does his faith explain the world to him, justify it and separate him from the needs of his neighbor who is out to change it? (p. 22)" Secondly, Marxism presents a vision of history, directed toward the success of the proletarian revolution and a classless society: "The Marxist vision of a classless society has caught the imagination and energy of millions and even for many who have reason to fear it, it seems to represent the only hope for society. How does the Christian hope engage itself with the lives of these people? (p. 24)" Thirdly, Marxism is a Promethean social humanism, raising further questions: "How seriously are social institutions dealt with as instruments, not only of order but also of exploitation, as embodiments of social group interest. . . . How effectively do our theologians affirm and love all the fullness of human life? (p. 25)"

In practice, West says, this leads to self-examination on three points: the rules to observe on the responsible uses of power, when one is able to use it in a political context dominated by Communism; the social and political solutions which Christians may propose in opposition to the "Communist order"; and the apostolate to the Communist considered as a human being. It must be said immediately that the first Communist challenge, that of ideology, is given greatest emphasis by the author, but that apart from a discussion of the political principles of John Foster Dulles and George Kennan, the apostolate to individual Communists is the problem that most concerns him.

Of the theologians studied, West believes that Emil Brunner represents a conservative and out-of-date response to Communism. To consider Communism as "*per se* evil," to say "No" to it without reserve because of its inhuman consequences in the practice of Communist

states, involves a double danger: first, a "total rejection of Communists because of their Communism (p. 47)," and next, "confusion of Christian faith and ethics with the values and traditions of western culture, and Christian action with the defense of western civilization, so that one is never quite sure which is primary (p. 49)."

It is only after this is said with considerable emphasis that West nevertheless recognizes that Brunner has the merit of taking the "fundamental challenge" of Communism more seriously than Christian leftists like John Macmurray, Harry F. Ward, Hewlett Johnson or Fritz Lieb, who are full of illusions in their attempt to reconcile Communism with Christian ethics. This important concession of West even raises the question as to whether it does not contradict his radical rejection of Brunner's position!

It seems that it is Brunner's acceptance of some notion of natural law which is the object of West's criticism. His heart is with Barth, and his lengthy presentation of the latter's theological principles is one of the most successful sections of his book. But Barth seems to him as bad a political analyst as he is a good theologian, and West refuses to follow him in the practical attitude he has adopted in regard to Communism. Has he not come close to accepting the position of Hromadka, who sees in Communism not only the judgment of God in history, but the very meaning of human history?

We leave Barth, then, when it is a question of analyzing political reality. Let us mention, however, although it may seem paradoxical, that in order to retain certain theoretical conclusions of Barth, West is forced to accept certain Barthian theses which most resemble those of Brunner, for example, that there exists "an ethical understanding

of created humanity . . . which may be known, perhaps better known, by the children of this world, even where there is no question of Christian revelation (p. 229)." This would imply the understanding that human nature has not been destroyed by sin, and that sin was not a sort of second nature for man. Here and elsewhere West agrees with Gollwitzer, with his emphasis on the idea of a western culture "serviceable to human beings, especially in comparison to Communism (p. 248)," and insists on the inadequacy of Barth who does not bring himself to recognize the possibility of the illegitimacy of political power (p. 308).

Thus, West is nearer to the post-war position of Reinhold Niebuhr, when he insists on the relationship between charity and natural law, and the value of democracy, than to the Niebuhr of the 30's, Marxist almost in the same sense as Hromadka, or to Tillich's former hopes for a "religious socialism" proclaiming the "kairos" of socialism (p. 99). Nevertheless, West cannot help having a secret preference for the way in which Tillich unreservedly accepted the Marxist criticism of ideology (pp. 92, 97), and Barth, under the same influence, rejects every form of Christian culture and "heteronomy" (to use a Tillich expression). As we have already said, it is Marxism's denunciation of all ideology which most strikes the author. Christianity should justify itself against this criticism, by refraining from bringing cultural formulas, concepts of natural law, or ideas for world organization.

By analysis, discussion, and confrontation of diverse opinions, we thus arrive at the personal position of the author, which seems even more radical than that of Barth in the acceptance of the Marxist principle of the criticism of ideology, the refusal of any Christian social ideal, or any use of the idea of

God to fill the gaps in the science of man or bring him help in action. Nevertheless, at the same time, the author insists on the fact that the mystery of Christ is not outside this world, and that the Christian has the duty of making a responsible use of power and of transforming political and social life. The Christian would thus have to do full justice to the secularization of human existence, science, social organization and even morality, and he would have to keep himself from violating, in the name of religion, the autonomy of this world; nevertheless, he is to live in conformity with the act by which God has healed this world by tearing it from sin and revolt.

Is there a contradiction here? Perhaps there would not be one if the author had been content to accept only a legitimate criticism of Christian pseudo-ideals—those which are only class ideologies and defense of vested interests—which surely exist. But at more than one point West seems to go beyond this, and to suppose, counter to his own conclusion, that religion has little to do with the world that man makes. "Realities such as death and the state of inner life of man are its legitimate sphere. But these appeal to the mature secular world as borderline problems, not as central tasks (p. 342)"! There is surely some incoherence in this position, which represents an uneasy reconciliation of the absolute renunciation represented by Barth's theological position, and the social-political commitment of Niebuhr or the Evanston meeting of the World Council of Churches.

The heart of the problem is that it is erroneous to accept, as West does, without examination or reserve, the critical question as posed by Marxism. First of all, it is notorious that there is a contradiction between the denunciation of ideology by Marxism, and its con-

struction of a vision of history or a social humanism, which is seriously tainted with ideology, even in terms of Marxist criteria. West recognizes this at various points, but does not seem to realize the further point that the theologian cannot accept indifferently *any* form of attack on ideology as a final criterion of value. The Marxist denunciation is more than a criticism of ideology; it constitutes an attempt to reduce everything to the level of economic reality. Whether we like it or not, it is not only the social pseudo-ideals of certain Christians which are here attacked, but the very mystery of the redemptive act of Christ, that of the divine reconciliation that He accomplished in this world, is doomed to unreality and abstraction. Have we a right, in accepting the Marxist criticism of ideology, to give Communism such a prize? Is it not rather a matter of recovering from Marxism, by means of a discussion of its own preconceptions, the terrain for a possible meeting of God and the world of man?

In brief, it must be concluded that the *doctrinal* discussion of Marxism is not as pointless as West believes. If he has given it so little attention, it is probably because he is thinking, ultimately, only of the situation of Christians behind the Iron Curtain, where the testimony in the face of Communism is in fact sometimes reduced, by the force of events, to the elementary actions of charity exercised from man to man. These acts often have the greatest evangelical efficacy, but nevertheless, we should not believe that in retaining only this aspect of testimony, we have surveyed the whole field of genuine encounter with Communism.

In this respect, is it not significant that under the title, *Communism and the Theologians*, the author has only studied the positions of a restricted group of theologians? To limit ourselves

to a country where the encounter of theology and Marxism has had considerable reverberation, why keep us in ignorance in regard to the thought of Henri de Lubac, Pierre Bigo and especially Gaston Fessard? Still in France, the reader would certainly have found interesting a comparison of the position of Hromadka with the views formerly proposed in a book like *Les Evenements et la foi*, in various publications of the group *Jeunesse de l'Eglise*, or in the important study of Henri Desroches, *Signification du Marxisme*? The present work would not only have gained in range, but the author would have been able to examine the impact of Communism on theologians in a particularly interesting case, rather than in a situation where the power is either monopolized by Communism (as in China, East Germany, or Czechoslovakia), or where, as in the United States (even in the 30's), Communism remained feeble both in organization and doctrine. In brief, are West's solutions valid for the encounter with a Communism which is both strongly organized and entrenched within a strong doctrinal shell, but situated in a country which still enjoys all the privileges of free discussion? In such a situation, is there nothing to do but what the author proposes?

The interest of his book is in the review that he makes of the principal positions of Protestant theology, and in this regard his contribution is excellent. Its limits derive from that of the area under consideration, for he thus omits some essential aspects of the encounter of Marxism and Christian theology.

JEAN Y. CALVEZ

3.

The tension between ethics and public power is of perennial concern to theologian and historian alike. In Reinhold Niebuhr's *The Structure of Nations and Empires* (Scribner's, 306 pp.,

\$5), we have a distinguished theologian turning to history for an illumination of this problematic relationship.

An examination of the anatomy of power in classic, European medieval, oriental, and modern societies leads Dr. Niebuhr to predict that the Western liberal democratic system will survive in the long run—barring an intervening nuclear holocaust, because the ultimate prestige-value which elicits the ever-necessary spiritual response from Western society is not dependent upon a religious ideology (as in the classic and medieval empires) nor upon a utopia (as in the Communist system). Rather, the strength of the liberal democratic creed rests in its ability to base its prestige upon its historical freedom from despotism.

Dr. Niebuhr examines the historical interaction of ultimate religious systems with politics, and concludes that this only serves to compound the moral ambiguity of the political order by masking the personal ambitions of the human element in politics behind an ultimate and transcendent legitimacy. His study thus finds that "the religious intrusion of ultimates is a source of confusion" in the practice of politics. In explicitly accepting Hume's tired thesis that history proves the necessity of such a distinction between personal and public ethics, Niebuhr makes too facile and without apology the leap from history to philosophy.

Nevertheless, Niebuhr admits to his scheme such an individual, personal sense of the ultimate as is symbolized by Christianity, which, "when creative, sets standards and frames of meaning which transcend the ambiguities of the political order and make the conscience of the individual the leaven of the community." In thus shifting the burden for the intrusion of morality upon politics into the arena of the empirically-determined consensus of free men, Nie-

buhr substitutes platitude for a confrontation of the central issue which requires illumination: how is the consensus of a mass democratic community, either in its secular or its moral dimension, arrived at?

The original utopian concept of "progress" which infused the Western revolt against traditional structures, Niebuhr concedes, is now obsolete. He rejoices that its place has been taken not by a set of transcendent ultimates but by a commitment to a concept of justice whose only touchstone is the absence of despotism. This is very thin ice for an optimist to skate upon.

In its historical treatment, *The Structure of Nations and Empires* ranges from the provocative ("It is sobering to observe that race prejudice is so intimately related to Anglo-Saxon achievements in empire that, indeed, it may even be basic to its success.") to the merely plausible ("Modern western culture has in fact acquired most of its distinguishing marks in political and cultural rebellion against papal dominion."). The analysis of the classical Chinese power structure utilizes the emperor's claim to divinity as a prestige-factor with no reference to the equally valid, but distinctly non-religious, claims of the Confucian ethic.

As a study in political history, *The Structure of Nations and Empires* is too broad in scope to validate its frequent generalizations; as a study in political ethics, it relies too heavily on that history to justify its existence.

MICHAEL E. SCHILTZ

4.

The socio-economic aspects of the Cuban Revolution, and the continuous dichotomy between Western economic interests and the social aspirations of peoples in Africa and the Middle East, give dramatic import to the work being

carried on for the past few years by a French group called *Economie et Humanisme*. A science of economics based on human needs and aspirations must replace the prevailing systems of self-interest, writes the group's director in preface to their second volume of a series called "Economics and Civilization." Human Economics, as defined by Father Lebreton and his co-workers, takes as its first principle respect for the whole man and for all men. It is not sufficient to have a somewhat detached good-will for our fellow men, we must want to see them live and develop in a truly human perspective—we must help them secure their rights and fulfill their obligations as men.

In this light, Western attitudes towards non-developed and underdeveloped nations become a problem of pressing urgency. Human Economics, Father Lebreton warns, will be nothing if it is not universal. If not applied now, it will be a lost chance to preserve the political liberties and social gains which Western democracies justly prize. But it must be remembered that liberal capitalism is the outgrowth of traditions, of movements and counter-movements, not shared by other cultures. Indeed, the forms of democracy are as diverse as the countries in which they are found. An American, for example, need not be reactionary to find a great deal of European economic life socialistic. Nor need he be a Communist to see in the most liberal Latin American republics a close partnership between the military and the political, between economic oligarchy and public administration.

Each country then, from the most highly developed to the most primitive, must be treated according to its own peculiar socio-economic metabolism. In almost all under-developed countries, the population is mainly rural. The mode of land ownership is rarely that

of private property. Local capitalism does not draw its capacity from a more or less atomized contribution of savings, but almost exclusively from self-financing. A large percentage of saving goes back in the form of dividends to the Western power, or is re-used in speculation on virgin islands or in enterprises promising a quick net return. The under-developed area is thus deprived of that investment capacity which would normally correspond to its productivity. Keynesian theories and techniques are therefore hardly applicable to regions where industry is, at best, still in the "Manchester stage" and where entrepreneurship and other economic factors show forms only vaguely akin to those of modern capitalism.

Another point to be remembered is, that in Western countries, transition from one type of socio-economic organization to another is made with relatively little upheaval, since portions of capital expenditure may be set aside for subsistence during the re-adjustment period. Attempts are made not only to maintain, but to improve social health and economic efficiency during the change from the old to the new. But in under-developed regions, such as Africa, where between 1870 and 1936, the lion's share of total capital investment was directed towards undertakings promising the greatest immediate net return, few provisions were made for the passage from tribal economic organization to a modern framework. To maximize profits, unskilled, indigenous labor (often migratory) was combined with readily exploitable natural resources. The result has been an economic pattern which tends to perpetuate itself, culminating, as in the case of South Africa, in legal strictures designed to prevent alteration in the production scheme. In such a system the indigenous socio-economic structure rap-

idly deteriorates through the draining-off of its able-bodied, more enterprising members into a sprawling, unskilled, urban proletariat. The problem of development in Africa, and elsewhere is no longer a narrow economic one. As Professor Frankel of Oxford suggests in his paper "Impact of Investments in Africa," the need is "more for capital of a kind which cannot yield, and should not be expected to yield, immediate net returns."

Such are the dimensions to which economics in the West must now accommodate its vision. All of the variegated forms and configurations of human society must be apprehended as inextricable parts of one vast kaleidoscope. But however self-evident this concept may appear, the distinguished economist François Perroux (cf. his article, "From an Economy of Avarice to an Economics for Mankind," *CROSS CURRENTS*, Spring 1953) deems it quite beyond the purview of either communism or capitalism. Both, he writes in "The Method of Generalized Economics and of an Economics of Mankind," are structurally imperialistic. They are both "creatures of modern technology," and must by their very nature encroach on the territory, the sovereignty and the independence of other nations, in order to feed their own centers of production and sell their goods.

The competence of *Economie et Humanisme's* specialists is, as usual, without question. One may disagree with some of the secondary themes advanced by one or two writers, but one cannot but be grateful to Father Lebret and his group for their provocative contribution to our understanding of the requirements for a Christian humanism in our times.

Economie et Humanisme, 99, quai Clémenceau, Caluire (Rhône), France, 2300f. for annual foreign subscription.

LÉON KING

5.

A crucial concern for every Christian today is studied at a profound level in Pie Régamey's *Non-violence et Conscience chrétienne* (Éditions du Cerf, pp. 380, 690f). The distinguished Dominican theologian is not only concerned with the absence of a definite status for conscientious objectors in France, but has written for anyone—and especially any Christian—who is willing to reflect on the implications of the life of the deeply spiritual, non-Christian Gandhi, which rejoins that of the purest aspects of the Sermon on the Mount. While experts remain stalled in their efforts to work out a suspension of nuclear testing, and torture is still an accepted practice in "civilized nations," it is surely high time for a serious Catholic study of non-violence.

Fr. Régamey's analysis makes clear that if non-violence is to have meaning, it must be positive; it should not only avoid causing physical harm to someone, but should involve a firm desire for the real good of one's adversary, a desire that will lead the man practicing non-violence to accept profound suffering. This fundamental attitude of total charity is capable, by reason of its exceptional, even "prophetic" character, to help the adversary to reflect, and eventually to make him change his mind. A consistent practice of non-violence is not easy; such an attitude requires morally exceptional people, living in psychic harmony; only such men will be able to bear this prophetic message. Those who have not attained this moral purity should not undertake it, but it is good that in this disturbed world there are courageous personalities who, in spite of all obstacles, misunderstandings and criticisms, clearly proclaim the reality and morality of a positive and absolute non-violence, and try to show its

relevance in our world. They should have no illusions; they should not expect that the world in general will follow them. They will at least have recalled to our eyes, often in a way that some will consider imprudent or inopportune, the madness of our hatreds and oppositions; violence solves nothing, even for the winners. The partisans of non-violence maintain that we have not seriously tried to wage peace. Fr. Régamey's book, like his earlier study of *Poverty* (Sheed & Ward), merits serious meditation, and should awaken many slumbering consciences. It breathes confidence in man's spirit, and especially in the action of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the Christian. Let us hope for an English edition as soon as possible.

JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

6.

"*Socialist Realism.*" The February 1959 issue of *ESPRIT* contains a revealing article with this title, penned by an anonymous young Soviet writer inside the USSR, before "l'affaire Pasternak." The significance of the criticism of Soviet officialdom appears heightened by the fact that the writer grapples with the idea of God, the ideal of Christ and love, and asks where the kingdom of God, the free Christian personality, the lived Gospel can be found in the West? "In losing Faith," insists the writer, "we have (at least) not lost the enthusiasm for the transformations God has wrought before our eyes." This document constitutes also a useful survey of Russian literature, past and present.

(E. F. W.)

PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION

1.

Introductions to the Bible. Two recent additions to the Canterbury paperback series (Sheed and Ward, 75¢ ea.) should be of help for the growing number of Catholic laymen who are beginning to study the Bible. The three essayists of *Pattern of Scripture* write easily, and succeed in encouraging the reader who is not yet familiar with Scripture or the various modern tools that might help him to become so. Cecily Hastings' sympathy for the problems of the new reader is real, and her suggestions of attitudes to adopt sound like the fruit of victorious personal experience. Fr. Vincent Rochford attempts to sketch "The Plan of God" for man as it can be seen through the Old and New Testament. Such an approach emphasizes the theme of fulfillment and should serve as a reminder that the reader should strive to see the Bible as a whole.

The last essay is a brief but convincing attempt by Fr. Alexander Jones to describe Mary's role in the Bible as it was conceived by Luke and John.

The second booklet, *The Bible in the Church*, is by Fr. Bruce Vawter, C.M., and is intended as a brief explanation of the role played by the Bible in the life of the Catholic Church. Vawter seems more interested in showing that Catholics read the Bible before the Reformation than in providing an historical survey, but does manage to provide considerable relevant material on his broad theme.

For a book-length introduction, it would be hard to find anything better than *The Christian Approach to the Bible* by Dom Celestin Charlier (Newman Press, \$3.50). The author has managed to digest the findings of contemporary Biblical scholarship and incorporate them in a beautifully designed book which is a pleasure to read. He

does not over-simplify the problems, but manages to avoid the specialist's jargon.

Charlier begins with a chapter on the history of the Bible within the Church, then takes up the texts, the geographical and historical background, "the human element" in the Bible, and ends with a statement as to what Christians (individually and collectively) may be expected to acquire through reading the Bible regularly. The only shortcoming is the lack of notes, bibliography and index, which will be missed by the many serious readers whom the book is sure to find.

Also deserving of mention is Fr. Ignatius Hunt's usefully informative survey of "Rome and the Literal Sense of Sacred Scripture," in the Spring-Summer AMERICAN BENEDICTINE REVIEW. Fr. Hunt's well-documented article discusses the complex meaning and importance of the "literal sense" in Scripture as it is contained in the constantly increasing magisterial directives on this point, as well as in the light of St. Thomas' doctrine and in relation to current Catholic exegetical opinion.

SALLY S. CUNNEEN

2.

Church and Parliament: The Reshaping of the Church of England. (Stanford University Press, \$5.00) In her excellently focused and well written account, Dr. Olive J. Brose traces the ins and outs of the political and ecclesiastical maneuvering which constituted the center of Church-State negotiations in a critical period of England's history. Her aim is to explain how and why in the middle decades of the nineteenth century the Church of England, rather than perishing, as many feared and some hoped it would, in fact underwent a metamorphosis from which it emerged intact if not unshaken. After an introductory section on the issues raised in

the highly charged atmosphere of the 1820's, Dr. Brose deals, in order with State policy as represented by Bishop Blomfield of London, and, finally, with the formation and growth of the important Ecclesiastical Commission that resulted from the efforts of men like Peel and Blomfield. The author then discusses briefly the relation of these developments to the possibility and place of religious instruction in a secularized, pluralistic society.

It is evident from Dr. Brose's careful analysis that the Church of England shared, in its own way, the experience of organized Christianity generally in the middle of the 19th century. Bishop Blomfield's comment on his own diocese of London—"I traverse the streets of this crowded city with deep and solemn thoughts of the spiritual condition of its inhabitants"—may remind the reader of Pius XI's famous words on the Church's tragedy during the last century in losing the working classes. Again, like the Catholic Church on the Continent, in a consciously pluralistic society become secular in its deepest motives and objectives, the Church of England lost her unique privileges as the teacher in faith and morals. Indeed, although it succeeded in maintaining its legal status as an "Established" Church, its leading churchmen failed to realize that this status made it, not the grand and appropriate expression of a Christian polity, but an ambiguous and paradoxical institution whose main function was now missionary work in its own parishes. A recent survey indicating that less than 10% of the English population regularly attends church suggests that such missionary activity as there was radically failed.

The immediate problems confronting organized Christianity in the 1830's were those raised by the industrialization and urbanization of a growing so-

ciety which had lost touch, on the intellectual as well as on the practical level, with the notion of "Christendom." Or if the notion was retained, its intellectual and practical ramifications in a society which was undergoing sweeping change were lost. There were notable exceptions—men like Newman and F. D. Maurice in England, and Father Hecker in America, but in the main churchmen failed to come to grips with the central issues of the day.

Beginning on the practical level with very nearly overwhelming problems of poverty and ignorance in the vast cities, the crisis gradually extended into the area of theology. When, in 1859, an intellectually impoverished and physically overworked clergy was confronted by Darwin's massive evidence collected on behalf of a new theory, the tragedy of losing the working-classes was compounded by the loss of a considerable part of the small body of intellectuals.

Dr. Brose makes no attempt to set her story in the centuries-old tradition of Church-State relations (as discussed, for example, in Père Leclerc's *The Two Sovereignities*), nor, understandably, does she concern herself with the later issues raised by the crisis of the Church of England in the middle of the last century. Nevertheless, theologians will find her account an illuminating study of a crucial phase in these relations. The problems faced by the Church of England in the 1820's and 1830's were unprecedented; they reflected the larger European crisis whose manifold implications have still to be fully confronted.

WILLIAM A. MADDEN

3.

Johannes Hessen. In his autobiographical *Geistige Kämpfe der Zeit: Johannes Hessen im Spiegel eines Lebens* (Nürnberg,

berg, Glock & Lutz, 1959, 276 pp.) we meet an outstanding personality of our times, born a peasant 70 years ago (Sept. 14): a compassionate priest, a gifted theologian, an original philosopher, a successful educator at the University of Cologne, a humanist in the service of truth and freedom. He has been a leader in both the *Una Sancta* movement and German pacifism since the early 20's.

When we accompany Hessen through his life story, we observe the development of a fertile mind, and the courage of his scholarly convictions (suffering censorship by Church authorities and persecution under the Nazis). The following is a short bibliographical guide, honoring the septuagenarian's work.

A theological dissertation, *Die Begründung der Erkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustinus* (1916) began Hessen's career of eminence among modern Augustinian scholars, followed by *Die unmittelbare Gotteserkenntnis nach dem hl. Augustinus* (1919), *Der Augustinische Gottesbeweis* (1920), *Augustinische und thomistische Erkenntnislehre* (1921), *Augustinus und seine Bedeutung für die Gegenwart* (1924), *Augustin Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (1931), and *Die Philosophie des hl. Augustinus* (1947). This concentration on St. Augustine led Hessen to a thorough re-evaluation of Platonism, ancient and modern. Critics consider *Platonismus und Prophetismus* (1953, 1955²) Hessen's maturest philosophical work. It demonstrates how scholasticism and neo-scholasticism fail in their attempt at synthesis and how their attempt must be made again in every age. Two subsequent investigations helped Hessen in arriving at such a synthesis for our time: first, his study of St. Thomas, second, the theological projection of the synthesis' implications. Milestones in the former are *Patristische und scholastische Philosophie* (1922),

Die Weltanschauung des Thomas von Aquin (1926) and especially the critical study of Thomism in *Thomas von Aquin und wir* (1955). The theological projection, on the other hand, in *Griechische oder biblische Theologie?* (1956) arrives at the formulation of a biblical theology and its methods.

The many philosophical works of Hessen strive towards a climax, a post-Thomistic synthesis of faith and reason, theology and philosophy. Such monographs as *Erkenntnistheorie* (1926), the critical analysis of 'causation,' *Das Kausalprinzip* (1928), *Die philosophischen Strömungen der Gegenwart* (1923, 1940²) *Das Substanzproblem in der Philosophie der Neuzeit* and *Die Methode der Metaphysik* (1932), *Die Geistesströmungen der Gegenwart* (1937), and *Existenzphilosophie* (1947) prepare the way for the three-volume textual deposit in *Lehrbuch der Philosophie* (1947-49, 1959²).

Within this grandly conceived framework (continuing into modern times the thought of Plato-Augustine-Kant, rather than Aristotle-Thomas-Hegel) Hessen is fascinated by a number of special problems. Foremost is a reformulation of "Wertethik" (value ethics). Hessen builds together with Windelband, Husserl, Scheler and Hartmann; rejects the scholastic axiom *omne ens est bonum*: arrives in his *Wertphilosophie* (1937) and *Ethik* (1954) at an autonomous ethics (like Dietrich von Hildebrand, Hans Reiner, Schöllgen, Guardini and others). From value ethics Hessen moves to phenomenology, then to the philosophy of religion. His philosophical dissertation, *Die Religionsphilosophie des Neukantianismus* (1919), *Die Kategorienlehre* Ed. von Hartmanns (1924) and *Die Werte des Heiligen* (1938), among others, prepare for a two-volume text *Religionsphilosophie* (1948, 1955²), written in exile.

A third fascination is Hessen's re-

evaluation of Luther. The picture which emerges goes beyond Denifle (immorality), Grisar (psychopathology), Lortz (subjectivism), and resembles, according to Hessen, the view of the Redemptorist St. Clemens Maria Hofbauer (irresistible desire for pious religiosity). Hessen describes Luther as a genuine *homo propheticus* in *Luther im katholischer Sicht* (1948).

Historically it was Hessen's dedication to *Una Sancta* which led to his Luther research; it was his own experience with scrupulosity that produced a sympathetic understanding of Luther (*Gotteskindschaft*, 1924). Consequently, Hessen's theory of biblical theology has been contributing to the theological grounding of *Una Sancta*, and his liturgical homilies to a heartfelt understanding between Catholics and Lutherans (*Das Kirchenjahr im Lichte der Frohschaft*, 1952).

Appropriately, this Christian humanist's last chapter in his latest work concerns *pax*. Man, the creature, is on this earth to become man, the image and likeness of God. Hessen is convinced that politics of universal reconciliation comes closest to fostering the unfolding in man of that divine spirit of truth, beauty, goodness and holiness. This 'vita nuova,' to which all of Hessen's lifework has been dedicated, grants us a vision of philosophical and theological integration with the modern world, of Church unity and of Christian peace. (Interested readers can send for a detailed bibliography, prepared by the writer of this note.)

ERNST F. WINTER

4.

The Darwin Centennial. The Summer 1959 issue of *THOUGHT* includes articles on Darwin and Darwinism by a biologist, philosopher, theologian, and historian. Alexander Wolsky ("A Centennial cautions against an uncritical and auto-

tury of Darwinism in Biology") maintains that "Darwin's great and lasting contribution to biology was a concrete, realistic and penetrating theory which changed the idea of evolution from vague speculation into exact science."

Robert W. Gleason, S.J. ("A Note on Theology and Evolution") emphasizes that the uniqueness of the origin of man must never be lost sight of in any theory of evolution, but he admits that "present-day theologians are far more moderate in their claims in this area than were their predecessors."

Vincent C. Hopkins, S.J. ("Darwinism and America") concerns himself "with the social aspects of the influence of Darwin's ideas, particularly in the United States."

While stressing the all-pervasive and ever-widening influence of evolutionary discoveries on philosophy, James Collins ("Darwin's Impact on Philosophy")

matic transformation of these discoveries or scientific hypotheses into philosophical conclusions. It is his contention that none of the major philosophical problems can be resolved by a simple reference to evolution. By way of substantiating his position Collins first locates the Darwinian discovery historically, and shows that its destructive consequences for theism and natural theology were of a definitely limited nature. He then analyzes some characteristic instances in which Darwinism influenced philosophy.

Professor Collins concludes that though the scientific sources of evidence influence, they "do not entirely determine the structure of an evolutionary philosophy." This is clearly seen by comparing Julian Huxley and Fr. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin who though proceeding from the same scientific data, formulate very different world visions.

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